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FOREWORD
In the initial, heady days after the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC), it was com-
mon to hear that hybrid courts would no longer be needed because prosecutions for atrocity crimes 
could go forward either at the ICC or at the national level. Now, after 16 years of operation of the Rome 
Statute system and with only three convictions at the ICC for core international crimes as well as limited 
progress in trying serious alleged perpetrators at the national level, there is a recognition that an ef-
fective system of global accountability requires more options. The choices cannot be only a single court 
in The Hague that is necessarily expensive, distant and easy for local leaders to demonise, and national 
systems that are often challenged to overcome legacies of dysfunction that led to impunity before the 
mass violence and then were further disabled by it.
This general recognition of the need for additional justice options, alongside the recent creation of new 
hybrid courts for the Central African Republic (CAR) and Kosovo as well as the agreement to establish 
one for South Sudan, make the publication of the Dakar Guidelines on the Establishment of Hybrid 
Courts particularly timely. Of course, the Guidelines are also very necessary because achieving justice 
against the interests of powerful actors, at any level, is never easy, and as the authors note requires 
“trade-offs among aims and features that are in some tension with each other”.
My own experience as the Prosecutor of the hybrid Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) followed my 
tenure in the Office of the Prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. It convinced 
me of the profound advantages of the hybrid approach 1.  However, even at the SCSL, I thought that 
the court was perhaps too internationalised. I wished that more could have been done to connect it 
to Sierra Leone’s own justice system so as to strengthen the future protection of the rule of law at the 
national level. 
As the Rome Statute recognises the primary responsibility of the national legal systems and admits 
cases at the international level only where there is clear necessity, the design and creation of hybrid 
courts should be internationalised only to the extent required to fil l  specific needs that cannot be met 
at the national level. If those needs can eventually be met domestically, then the hybrid court should 
be organised in a way that facilitates the transition.
THE USEFULNESS AND ADAPTABILITY 
OF THE HYBRID APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
By
Stephen Rapp*
* Stephen J. Rapp is a Fellow at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum’s Center for Prevention of Genocide. From 2009 to 
2015, he was Ambassador-at-Large heading the Office of Global Criminal Justice in the US State Department. Rapp was the Prose-
cutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone from 2007 to 2009 where he led the prosecution of former Liberian President Charles 
Taylor. From 2001 to 2007, he served as Senior Trial Attorney and Chief of Prosecutions at the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, where he headed the trial team that achieved the first convictions in history of leaders of the mass media for the crime of 
direct and public incitement to commit genocide. Before becoming an international prosecutor, he was the United States Attorney 
for the N. District of Iowa from 1993 to 2001.
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The deficiencies that require creation of hybrid courts include 1) inadequacy of legal tools available at 
the national level, 2) insufficiency of domestic judicial capacity, and 3) absence of the political will to 
deliver independent justice for core international crimes.
Legal tools are often lacking at the national level in that top leaders may benefit from traditional im-
munities and domestic law may not recognise command responsibility or modes of liability that reflect 
the ways in which mass crimes are typically perpetrated. In many countries, national statutes do not 
prohibit or define genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, particularly those committed 
during civil conflicts. While Article 15(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights per-
mits countries to apply international criminal law retroactively, such retroactive application of national 
law is sometimes prohibited by domestic constitutions or regional treaties.
In the case of former Chadian dictator Hissène Habré, the political will to try him in Senegal, his country 
of exile, eventually emerged, and there were international donors ready to assist Senegal in developing 
the necessary capacity. But the legal tools could not be provided by domestic legislation. In November 
2010, the Economic Community of West African States’ Court of Justice ruled that it was a violation of 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights for Senegal to try Habré under a retroactive domestic 
statute, and that this could only be accomplished by following the international practice of establishing 
an ad hoc  or special court. This was subsequently achieved by an international agreement between the 
African Union and Senegal to create the Extraordinary African Chambers, staffed entirely by Senegalese 
personnel except for two international judges, one to preside at trial and the other on appeal.
Another common deficit at the domestic level, particularly after devastating internal conflicts, is the 
lack of national capacity to investigate, prosecute, and try atrocity crimes in the national courts. If this 
were the only deficit, it might be remedied by the training of domestic personnel and the provision of 
resources to rebuild and equip the national system. However, international assistance may be hit-and-
miss, depending on the priorities of the donors, and may not result in a functioning judicial system. It 
may be particularly challenging to develop the capacity to try atrocity crimes given the complexity of the 
cases and the security threats posed by powerful perpetrators against witnesses and court personnel.
After the commission of mass atrocities in CAR in 2013-2014, transitional President Samba-Panza 
demonstrated the political will to seek justice for the crimes by referring her country to the ICC in order 
to pursue the major perpetrators and by creating a “special cell” to investigate and charge those at the 
mid and lower levels. Five months later, the head of the special cell told a UN fact-finder that his only 
success was in finally finding a “chair” from which to work. Several major donors put their resources 
into efforts to re-establish the ordinary courts that had been so starved that they had not conducted 
trials in the five years before the conflict. When I visited in September 2016, the ordinary courts had 
conducted a few long-delayed trials, but the prosecutors told me that there was no way that they could 
be sufficiently secure to try even those accused of low-level atrocity crimes.
The answer was the creation, under national legislation, of the hybrid Special Criminal Court (SCC). It 
has an international prosecutor, and a mix of national and international judges. Though the available 
funding is limited, it is sufficient for the facilities, security and personnel necessary to commence op-
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erations. The SCC has recruited legal and judicial officers from other countries that follow the French 
civil law system, so that the internationals can work comfortably with their CAR counterparts, gaining 
capacity by learning from each other’s knowledge and experience in ways not easily achieved through 
training courses alone. Because this was not a situation where political will was the obstacle deficit, 
the statute provided that the international judges were in the minority, and was structured so that they 
would be phased out over time.
In many other situations, it is the absence of political will that is the greatest hurdle to accountability. 
Particularly during and immediately after the commission of mass atrocities, state authorities are quite 
unlikely to be willing to pursue defendants who have control over state institutions or to pursue the 
leaders of opposing armed groups who have joined in power-sharing arrangements. To date, all hy-
brids have been created with the consent of the governments of the territorial states. While there are 
creative proposals for third-party states to pool protective and universal jurisdiction to reach crimes 
committed in unwilling states, the hybrid approach has not been a realistic option in situations where 
the territorial state is overtly hostile to accountability.
However, after the perpetrators of atrocities have been defeated in conflict, or after their removal from 
political power, the new national authorities may have an abundance of will to pursue these former 
enemies as well as former allies who may be become political competitors. Exclusively national trials, 
conducted by the victors of an internal conflict, are thus likely to be seen as unfair to parts of the 
population and can even sow the seeds of future conflict. It is a much better approach if civil society 
groups and international partners encourage the new leaders, perhaps as a condition of acceptance 
and assistance, to negotiate the creation of hybrid courts that will be seen to deliver independent jus-
tice. The resulting trials may end up being one-sided, but nonetheless fair. This is not an insignificant 
achievement, given that this was the outcome of international tribunals at Nuremberg and Arusha. 
Ideally, such hybrids could increase the possibility that serious perpetrators on more than one side of 
an armed conflict are prosecuted, as was achieved at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia and at the hybrid SCSL.
The SCSL met this test in its successful prosecution of the leaders of the pro-government militia, the 
Civil Defense Force (CDF). It is unlikely that significant convictions would have resulted if the SCSL stat-
ute had not provided for majorities of international judges in both trial and appeal chambers. In the 
three-judge trial chamber, the national judge voted to acquit the CDF defendants and in the five-judge 
appeals chamber one national judge voted to acquit and the other voted against the prosecution’s suc-
cessful appeal to increase the sentences for very serious crimes from six years to fifteen years for one 
defendant, and from eight years to twenty years for another. While the CDF prosecution was contro-
versial, the SCSL’s successful outreach program helped increase public knowledge of the evidence and 
fairness of the proceedings, and may have contributed to the general national perception, verified by 
independent surveys, that the court contributed to the country’s peace and security. In the process, the 
court also delivered a message to those combating insurgencies by “fighting fire with fire”: that these 
tactics escalate brutality and human suffering and should appropriately result in accountability even 
for those who fight on the “right side.”
Dakar Guidelines_v6.indd   6 15.07.19   07:51
D A K A R  G U I D E L I N E S
P A G E  v i i
The inclusion of international judges may be important in situations even where national participation 
is already balanced, but where a conflict has exacerbated divisions in domestic society. In Bosnia, the 
War Crimes Chamber of the State Court, established in 2002, included judges that were representative 
of the Bosnian Muslim, Bosnia Croat and Bosnian Serb communities. However, many victims and other 
witnesses were profoundly distrustful and even fearful of personnel who came from the same com-
munities as the charged perpetrator(s). Having international judges and other personnel reduced this 
tension and showed that justice could be delivered fairly by courts that included staff from a mix of 
ethnic, religious or national backgrounds. This did not require a majority of international judges, and by 
2009 the international participation was substantially diminished and by 2012 was ended completely. 
Nevertheless, the Bosnian War Crimes Chamber has been able to continue to deliver justice in trials of 
alleged perpetrators from each of the three communities.
The Dakar Guidelines draw on the experiences of people who were directly involved in all of the situa-
tions and accountability efforts that I have described. The authors have studied what has worked and 
not worked, depending on the context, and offer practical advice and guidance in designing solutions 
that will best fit the needs and political realities of differing situations. Most importantly, the Guide-
lines show the usefulness, potential creativity, and adaptability of the hybrid approach. They provide 
us and all those interested in achieving accountability with a roadmap for delivering justice in ways 
that are more fair, efficient, accessible, and beneficial for the victims and their future protection in the 
nations in which they live.
Stephen Rapp
July 2019
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1) INTRODUCTION, GUIDING 
PRINCIPLES, AND KEY TERMS
On 30 May 2016, Hissène Habré was convict-
ed for his role in crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and torture committed during his reign 
as President of Chad. Habré’s trial took place not 
in N’Djamena, but in Dakar, Senegal, where the 
Extraordinary African Chambers (EAC) were es-
tablished as a joint venture between the African 
Union and Senegal for his prosecution. The EAC’s 
creation represented the latest generation of hy-
brid courts, a tribunal type that usually employs 
both national and international staff and applies 
both national and international laws. It prose-
cuted Habré for international crimes for his in-
volvement in the arbitrary arrest and detention, 
rape, sexual slavery, and deaths of some 40,000 
people between 1982 and 1990. As the Habré tri-
al progressed in the Palace of Justice in Dakar, 
officials at the African Union were negotiating the 
creation of a hybrid court in South Sudan while, 
in the Central African Republic, the hybrid Special 
Criminal Court was being staffed and set up. 
 
This interest in hybrid courts has not been lim-
ited to the African continent. In recent years, 
courts that would blend various combinations 
of international and national law and staff were 
established for Kosovo (the Kosovo Specialist 
Chambers (KSC) and Specialist Prosecutors Office 
(SPO)) and proposed for Syria, Sri Lanka, Myan-
mar, and for the bombing of Malaysian Air MH17 
over eastern Ukraine, among other situations. 
Together, these institutions demonstrate the re-
turn of the hybrid in the realm of international 
criminal justice.
1 Sriram, Chandra, Globalizing Justice for Mass Atrocities: A Revolution in Accountability ,  Routledge (2005); Teitel, Ruti, Globalizing 
Transitional Justice ,  Oxford University Press (2014).
2 Skaar, Elin, Camila Gianella Malca & Trine Eide, After Violence: Transitional Justice, Peace, and Democracy ,  Routledge (2015).
3 United Nations Secretary General, “Guidance Note of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Approach to Transitional Jus-
tice” United Nations (2010), available at: https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/TJ_Guidance_Note_March_2010FINAL.pdf; United 
Nations, “Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” (2015), available at: https://sustainablede-
velopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld/publication; United Nations & World Bank, Pathways for Peace ,  World Bank 
Publications (2018), available at:https://www.pathwaysforpeace.org/; Thoms, Oskar N.T., James Ron & Roland Paris, “State-Lev-
el Effects of Transitional Justice: What Do We Know?”, International Journal of Transitional Justice ,  Vol. 4 (2010): 329–354.
Hybrid tribunals are one of a series of possible 
responses to widespread attacks on civilians and 
other acts deemed to be unethical and/ or il legal 
during conflict. One of the most dramatic shifts 
in international politics in the last thirty years 
has been the increase in the use of international 
or internationalised criminal justice mechanisms 
in post-conflict states. 1 Instead of conflict being 
resolved through political deal-making between 
elites and amnesties for fighters, perpetrators 
of what are now widely called ‘atrocities’ (a term 
which usually refers to genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes, plus, depending on 
context, ethnic cleansing and aggression) are of-
ten tried in ad hoc  or permanent international or 
internationalised criminal courts. These courts 
are intended not just to provide accountability, 
but also to underwrite stable and resilient peace. 2 
There is widespread support in international or-
ganisations such as the United Nations for the 
view that criminal justice is positively correlated 
with measures of peace, though little concrete 
evidence of this so far. 3 The ‘prosecution prefer-
ence’ is currently based more on principle and 
the preferences of interested parties (victims and 
survivors, but also state actors who might bene-
fit from delegitimising opponents) than evidence, 
in part because such evidence is tremendously 
difficult, perhaps impossible, to gather. These 
Guidelines should be read with the tensions in-
herent in the practice of international criminal 
justice in mind: prosecutions for atrocity crimes 
are justified by commitments to retributive and 
(to a more limited extent) restorative justice, and 
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are likely to be in the interests of diverse groups 
within affected states. However, any sense of the 
imposition of justice from the outside, in partic-
ular from states not willing to subject their na-
tionals to international(ised) justice mechanisms, 
can be counterproductive. 4 Tribunals can also 
be used to further factional or political interests 
rather than the interests of justice. 5 And criminal 
justice tends to be expensive, at times diverting 
resources from other forms of transitional justice 
(TJ) or development that may be preferred by vic-
tim communities. 6
The move to criminal justice responses to conflict 
is controversial, but well-established. 7 Its con-
temporary manifestation began with the estab-
lishment of the ad hoc  International Criminal Tri-
bunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda 
(ICTR and ICTY) in 1993 and 1994 respectively. 
The ICTY and ICTR were established by the UN 
Security Council under Chapter VII mandates, to 
prosecute individuals accused of serious viola-
tions of international humanitarian law. They had 
concurrent jurisdiction with national systems but 
could claim primacy over national proceedings. 
Neither tribunal was located in the state(s) in 
which crimes were alleged to have taken place, 
nor were there concerted efforts to populate the 
tribunals with local staff. The initial spate of hy-
4 For more on the relationship between bodies like the UN Security Council and the ICC, see Kersten, Mark, “A Fatal Attraction? 
The UN Security Council and the Relationship between R2P and the International Criminal Court”, in Jeff Handmaker and Kar-
in Arts (eds.) Mobilising International Law for ‘Global Justice’ ,  Cambridge University Press (2018); Jalloh, Charles Chernor, “The 
African Union, the Security Council, and the International Criminal Court”, in Charles Chernor Jalloh and Ilias Bantekas (eds.) 
The International Criminal Court and Africa ,  Oxford University Press (2017); Kaye, David, with Bryan Hance, Manal Hanna, Sunny 
Hwang, Elisabeth Levin, Grace Lo, Esther Yoo, and Xiangyu Zhang, The Council and the Court: Improving Security Council Support 
of the International Criminal Court ,  University of California Irvine, (2013).
5 Ainley, Kirsten, “Transitional Justice in Cambodia: The Coincidence of Power and Principle”, in Renee Jeffery (ed.) Transitional 
Justice in the Asia-Pacific ,  Cambridge University Press (2014).
6 Clark, Theresa M. Clark, “Assessing the Special Court’s Contribution to Achieving Transitional Justice”, in Charles Chernor Jalloh 
(ed.) The Sierra Leone Special Court and Its Legacy: The Impact for Africa and International Criminal Law ,  Cambridge University 
Press (2014): 765.
7 Ainley, Kirsten, “Excesses of Responsibility: the Limits of Law and the Possibilities of Politics”, Ethics and International Affairs , 
Vol. 25 (2011): 407-431.
brid courts can be seen as a response to the need 
to make justice for atrocity crimes more respon-
sive and accessible to local populations.
The first generation of hybrid tribunals was initi-
ated by the creation of the Regulation 64 Panels 
in the Courts of Kosovo and the Special Panels 
of the Dili District Court (SPDDC) in East Timor in 
2000. These were followed by the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the Extraordinary Cham-
bers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), the War 
Crimes Chamber of the Court of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina (BiH WCC), the Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT) 
and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). These 
hybrid tribunals were quite different in their es-
tablishment and design as compared to the two 
ad hoc  International Criminal Tribunals. The hy-
brids blended different elements and varying de-
grees of national and international law and staff. 
Some held proceedings in the relevant situation 
country, others in third-party states, and yet oth-
ers in both. Most made some claims to building 
capacity in domestic legal systems that had been 
damaged by conflict. All contributed significantly 
to the broader ‘system’ of international criminal 
justice. However, with the creation of the Inter-
national Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002 and an in-
ternational community increasingly prioritising 
funding for international security and combating 
terrorism, interest in creating additional hybrid 
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courts waned. From 2007-2014, the hybrid model 
had seemingly fallen out of favour with no new 
hybrid courts created during this time. 
Since 2014, however, the hybrid tribunal has 
once again emerged as a popular response to 
mass atrocities. The reasons for this resurgence 
of hybrid courts have been addressed at greater 
length elsewhere, but it is notable that the re-
surgence accompanied a recognition of the lim-
itations of the International Criminal Court. 8 The 
establishment of the ICC was expected to make 
hybrids redundant, but the shortcomings of the 
Court, in particular perceived politicisation and 
bias, meant that states turned once again to the 
hybrid model. 9 However, because hybrids were 
thought to be a relic of pre-ICC justice, there is a 
relatively limited academic literature on their es-
tablishment and impact. 10 Little has been written 
about how hybrids should be designed in order 
to ensure that they are both effective in achiev-
ing accountability as well as ‘resilient’, that is, 
able to withstand political pressures and contrib-
ute to the resilience of the communities in which 
they operate.
8 Kersten, Mark, “As the Pendulum Swings – The Revival of the Hybrid Tribunal.” In Christensen, Mikkel Jarle & Ron Levi (eds.) 
International Practices of Criminal Justice ,  Routledge (2017): 251-273; Van Schaack, Beth, “The Building Blocks of Hybrid Justice”, 
Denver Journal of International Law and Policy ,  Vol. 44 (2016): 169.
9 Guilfoyle, Douglas, “Part I- This is not fine: The International Criminal Court in Trouble”, Blog of the European Journal of In-
ternational Law  (2019), available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/part-i-this-is-not-fine-the-international-criminal-court-in-trouble/; 
Kersten, Mark and Angela Mudukuti, “Building bridges and reaching compromise: Constructive engagement in the Africa-ICC 
relationship”, Wayamo Policy Paper (2018), http://www.wayamo.com/archives/policy-paper-africa-and-the-icc-building-bridg-
es-and-reaching-compromise/;  Ainley, Kirsten, “The International Criminal Court on Trial”, Cambridge Review of International Af-
fairs ,  Vol.  24 (2011): 309-333; Ainley, Kirsten, “State Power, Head of State Immunity and the Crisis at the International Criminal 
Court”, in Alison Brysk and Michael Stohl (eds.) Contracting Human Rights: Crisis, Accountability, and Opportunity ,  Edward Elgar 
(2018) 179-93.
10 Notable exceptions include Ciorciari, John D, & Anne Heindel, Hybrid Justice: The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cam-
bodia ,  University of Michigan Press (2014); Cohen, David, Indifference and Accountability: The United Nations and the Politics of 
International Justice in East Timor ,  East-West Center (2006); Fichtelberg, Aaron, Hybrid Tribunals: A Comparative Examination , 
Springer (2015); Jalloh, Charles Chernor (ed.) The Sierra Leone Special Court and Its Legacy: The Impact for Africa and International 
Criminal Law ,  Cambridge University Press (2014); Meisenberg, Simon M. & Ignaz Stegmiller (eds.) The Extraordinary Chambers 
in the Courts of Cambodia: Assessing Their Contribution to International Criminal Law ,  T.M.C. Asser Press (2016); Williams, Sarah, 
Hybrid and Internationalised Criminal Tribunals: Selected Jurisdictional Issues ,  Hart Publishing (2012).
This is where the Dakar Guidelines for the Estab-
lishment of Hybrid Courts  (hereinafter “the Dakar 
Guidelines”) come in. The goal of the Dakar Guide-
lines is to provide a reference guide on the es-
tablishment of hybrid courts. As such, the Dakar 
Guidelines do not represent a roadmap, nor are 
they a best practices manual. Rather, the Guide-
lines offer national, regional, and international 
actors involved in the establishment of hybrid tri-
bunals a set of key decision points and design op-
tions that should be considered when establish-
ing and running a hybrid court. The Guidelines 
are particularly tailored to two purposes: (1) to 
highlight issues that have proven complicated or 
had long-term implications for past hybrid courts 
and so should be given special consideration in 
the design phase, and (2) to suggest design com-
ponents that may increase the resilience of the 
court (i.e., the court’s own capacity to act inde-
pendently and to resist political, financial, and 
other pressures), and the resilience of affected 
communities through engagement with the court. 
They further offer interested observers, academ-
ics, researchers, and students a comprehensive 
and coherent study of the hybrid court model. 
They are, in short, a practical set of guidelines on 
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the establishment of hybrid tribunals meant to 
be of utility to a broad array of constituencies.11
The Dakar Guidelines are an output of the Hybrid 
Justice Project. The project, which is a product of 
its members’ interest in the intersection between 
international criminal law and international re-
lations, focuses on hybrid courts and resilience. 
Resilience in this context refers to the ability of 
hybrid courts to withstand political and other 
pressures in order to deliver justice and account-
ability, while also bolstering the resilience of af-
fected communities. The interest of the project in 
hybrid courts is thus not on the traditional focus 
of efficiency, rates of convictions, prosecutorial 
strategies, or the value for money that hybrids 
offer. Rather, its interest is in the design options 
available to the creators of hybrid tribunals as 
well as how their design affects the resiliency of 
these institutions.
The Dakar Guidelines were drafted by a team 
that included academics whose research focuses 
on hybrid and internationalised tribunals as well 
as practitioners with extensive experience of es-
tablishing and working in such institutions. The 
goal of the project was to capture this expertise 
in a format that would be useful to those contem-
plating the establishment of hybrids in the fu-
ture. The Dakar Guidelines were drafted over two 
years and were informed by broad-based consul-
tations with a range of experts. Initial discussions 
for the Guidelines took place in March 2017 in 
London. This was followed by a drafting session 
in July 2017 in Dakar. Primary drafters were: 
Kirsten Ainley, Philipp Ambach, Elena Baylis, Fi-
delma Donlon, Mark Kersten, Tiyanjana Maluwa, 
and Angela Mudukuti. Ainley and Kersten under-
11 The Dakar Guidelines are not designed to be a handbook on the operation of hybrid courts. Lessons learned are shared on 
some aspects of hybrid practice, but the practice of running trials is not covered in any detail. Readers are referred here to the 
resources listed in Section 5(C) on Running Trials.
took subsequent drafting through 2018 and the 
Dakar Guidelines were finalised in 2019.
The drafters and contributors differ in their views 
of the record of hybrid tribunals to date, as well 
as in their perspectives on some of the topics 
discussed and recommendations offered in this 
document. But all share a commitment to the 
prosecution of acts that constitute international 
crimes. They similarly share a conviction that ac-
countability for international crimes is best en-
acted through the leadership of national actors, 
and with all due respect to domestic laws and le-
gal traditions. This should not be read to suggest 
that they believe that the prosecution of interna-
tional crimes can act as a panacea for the ills that 
generate and prolong violence or, in and of itself, 
resolve societal cleavages. The Dakar Guidelines 
offer suggestions on how to decide when the 
prosecution of atrocity crimes could have posi-
tive impacts and how to minimise possible nega-
tive consequences. 
The issues arising when designing a court are 
complex, and the Guidelines below endeavour 
to outline the choices available and to explain 
their advantages and disadvantages in different 
contexts. The Guidelines do not propose a single 
model to fit all situations. This is not a checklist 
or a box-ticking exercise. The Dakar Guidelines 
offer a series of lessons learned, questions to 
ask, and recommendations based on prior expe-
rience.
 
In each section of the Guidelines, we discuss the 
design choices to be made, their implications and, 
in many sections, recommendations. These rec-
ommendations are based on extensive research, 
the experience of the practitioners who have 
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been involved in drafting the Dakar Guidelines, 
reports by courts, legal practitioners and civil so-
ciety organisations, and academic literature (see 
Useful Resources in Appendix B for the key litera-
ture used). It is important to note, however, that 
many of the costs and benefits of different de-
sign choices, and the advantages and disadvan-
tages of establishing a hybrid tribunal, are still 
theoretical rather than proven. Those involved in 
establishing tribunals should keep in mind:
• Many of the long-term benefits that hybrid 
tribunals may offer are as yet unproven, so 
in pursuing these, hybrid designers will have 
to operate with a significant degree of un-
certainty. More is known about short-term, 
small-scale effects, and here, careful atten-
tion should be paid to prior models and their 
results.
• Once a desired aim or benefit is identified—
for instance accountability, capacity building, 
or outreach—structural features to promote 
that aim will need to be built into the tribu-
nal’s design in multiple organs and aspects of 
the tribunal. Resources will also need to be 
committed to ongoing mechanisms and pro-
cesses in order to support that aim.
• Some choices will come in the form of trade-
offs among aims and features that are in 
some tension with each other. In particular, 
hybrid 
• tribunals inevitably face tensions between in-
ternationalising and localising the key charac-
teristics of the court.
• Other choices will come in the form of deter-
mining how to best expend limited resources 
and limited jurisdiction in the face of complex 
conflicts and numerous offences.
• Context is a determining factor of success – 
there is not a single model of tribunal that 
12 https://hybridjustice.files.wordpress.com/2019/02/hybridsoveralllit.pdf
will work across contexts. While there are 
substantial lessons to be learnt from previ-
ous experience at hybrid tribunals, local re-
alities need to be taken into account in de-
signing hybrids in order to ensure that they 
achieve optimum forms of accountability in 
the contexts in which they operate.
In addition to offering guidelines and a reference 
guide on the creation of hybrid courts, the Da-
kar Guidelines also highlight the need to consid-
er evaluation criteria for hybrids from the out-
set. The final section of the Guidelines outlines a 
number of criteria against which such courts can 
be measured. As discussed above and in Section 
9 below on Evaluation, it is tremendously diffi-
cult to investigate whether hybrids are success-
ful in achieving or contributing to deterrence or 
reconciliation. But there are a number of other 
criteria against which these courts can be fair-
ly judged. Establishing evaluation criteria in the 
form of clear goals and benchmarks ensures that 
stakeholders can hold the court and its staff ac-
countable. 
The Guidelines are just one of the resources de-
veloped within the Hybrid Justice project. The 
project’s website contains key facts about each 
past and present hybrid court, including links to 
their founding legal documents, lists of the sta-
tus of cases as of January 2019, literature reviews 
specific to each court, and diagrams illustrating 
the organisational structure of each court. The 
website also features a dataset tool enabling 
users to compare features of past and present 
hybrids. Finally, the website contains a literature 
review of hybrid courts, available here, 12 and re-
views for each past and present hybrid, available 
via the Hybrids page. The literature review for 
each court focuses on analyses of the ‘ impacts’ of 
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these mechanisms. The reviews include articles 
that focus on internal evaluation, which analyse 
the court’s legal framework, jurisprudence, and 
functional effectiveness, and on external evalu-
ation, which analyse the impact of the hybrid on 
communities and individuals, the country’s do-
mestic justice system, and themes such as recon-
ciliation and healing.
The Dakar Guidelines also can be read alongside 
two complementary recent reports on interna-
tional criminal justice mechanisms. The Open 
Society Foundation’s Options for Justice report 
outlines lessons learned from previous mecha-
nisms of criminal accountability for grave crimes, 
including hybrid courts, as well as summarising 
the key features of thirty three previous mecha-
nisms. The ICTJ’s Lessons from Hybrid Tribunals 
documents the experiences and lessons learned 
in the establishment and operation of five hy-
brid or mixed courts (the BiH WCC, the ECCC, the 
STL, SPDDC and the SCSL). There are many more 
Useful Resources listed in Appendix B below. Ul-
timately, it is the hope of the drafters of the Da-
kar Guidelines that they are of use to all actors 
interested in the efficacy of hybrid courts and, 
in particular, to those actors involved in the ne-
gotiation, establishment, and operation of these 
tribunals.
A) GUIDING PRINCIPLES
 
1. The overriding objective of hybrid court 
founders should be to build a genuinely inde-
pendent institution, properly established in 
law, to maximise the integrity, effectiveness 
and legitimacy of its organs. 
2. The design of the hybrid court should respond 
as much as possible to the particular needs 
13 Ainley, Kirsten and Mark Kersten, “Hybridization—A Spectrum of Possibilities”, in Carlson, Kerstin, Sharon Weill and Kim Thuy 
Seelinger (eds.) The Habré Trial and Beyond: New Models of Prosecuting International Crime? Oxford University Press (2019).
and circumstances of the concerned state(s) 
and to the conflict or situation that gave rise 
to the crimes at issue.
3. Hybrid designers will need to make choic-
es about prioritising certain aims or bene-
fits over others, rather than attempting to 
achieve all the potential goals or benefits.
4. Continuous evaluation must be planned in 
from the outset, including by designing ap-
propriate, and where possible measurable, 
aims, goals, and benchmarks.
The Guiding Principles above are drawn from the 
lessons learned and design considerations de-
tailed in the Dakar Guidelines. Notably missing 
from these principles are suggestions for what 
the outcome objectives of a hybrid should be – 
for instance, ending impunity, promoting recon-
ciliation or stabilising a post-conflict state. This 
is because hybrids must be responsive to indi-
vidual contexts, and outcome objectives will dif-
fer across cases. As discussed in Section 9 below 
on Evaluation and Benchmarking Hybrid Mecha-
nisms, goals should be defined at an early stage 
of the design process and may be a mix of ambi-
tious targets (for instance, ending impunity for 
perpetrators of the gravest crimes; contributing 
to reconciliation between groups) and targets 
that hybrid staff have direct control over the 
achievement of (for instance, providing for fair 
trials to the highest standards).
B) KEY TERMS
There is no consensus on what makes a hybrid 
tribunal ‘hybrid’. 13 In the field of international 
criminal law, one hears the terms ‘internation-
alised’, ‘mixed’, and hybrid’, as well as the terms 
‘hybrids’, ‘hybrid tribunals’, ‘hybrid courts’ and 
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‘hybrid mechanisms’ used, sometimes inter-
changeably. For the purposes of the Dakar Guide-
lines, ‘hybrids’ is shorthand for ‘hybrid, interna-
tionalised, and mixed investigatory and criminal 
justice mechanisms’. Structural diagrams of the 
institutions that fall under this categorisation 
can be found in the Appendix A. We use ‘hybrids’, 
‘hybrid tribunals’, ‘hybrid courts’, ‘hybrid mech-
anisms’, ‘tribunals’ and ‘courts’ interchangeably 
in the Guidelines to avoid excessive repetition. 
‘National’ ,  ‘domestic’,  and ‘local’ are to all in-
tents and purposes interchangeable in the Da-
kar Guidelines. We acknowledge that in other 
contexts a distinction may be drawn between 
‘national’ and ‘local’ ,  but we are not drawing any 
such distinction in this document. Our focus is on 
the partnership between domestic actors and in-
ternational actors in general. National input and 
ownership are critical to the legitimacy of hybrids 
and should be prioritised at all stages of the es-
tablishment of hybrid courts.
‘Statute’ is used as shorthand for ‘statute or legal 
framework’, as a statute is often used to establish 
a hybrid, but other mechanisms of legal estab-
lishment are possible.
‘Section’, ‘office’, and ‘unit’  are used interchange-
ably to refer to administrative units or sub-units 
of a court. Hybrids differ on whether they set up 
separate units or sections within existing units 
to undertake functions such as victim participa-
tion. 14 
14 Useful glossaries which explain many of the terms used in the Dakar Guidelines have been written by the Coalition for the 
International Criminal Court (CICC), and the Centre for Justice and Accountability (CJA).
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Section 1) Summary and Key Recommendations
Introduction, Guiding Principles, and Key Terms
Since 2014, there has been a resurgence of hybrid courts as a popular response to 
mass atrocities. While the reasons for this shift have been explored in academic lit-
erature, little has been written about how hybrids should be designed to maximise 
their effectiveness and resilience. 
 
The Dakar Guidelines are a reference guide developed by the Hybrid Justice Project 
to support the establishment of future hybrid courts. They offer those working to 
establish hybrids a set of key decision points and design options. 
 
It is important to note that the costs and benefits of various design choices are still 
largely theoretical, rather than proven. At present, there are no reliable methods 
for evaluating the contribution of hybrids to some of the goals they are intended to 
achieve, namely social reconciliation, political transformation, and other transition-
al justice goals.
Guiding principles for hybrid courts include:
• Institutional independence from political pressure
• Responsiveness to the needs and circumstances of the victims and the con-
cerned state
• Selection and prioritisation among a range of possible aims 
• Continuous evaluation
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2) NEEDS ASSESSMENT
A comprehensive needs assessment should be 
undertaken as the first step when considering 
whether to establish a hybrid tribunal. Under-
standing the political, social, legal and economic 
contexts is essential. Such an appraisal of con-
text in the first stage of the Needs Assessment 
is what will ultimately determine whether or not 
a hybrid court is an appropriate mechanism to 
institute in response to mass crimes. The second 
stage of the Needs Assessment, which is carried 
out if a hybrid court is deemed to be appropri-
ate, will provide the basis for decisions about the 
scope of the court’s jurisdiction and its relation-
ship to the national legal system.
Needs assessments should be conducted by an 
advance team that is able to evaluate the specif-
ic context of the crimes to which a hybrid would 
be responding and the environment in which a 
hybrid would potentially be embedded. The ad-
vance team should constitute qualified national 
actors, such as legal professionals, civil servants, 
and civil society leaders—particularly those from 
organisations that represent victim populations. 
Additionally, it should include international ex-
perts, such as legal professionals who have 
worked in other international or hybrid criminal 
tribunals as well as international civil society rep-
resentatives who have a longstanding presence 
and expertise in the region. In general, it is useful 
to include expertise in the following areas in the 
advance team conducting the Needs Assessment:
• The investigation, prosecution and defence of 
relevant crimes at the domestic level
• The investigation, prosecution and defence of 
relevant crimes in international criminal law
• Victim needs, views and interests
• Attitudes towards justice in general, and spe-
cific justice mechanisms in particular, among 
key stakeholders in affected states and among 
likely donors The contemporary political, eco-
nomic and social contexts in the state(s) in 
which crimes took place and the state(s) in 
which a hybrid could be based
• The role of any third-party states and inter-
national organisations with significant polit-
ical and economic relations with the state(s) 
in question
• The history and dynamics of the crimes like-
ly to be prosecuted, and, where relevant, the 
conflict within which they took place 
• The establishment and functioning of hybrid 
courts.
Decisions on whether to establish a hybrid should 
be responsive to national preferences. The team 
conducting the Needs Assessment should work 
extensively with groups and organisations in the 
situation country to ensure that a broad and rep-
resentative appraisal of the preferences of the 
population is generated, and later incorporated 
into the design of any justice mechanism conse-
quently established.
If the decision is made that a hybrid tribunal 
would be useful and appropriate as a means to 
address crimes perpetrated in a given situation, a 
more detailed second stage of the Needs Assess-
ment should inform actors of how the tribunal 
should be designed.
It is important to stress that this process should 
not be rushed. There may be pressure from ad-
vocates as well as victims and survivors to get a 
hybrid court set up as soon as possible. However, 
it is important to gather sufficient information to 
decide if a hybrid is the right option, and, if so, 
to set it up in such a way that ensures that the 
court is independent and is an appropriate and 
effective response to the political crisis or con-
flict it is seeking to address. Ensuring that this 
is the case requires a thorough understanding 
of the political violence and criminality that the 
tribunal is responding to as well as the context 
in which it would operate. The legal context and 
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the available options for justice must be clearly 
understood. The impetus for a hybrid court might 
be the lack of ability to prosecute certain crimes 
within the domestic system, for instance if the do-
mestic system allows for head of state immunity 
or if there are concerns about retroactivity. The 
EAC was created (as opposed to using Senegalese 
domestic courts) because the Economic Commu-
nity of West African States (ECOWAS) Court ruled 
that a Senegalese statute enacted in 2007 could 
not be applied retroactively and that a court of 
‘ international character’ was required to prose-
cute Habré. 15 The May 2019 decision of the Ap-
peals Chamber of the ICC on the Bashir case es-
tablishes (controversially) that the ‘international’ 
character of a court can override head of state 
immunity. 16 Hybrid courts may therefore be use-
ful to overcome constraints within domestic law.
In the initial stage, assessing whether or not the 
state in which crimes were committed is willing 
and able to engage in the process of setting up a 
tribunal—and how—is crucial. It is also critical to 
listen carefully and actively to the sentiments of 
relevant local civil society organisations, particu-
larly those in a position to reflect and represent 
victims and survivors. If domestic civil society is 
in favour of prosecutions and the state is willing 
to support prosecutions but requests or requires 
external support, then additional actors in the in-
ternational community will need to be engaged 
to partner with the relevant state. These might 
include international organisations like the Unit-
ed Nations or regional organisations such as the 
African Union (AU) or European Union (EU).
Here, it is important to note that political context 
can and does change. Political sentiment towards 
15 ECOWAS Court of Justice, ECOWAS Ruling: Hissein Habre v. Republic of Senegal (2010). Available at: http://www.legal-tools.org/
doc/cb76bb/
16 Appeals Chamber of the ICC, Judgment in the Jordan Referral re Al-Bashir Appeal  (2019). Available at: https://www.icc-cpi.int/
Pages/record.aspx?docNo=ICC-02/05-01/09-397-Corr
international justice is anything but static, and 
a states’ interest in a hybrid court may be fluid 
through time. However, getting strong, vocal, and 
concerted commitment from the concerned state 
and civil society from the outset can help capaci-
tate tribunals to better weather any future polit-
ical storms and potentially increase the costs to 
national governments seeking to renege on their 
previous commitment(s) to accountability.
If the relevant state is open to the creation of a 
hybrid, the advance team will have to ascertain 
the specific individuals and institutions that they 
and the hybrid court’s staff can engage with. Dif-
ferent contexts will require different approaches 
in this respect. There may not be any issue in en-
gaging with representatives of states undergoing 
a genuine political transition. However, in other 
cases, there may be a need to engage with alleged 
perpetrators of international crimes who retain 
positions in government because the country has 
not experienced any genuine transition.
In situations where interlocutors may subse-
quently be persons of interest to the tribunal, the 
advance team and political figures involved in the 
design and creation of the court must take spe-
cial care to insulate the tribunal’s development 
from politicisation and, at all times, to avoid com-
mitments to particular prosecutorial decisions. 
They should also seek to guarantee the tribunal’s 
independence and ability to execute its mandate 
securely. Here, it might be useful for the advance 
team to get specific and public pledges of good 
faith and support for the hybrid from the rele-
vant state actors as a means to deepen national 
investment in the tribunal and, potentially, as a 
reference point if such support waivers in the fu-
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ture. Generally, it is good practice to seek only 
essential contact with anyone who may be impli-
cated, directly or indirectly, in the violence that 
led to the consideration of a hybrid court in the 
first place.
Hybrid designers should also pay attention to 
the possibility that government actors with rel-
atively clean hands might support the hybrid to 
undermine political opponents, which can affect 
the legitimacy of the hybrid among domestic au-
diences. Public contact with any political group, 
which might be perceived to indicate an align-
ment of views or objectives, should therefore be 
minimised.
In the second stage, the Needs Assessment 
should ascertain the appropriate temporal juris-
diction of any hybrid court by gathering the views 
of different affected communities on when the 
conflict effectively began and ended (if it is in-
deed perceived to have ended) and highlighting 
which alleged crimes would be under the juris-
diction of the hybrid given different choices on 
temporal limits.
The second stage of the Needs Assessment 
should also evaluate the security situation with-
in the concerned country. If the concerned state 
is still  unstable or the security of the court and 
its personnel cannot be ensured, then the court 
may need to be located outside of the relevant 
country. On the other hand, if the country is sta-
ble and the risk to court personnel and the court 
itself is low, then the court may be located with-
in the concerned state. This latter option is ide-
al because of the benefits for proximity to and 
engagement with the concerned communities, 
including domestic legal actors, victims, and the 
public.
The Needs Assessment will also need to consider 
the types of criminality that seem to have taken 
place, so as to develop a basis for determining 
the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. A no-
table trend in international criminal justice is the 
linkage of core international crimes (genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggres-
sion) with transnational organised crimes (such as 
corruption, piracy, terrorism, money laundering, 
trafficking of drugs and people, and the exploita-
tion of natural resources). Accordingly, the Needs 
Assessment should evaluate the prevalence and 
centrality of transnational organised crimes, as 
well as international crimes, to the period of po-
litical violence under scrutiny and the extent to 
which their perpetration was/ is linked. The same 
goes for national crimes, insofar as they reflect 
the specific national context of criminality that 
the hybrid court is supposed to respond to. Par-
ticular attention should be paid to whether sex-
ual and gender-based crimes (SGBC) took place.
Finally, a thorough understanding of the domes-
tic legal situation, existing national laws and rel-
evant constitutional norms and decrees, as well 
as the country’s policing, investigatory, prosecu-
torial, and judicial capacities will help to deter-
mine the additional resources that are needed 
to effect a hybrid court. This information should 
also inform designers’ thinking on the roles that 
national officials can have in the tribunal, the ap-
plicable procedural law, the extent to which ca-
pacity building initiatives will be beneficial or re-
quired, and whether any national legislation can 
be used or requires amendment.
Overall, it is hard to over-state how important it 
is that a sophisticated understanding of the na-
ture of the political crisis, political violence, and 
current state of security be established. That un-
derstanding will inform when, where, and how a 
hybrid court can be created, as well as the pa-
rameters regarding the violence and criminality 
that it is seeking to address. It will also instil an 
understanding of the causes and drivers of polit-
ical violence and atrocity—something that tribu-
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nals are often accused of not being sufficiently 
attuned to. 17 
Furthermore, decisions taken from the very out-
set of tribunal design will continue to resonate 
throughout the lifespan of the court, so that a 
careful, comprehensive needs assessment will 
be essential to its resilience. What follows in the 
sections below are guidelines on how hybrids can 
respond to identified needs, as well as details of 
current good practice in specific contexts.
A) CHECKLIST OF QUESTIONS FOR NEEDS AS-
SESSMENT
Stage 1 
The first stage of the Needs Assessment deter-
mines whether a hybrid court is necessary and 
appropriate. Questions to ask at this stage in-
clude:
1. What are the justice preferences of victims 
and affected communities? In particular, 
what is the relative importance of prosecu-
tions versus other mechanisms of transitional 
justice (such as a truth commission) to these 
groups? 
2. What are the alternatives to establishing a hy-
brid? Are any of them preferable to a hybrid?
3. Why is a hybrid being considered to address 
atrocities rather than national systems or the 
ICC (perhaps in conjunction with national sys-
tems)?
4. Do the local institutions and law enforcement 
authorities have sufficient capacity to investi-
gate and prosecute complex cases? 
17 Kersten, Mark, Justice in Conflict: The Effects of the International Criminal Court’s Interventions on Ending Wars and Building Peace , 
Oxford University Press (2016): 37-63.
5. Are the domestic judiciary sufficiently inde-
pendent, or is there a risk of political interfer-
ence with the local courts?
6. Is there a legal justification for establishing a 
hybrid, for instance to overcome constraints 
in domestic law on head of state immunity 
and/ or non-retroactivity? 
7. Under which system would fair trial rights be 
most likely to be upheld?
8. Would a hybrid tribunal fit within a larger 
framework of transitional justice where other 
mechanisms are also implemented?
9. Might a hybrid court divert resources/ fund-
ing/ staff from other potential transitional 
justice mechanisms, particularly those which 
have a high level of support from victim com-
munities? 
10. What are the key features of the political, so-
cial, security and economic landscape(s) that 
the hybrid would operate within and how 
might they impact the court?
11. What are the political, social, and economic 
drivers of the violence and crimes that the tri-
bunal is seeking to address?
12. Which domestic actors support the establish-
ment of a hybrid and why? Are their objec-
tives realistic? 
13. Which domestic actors oppose the establish-
ment of a hybrid and why? How likely are they 
to be able to critically undermine the func-
tioning of a legal mechanism?
14. Who are the key interlocutors in other con-
cerned states? Who are the relevant interna-
tional or regional organisations that are like-
ly to support the establishment of a tribunal 
and which actors are most likely to oppose it?
15. Which other actors would it be useful to gain 
support from? How could their support be 
achieved?
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16. What is the community of practice (especially 
within the domestic legal community) that the 
hybrid court could draw upon for expertise 
and staffing?
17. Is there sufficient national  interest in contrib-
uting funding, human resources, etc. to a hy-
brid?
18. Is there sufficient international  and/ or region-
al  interest in contributing funding, human re-
sources, etc.? Which regional or international 
organisations might take the lead?
19. Would funding from identified likely sources 
come with any (political) expectations that 
need to be identified and confronted?
20. Does a hybrid have a realistic chance of suc-
cess? Is it a justifiable use of resources given 
the alternatives?
Stage 2
The second stage of the Needs Assessment takes 
place once it has been decided that a hybrid court 
should be established. Questions to ask at this 
stage include:
1. How can the hybrid be designed to maximise 
local authority and ownership?
2. Where should the hybrid be based? Is the rel-
evant state able and willing to host the tri-
bunal? If not, what is the most appropriate 
location for the court to be based?
3. How long should the hybrid ideally be in op-
eration for?
4. What time-frame should the tribunal have ju-
risdiction over?
5. Which crimes should the hybrid have jurisdic-
tion over? 
6. What are the key features of the legal context 
within which the hybrid will operate? Can ex-
isting national laws be used, or would they 
need to be amended? 
7. What are the capacities, capabilities, and lev-
els of independence from political pressure 
of the domestic judiciary, legal personal, law 
enforcement agencies, etc? How can these be 
increased or supplemented if necessary?
8. How would victims ideally participate in the 
court?
9. Is there the potential for a trust fund for vic-
tims or a reparations fund to be established?
10. How can domestic and external opposition be 
confronted or managed from the outset? 
The Options for Justice report has further lists of 
Key Questions to consider in the Needs Assess-
ment and establishment phases of justice mech-
anisms, many of which are relevant to hybrids.
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Section 2) Summary and Key Recommendations
Political Environment and Needs Assessment
The Needs Assessment is an imperative first step when considering whether a hy-
brid court is appropriate and necessary after atrocity crimes. An advance team 
made up of legal professionals, government officials and civil society organisations 
from the affected country, alongside relevant international experts, should conduct 
the assessment.
 
Those establishing hybrid courts should also have a sophisticated understanding of 
the context of alleged crimes and current state of political affairs, which will inform 
key design choices.
There are two main stages involved in the Needs Assessment:
Stage 1
• This stage seeks to determine whether a hybrid court is necessary and appro-
priate for the context. 
• The determination should be based on information about the following (see 
page 12 for a checklist of questions):
• Victim preferences
• The capacity of existing justice systems to deliver justice
• Other transitional justice frameworks and ongoing justice efforts that would 
affect the jurisdiction of the hybrid court
• Political, legal, and security context in the affected country or proposed host 
country
• National and international commitment to criminal justice
• Dominant actors and potential spoilers
• Access to resources and funding
• The likelihood of a hybrid court achieving desired aims
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Stage 2
• This stage occurs if a hybrid court is deemed appropriate and necessary. 
• The second stage should assess the following (see page 13 for a checklist of 
questions):
• Capacity of national justice system and justice officials to contribute to the 
work of the hybrid court
• Jurisdiction 
• Access and participation for victims and affected communities 
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3) CONSTITUENT LEGAL DOCUMENTS, 
JURISDICTION, AND STRUCTURE
A) PROCESS OF CONSULTATIONS, STATUTE 
ADOPTION, AND IMPLEMENTATION IN LAW
As per the discussion above, the legal constitu-
tion and promulgation of a hybrid tribunal must 
be context-driven. It is important to engage rel-
evant national, regional, and international actors 
in the agreement to constitute a hybrid tribunal 
and in relevant consultations, drafting of the 
Statute or legal framework, and implementation 
of the hybrid.
Past hybrid courts have been constituted by bilat-
eral agreements between the relevant state exec-
utive (and sometimes also state legislature) and a 
variety of international and regional institutions. 
Examples of these institutions include:
• The UN Secretariat (SCSL; ECCC) 18
• A UN Mission, regional mission, or other tran-
sitional authority (Special Criminal Court in 
the Central African Republic (SCC); SPDDC; 
IHT; KSC; SPO)
• Another regional entity such as the African 
Union (EAC; the proposed hybrid court for 
South Sudan). 19
Sharing responsibility for the establishment and 
functioning of a hybrid court among domestic, re-
gional, and international actors ensures national 
input and access to justice, and may be a useful 
means of insulating the court from political ma-
nipulation as multiple actors have scrutiny over 
it. However, in cases where there is significant 
competition of interests among national actors, 
having an independent external authority take 
18 The ECCC was technically established by the domestic legislation that situated the Court, as envisaged by the Agreement be-
tween the UN and Cambodia, into the Cambodian legal framework.
19 The Hybrid Justice Project website provides more details of the legal constitution of each hybrid. Note that the STL was intend-
ed to be established by an agreement between the UN Secretary General and Lebanon, but it was eventually established by a 
UN Security Council resolution as the Lebanese parliament failed to ratify the agreement.
20 Hicks, Celeste, The Trial of Hissène Habré: How the People of Chad Brought a Tyrant to Justice ,  Zed Books (2018).
responsibility for implementation may be more 
in line with the interests of justice and of victim 
populations. This was the case, for instance, at 
the EAC, which was entirely independent from 
Chad. It should be noted that a significant cost 
of the lack of engagement with Chad was the fail-
ure of the EAC to secure the extradition of five 
of Habré’s co-accused. 20 Shared commitment and 
responsibility from all affected actors is likely to 
lead to better outcomes when it is possible to 
achieve.
In most cases, it will be critical for national spe-
cialists to be involved in the technical elements 
of tribunal design and for national authorities to 
signal their acceptance and support for the tribu-
nal at the political level, both so that the tribunal 
is designed to function effectively as well as to 
facilitate national collaboration and legitimation. 
This may require, where appropriate, that na-
tional authorities—including those from the min-
istries of justice, law enforcement, and security 
agencies—play a direct role in the drafting of the 
Statute or legal framework as well as any relevant 
legislation relating to the creation of the tribunal, 
such as a witness protection law or an extradition 
treaty. Domestic experts and officials who sup-
port the hybrid are well situated to identify the 
relevant existing legislation that can be utilised 
by the court, as well as any legislation that needs 
amendment for the court to function effectively.
Without leadership and support from domestic 
officials, institutions, and experts, the estab-
lishment of even a well-considered hybrid court 
could become an external imposition, which is 
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l ikely to undermine its effectiveness and legiti-
macy. National legal and political buy-in will l ike-
ly affect levels of domestic ownership as well as 
the presence and persistence of broad and pop-
ular acceptance of the tribunal’s existence and 
mandate. However, it also important to note that 
in situations where, for example, trust in domes-
tic institutions is low or domestic actors are pri-
marily responsibility for relevant crimes, external 
buy-in will be essential to the success of a tribu-
nal and its legitimacy. This is likely to be the case 
in any situation in which victims are alleged to 
have suffered at the hands of people who remain 
in power.
Domestic legal consent will affect the level of sup-
port that the establishment of a tribunal enjoys. 
This can be achieved by, for example, assenting 
and effectuating legislation in parliament which, 
depending on the existing domestic law, may re-
quire specific legislation approving the hybrid 
court’s statute. This was the case, for instance at 
the ECCC and the KSC. Alternatively, if the domes-
tic law does not require amendment to the legal 
code for the hybrid to be created, consent can be 
achieved by legislation committing the govern-
ment and state to supporting the tribunal. At all 
times, professionally drafted legislation regard-
ing the tribunal and its legal framework should 
be insulated from changes driven by overtly po-
litical interests.
Situations where domestic law needs to be creat-
ed or amended for the tribunal to be established 
are a potential opportunity for early capacity 
building, which is often a core goal of hybrids 
(see Section 7(b) below for an extended discus-
sion of capacity building). The process of drafting 
or amending domestic law can be used by hybrid 
designers,
ideally working with civil society organisations, 
in order to try to ensure that legal reforms re-
flect the highest appropriate standards of inter-
national human rights law. The process can also 
increase domestic understanding of relevant le-
gal texts and tools where there has been limited 
previous engagement with international law.
Regardless of whether a statute must be legis-
lated or whether the existing law is sufficient, it 
is important for all legal frameworks to provide 
absolute clarity in stipulating the material law 
that is applicable and the interaction between 
domestic and international law. Cognisance of 
and respect for relevant national procedural law 
is likely to be crucial to the effectiveness of the 
court in its context, as well as enhancing national 
understanding of and commitment to the court’s 
work and proceedings. Where key features of the 
national procedural law (such as a common law 
approach or an inquisitorial process) are replicat-
ed in the hybrid structure, national legal practice 
will be able to connect better to the hybrid insti-
tution.
Consultation with the public is critical in order to 
adequately represent the needs of the stakehold-
ers as well as to establish legitimacy amongst 
officials, civil society, victims, and the wider citi-
zenry, including opposition voices. This should be 
done at the Needs Assessment stage, and again 
after a professional and detailed statute/ frame-
work has been drafted which can be used to in-
form and structure consultations. This should be 
done not only to consider and understand the 
views and expectations of stakeholders, but as an 
early opportunity to:
• Create broad-based support and good-will
• Generate understanding from key actors in-
volved in the creation of the hybrid as to what 
the community’s grievances are
• Build a broad understanding of the tribunal, 
its functions and its limitations
• Manage expectations about what the tribu-
nal can achieve (and what it cannot) and how 
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quickly—this is particularly important for is-
sues of victim participation and, where rele-
vant, a reparations scheme, which should be 
planned in at the outset
• Help to establish the key concerns and likely 
criticism that a tribunal might face and give 
proponents an early opportunity to engage 
with and address this criticism
• Engage with non-affected populations in or-
der to build sympathy and understanding for 
the need for a tribunal 21
• Broaden understanding of how the hybrid 
court may interact and relate with other tran-
sitional justice or post-conflict, post-atrocity 
development goals
• Establish effective networks that can subse-
quently be engaged for outreach and feed-
back purposes.
An open appreciation and acknowledgement that 
victims and affected communities have divergent 
and diverse views, some of which may not be in 
line with those of the tribunal, is an important 
way to establish good will and open lines of com-
munications between the tribunal and those con-
stituencies. Further, understanding and making 
clear that no tribunal will be a panacea for the 
social and political harms done by conflict and 
atrocities is crucial to fostering trust among af-
fected and non-affected populations. Tribunals 
should ideally be seen as useful and necessary 
but limited tools to address past crimes and offer 
accountability, rather than as potential solutions 
to a wider range of societal il ls or as a drain on 
national resources and energy.
In some conflict-affected contexts, the ability to 
initiate a fully comprehensive programme of con-
sultations prior to the establishment of a court 
21 Quinn, Joanna R., “Cultivating Sympathy and Reconciliation: The Importance of Sympathetic Response in the Uptake of Transi-
tional Justice”, in Clark, Tom, Ravi de Costa, Sarah Maddison (eds.) The Limits of Settler Colonial Reconciliation: Non-Indigenous 
People and the Responsibility to Engage ,  Springer, (2016): 119-135.
may be severely limited as a result of political, 
security, and infrastructural issues identified in 
the Needs Assessment phase. Hybrid court staff, 
the government, and their partners should not 
use the lack of an ability to have pre-establish-
ment consultations as a reason to stop the pro-
cess of creating a hybrid or thinking about how 
to share information. They can also consider con-
sulting parties creatively, such as through radio 
programmes or broad-based leafletting. In such 
scenarios, more resources can also be focused 
on ensuring effective consultations during the 
process of implementation of legislation creating 
the hybrid tribunal as well as on outreach efforts 
once the hybrid is created. Indeed, as the hybrid 
tribunal’s work increases, so too will knowledge 
of it, requiring ongoing and consistent consulta-
tion with relevant segments of society. It is im-
portant to stress here, however, that unanimous 
support for the creation of a hybrid court is never 
likely to be achieved. International criminal jus-
tice is, by its very nature, a project that pushes 
uncomfortably against those who seek to retain 
positions of influence and power over others. It 
may also sit uncomfortably against expectations 
of reconciliation, truth telling, or other priorities 
related to transitional justice and post-conflict 
development. There will never be full buy-in from 
all actors and the entire population. Staff and 
supporters of hybrid tribunals should not pre-
sume otherwise.
B) JURISDICTION
To a significant extent, the jurisdiction of hybrid 
courts determines the impacts that they can have 
on achieving accountability for atrocity crimes 
and on attempts to address the past more broad-
ly. Care should be taken to ensure that the hybrid 
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has jurisdiction over the crimes that were identi-
fied during the Needs Assessment phase, recog-
nising that there will almost certainly be pressure 
from actors who might come under the jurisdic-
tion of the court to design jurisdiction in ways 
that exclude them but include their (political) op-
ponents. Hybrids are always at risk of allegations 
of being politicised, biased against those who 
fall under their jurisdiction and working in the 
interests of those who do not. There are limits 
to how far these allegations can be avoided, but 
drafters should at least consider the implications 
of decisions about jurisdiction in terms of which 
crimes or actors are included and excluded under 
different options. Reference back to the Needs 
Assessment should aid in making decisions over 
jurisdiction.
i) Concurrent and Primary
As a consequence of their ‘hybrid’ nature, it is 
important to clearly and formally spell out the 
relationship between hybrid courts and their do-
mestic counterparts. This will ensure clarity over
whether or not a hybrid tribunal has concurrent 
jurisdiction with national courts (i.e. whether the 
hybrid and national courts both have authority to 
hear the same or similar cases) and whether or 
not the tribunal can exercise primary jurisdiction 
over the authority of domestic courts—in other 
words, whether the hybrid has the authority to 
select its cases, including from those that nation-
al courts have concurrent jurisdiction over. In 
order to be effective in investigating and pros-
ecuting international crimes, hybrid courts must 
22 African Union, Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights  (2014). 
Available at: https://au.int/en/treaties/protocol-amendments-protocol-statute-african-court-justice-and-human-rights
23 Human Rights Watch, “Looking for Justice: The Special Criminal Court, a New Opportunity for Victims in the Central African 
Republic” (2018). Available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/05/17/looking-justice/special-criminal-court-new-opportuni-
ty-victims-central-african
24 Labuda, Patryk I.,  “ ’Open for Business’: The Special Criminal Court Launches Investigations in the Central African Republic”, Blog 
of the European Journal of International Law (2019), available at: https://www.ejiltalk.org/open-for-business-the-special-crimi-
nal-court-launches-investigations-in-the-central-african-republic/.
be able to cooperate effectively with and, if and 
when necessary, exercise authority over  national 
courts, prosecutorial services, and investigation 
services. Such situations arise when domestic 
courts are used, for example, in an attempt to 
shield perpetrators rather than prosecute them.
Drafters of hybrid tribunals must also be aware 
of the concurrent jurisdiction that the tribunal 
may share with regional courts and/ or the ICC. 
The former may become particularly relevant if 
the Malabo Protocol is enacted, expanding the 
jurisdiction of the African Court for Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) to include core interna-
tional crimes alongside an extensive catalogue of 
transnational and other crimes. 22 The latter is al-
ready of relevance to some hybrid courts, such as 
the Special Criminal Court in the Central African 
Republic. The SCC is investigating international 
crimes concurrently with the ICC and has a Memo-
randum of Understanding with it.23 The SCC’s stat-
ute cedes primary jurisdiction to the ICC. 24 States 
Parties to the Rome Statute which are involved in 
establishing hybrid courts should open lines of 
communication to the ICC early in the process, as 
the status of hybrids under the complementarity 
regime of the Rome Statute is not settled. Equal-
ly, it is not yet clear how the expanded jurisdic-
tion of the Malabo Protocol might affect hybrids, 
and the African Union should ideally be involved 
in discussions on jurisdiction for African hybrids 
in order to enhance regional commitment.
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ii) Subject Matter
Hybrid tribunals are tasked with investigating and 
prosecuting complex crimes and, in most cases, 
core international crimes. This generally includes 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and geno-
cide. It could also, where appropriate, include 
transnational organised crime (i.e. wildlife traf-
ficking, human trafficking, money laundering, 
il legal trade in arms, terrorism, etc.), as well as 
relevant crimes under national laws. The specific 
subject matter jurisdiction (i.e. which crimes the 
hybrid has jurisdiction over) of a tribunal should 
reflect the set of circumstances—and crimes—to 
which the tribunal is responding. These crimes 
must be clearly defined in the hybrid court’s stat-
ute. Relevant definitions, particularly relating to 
international crimes, can be sourced from ex-
isting legal documents such as the Geneva Con-
ventions, the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, other relevant treaties, and from 
the Statutes and jurisprudence of other tribu-
nals. However, it is important to note that there 
may be multiple international legal definitions 
for one crime, as is the case for crimes against 
humanity. (Note, however, that the anticipated 
Draft Convention for Preventing and Punishing 
Crimes Against Humanity may promote interna-
tional consensus on the definition of this crime 
and/ or provide a model definition for hybrids.) In 
addition, the drafters should know whether the 
national legal system has adopted the relevant 
international crimes as part of its national crimi-
nal code. If so, drafters should consider whether 
the Statute should refer to the national versions 
of these crimes (which increases legitimacy and 
could help to avoid criticism that the hybrid is vi-
olating the principle of legality) or to an interna-
tional version – and if so, which specific interna-
tional version. The drafters should also consider 
25 Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, Law No.05/L-053, art. 12 (2015).
whether to refer to other crimes under national 
law that may be particularly appropriate if there 
are distinctive offences as noted above. In ad-
dition, the Malabo Protocol can be drawn upon 
for definitions of transnational crimes such as 
piracy, terrorism, corruption, money laundering, 
drug trafficking, human trafficking and the ex-
ploitation of natural resources (noting that these 
definitions are not yet well-established in law, 
so definitions used in relevant national codes, 
if they exist, are likely to be less problematic at 
least in terms of legality).
Definitions of crimes can be tailored to the sit-
uation for which the hybrid tribunal is being de-
signed. Such tailoring is, however, controversial. 
Many would argue that the definitions of core 
crimes should be consistent and that amending 
them to fit particular situations risks creating 
confusion and narrowing the definitions to ex-
clude some acts. Any tailoring of offences should 
therefore be kept to a minimum and be clearly 
justified by the context.
In selecting among potential definitions of 
crimes, another important consideration is legali-
ty during the time period in question, particularly 
if considerable time has elapsed. The KSC Stat-
ute, for example, specifies that the court should 
apply the relevant international customary law 
and national law “as applicable at the time the 
crimes were committed”, so as to ensure non-ret-
roactivity. 25 This is also a concern in determining 
modes of liability, as discussed below.
Hybrid courts cannot do it all; nor should they. It 
is therefore important that prosecutors prioritise 
cases (see also the discussion below in Section 
5(a) on case selection). In most circumstances, 
this will mean that only crimes of a certain grav-
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ity and relevance to the given context should be 
eligible for prosecution at hybrid courts. A clear 
definition or set of guidelines regarding gravity 
will help the tribunal prosecute those accused of 
sufficiently grave crimes. Such guidelines could 
include both quantitative measures, such as the 
amount and nature of victimisation, incidence of 
violence, numbers of displaced persons (though 
absolute numerical minimums may be ill  ad-
vised), and qualitative measures, which could fo-
cus on the broader social, economic or political 
impact and consequences of the crime(s) on af-
fected communities. Note that gravity is not the 
only reason to select cases. There may be con-
texts in which prosecuting mid-level perpetrators 
is appropriate, for example where the ICC is pros-
ecuting the gravest crimes or where the hybrid 
has the objective of capacity building within the 
domestic system and so might want to prosecute 
a range of crimes including those deemed less 
grave, as, for instance at the BiH WCC.
In assessing the relevant domestic legal land-
scape to determine if the crimes defined can 
be prosecuted, the creators of a hybrid court 
will often have two choices if national laws have 
shortcomings: (a) rely on international legal stan-
dards (though note that there may be multiple 
legal standards in some cases) or (b) work with 
relevant national partners to revise and amend 
domestic law. The former has the advantage of 
likely being more efficient. The latter, however, 
presents an opportunity to enhance the domestic 
legal landscape and build the capacity of domes-
tic actors and institutions. Hybrid court designers 
and staff will need to balance these two preroga-
tives of efficiency and domestic impact.
It is essential that the subject matter jurisdiction 
of the hybrid court as it relates to national courts 
be made clear. In situations where there may be a 
national statute of limitations regarding crimes, a 
hybrid statute should deal with this head-on and 
clarify that no such statute of limitation applies 
to the (international) crimes under its jurisdic-
tion. The Statute should also address the ques-
tions of immunity and amnesties. This is par-
ticularly important if domestic law provides for 
immunity for the head of state or senior officials, 
or if peace agreements or other documents offer 
amnesties from prosecution under domestic law. 
In addition, the Statute of the hybrid court could 
be used by national actors to advance national 
law here, for instance by supporting or enabling 
national-level trials of historically under-investi-
gated crimes relating to sexual and gender-based 
violence, rape, or the destruction of cultural arte-
facts and historical sites.
Finally, it is important that the court has jurisdic-
tion over crimes against the administration of jus-
tice. The types of alleged crimes that a hybrid tri-
bunal investigates and prosecutes will invariably 
be politically sensitive. There will consequently 
be those parties and powers that will seek to 
avoid scrutiny or prosecution. Some may seek to 
subvert investigations and prosecutions by inter-
fering with witnesses or intimidating them or oth-
ers involved in relevant investigations or prose-
cutions. It is therefore essential that the tribunal 
be given jurisdiction over offences such as giv-
ing false testimony, presenting evidence known 
to be false, offences against witnesses, offences 
against court officials, and accepting or soliciting 
bribes as a court official.
iii) Temporal
The Statute of a hybrid court should set limita-
tions on the specific period that the hybrid is 
able to investigate. The temporal jurisdiction 
(i.e. which time period the hybrid has jurisdiction 
over) of a hybrid tribunal should accurately re-
flect the period of political violence and hostili-
ties under examination. The choice of temporal 
jurisdiction must also be communicated effec-
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tively to affected populations, as it will ultimate-
ly shape the narrative of political conflict under 
consideration. In other words, the time period of 
the court’s jurisdiction will signal to communities 
and outsiders a view of when the political conflict 
effectively began and ended.
While often appearing innocuous, there is a dis-
tinct danger in tailoring the temporal jurisdiction 
in order to limit a tribunal’s examination of par-
ticular actors’ conduct and alleged crimes. The 
SCSL’s temporal jurisdiction, for instance, began 
on 30th November 1996, which was the date of 
the Abidjan Peace Accord. This created a de facto 
amnesty for the first five years of the Sierra Leo-
nean civil war. Similarly, the ICTR’s temporal ju-
risdiction was limited to 1 January – 31 December 
1994, a period that covered the Rwandan Geno-
cide, but which ensured that any crimes planned 
or committed in the lead-up to the genocide as 
well as in its wake were left outside of the scope 
of investigation and prosecution. 26 It is import-
ant, therefore, for hybrid tribunal designers to be 
cognisant of the implications of their decisions 
at ‘both ends’ of a tribunal’s temporal jurisdic-
tion—i.e. how far back the jurisdiction of the hy-
brid court can reach as well as the cut-off point 
for when its jurisdiction ends.
It may be that alleged crimes outside of the tem-
poral jurisdiction of a tribunal are only brought 
to light in the course of the hybrid’s lifespan. This 
may result in the scenario of certain perpetrators 
escaping investigation and prosecution. In addi-
tion to undermining accountability, this can lead 
to disenchantment and disappointment among 
the population, particularly if the crimes outside 
of the temporal jurisdiction were, or are believed 
to have been, disproportionately committed by a 
26 Lanegran, Kimberly, “Truth Commissions, Human Rights Trials, and the Politics of Memory”, Comparative Studies of South Asia, 
Africa and the Middle East ,  Vol. 25 (2005): 111-121.
particular side to a conflict. Public consultation 
at the Needs Assessment and early establishment 
phases of the hybrid should help to ensure that 
alleged crimes are identified early enough to be 
taken into account when temporal jurisdictional 
limits are set.
At the same time, the temporal jurisdiction of a 
hybrid should not be so overly expansive so as 
to burden the tribunal with an impossible man-
date. Some crimes and some causes of conflict 
will inevitably be excluded in setting the tempo-
ral jurisdiction of tribunals. However, by gaining 
an appreciation for the causes and dynamics of 
the political violence or conflict, the Needs As-
sessment advance team as well as drafters and 
designers of hybrid courts can work to find an 
adequate, if not perfect, middle-ground. In par-
ticularly complex cases, they may also consider 
temporal jurisdiction ‘buffers’—a period of 1-2 
years before and after episodes of political vio-
lence and atrocity that can be invoked and thus 
‘added’ to the tribunal’s temporal jurisdiction if 
reasonable grounds to do so become apparent in 
the course of the tribunal’s work.
iv) Territorial
Decisions on territorial jurisdiction (i.e. which 
territory the hybrid has jurisdiction over)must 
also reflect an understanding of the situation as 
established during the Needs Assessment phase. 
If the geographical scope of the conflict was in-
ternational, the legal framework of the tribunal 
should reflect this if possible, so as not to create 
blind spots or zones of impunity. Territorial juris-
diction, however, may be limited by political fac-
tors, particularly if only one state is involved in a 
hybrid court’s establishment. The rules of terri-
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torial integrity of states might serve as a limiting 
factor where no UN Security Council mandate un-
der Chapter VII exists, as other states cannot be 
compelled to cooperate with the hybrid.
In those cases where the geographical scope of 
the conflict, including the geographical location 
of key protagonists, is limited to a particular 
state or region of a state, then the Statute’s pro-
visions on territorial jurisdiction should likewise 
reflect that.
v) Personal
The Statute of a hybrid court must clearly estab-
lish personal jurisdiction (i.e. which actors the hy-
brid has jurisdiction over, which is often framed 
in terms of nationals of specific states). This will 
invariably be linked to the territorial jurisdiction 
of the court. The hybrid tribunal should ideal-
ly have jurisdiction over any persons alleged to 
have committed crimes, including citizens of the 
state(s) under its jurisdiction and citizens of any 
other states who are alleged to have committed 
crimes in the territory within the temporal juris-
diction of the tribunal. Clearly elaborating person-
al jurisdiction is of particular importance where: 
i) crimes are committed  outside of the territory 
over which the hybrid has jurisdiction but were 
initiated  on the territory; ii) where the perpetra-
tors are not citizens of the state in which crimes 
took place; or ii i) where crimes were committed 
on the territory which the hybrid has jurisdiction 
over by perpetrators who were geographically 
distant. For example, former Liberian President 
Charles Taylor was prosecuted by the SCSL and 
convicted for aiding and abetting war crimes and 
crimes against humanity in neighbouring Sierra 
Leone. Drafters should in general err on the side 
of a broader personal jurisdiction, as criticisms 
27 Drumbl, Mark, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy ,  Oxford University Press (2012).
of former hybrids have often focused on the in-
ability or unwillingness of the courts to prosecute 
external actors who bore responsibility for grave 
crimes. In such instances, the relevant govern-
ments should work with international partners 
such as the UN and regional institutions if nec-
essary, to establish extradition treaties as well as 
other means of legal and technical cooperation 
and assistance.
It is important to be aware that some exceptions 
to personal jurisdiction may be advocated by 
states supporting the tribunal, for example, for 
United Nations peacekeepers or other personnel 
who are typically under the jurisdiction of their 
native states. These kinds of exceptions to juris-
diction are heavily criticised and risk undermin-
ing the independence and legitimacy of the court. 
It is important for hybrids to maintain indepen-
dence from donor states as well as the concerned 
state. Exceptions to personal jurisdiction should 
certainly be resisted if international peacekeep-
ers or other personnel were directly involved in 
the perpetration of atrocities during the relevant 
period under investigation by the hybrid court.
The Statute of a hybrid tribunal should also clear-
ly state the minimum age that is required for an 
alleged perpetrator to be prosecuted. The gener-
al standard amongst tribunals is 18 years. How-
ever, some tribunals, such as the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone, set the minimum age limit at 
15. There is no consensus age for adulthood, re-
flecting ongoing disputes about when individuals 
can express effective agency. Here again, draft-
ers must be context sensitive, and the alleged 
involvement of child soldiers in crimes, for ex-
ample, may affect the provision on age require-
ments. 27
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To date, the jurisdiction of hybrid courts has 
not extended to corporate actors. However, cor-
porate liability may be contemplated as a novel 
feature of new hybrids, especially given the pro-
pensity of corporate actors to be responsible for, 
or complicit in the commission of, atrocities. The 
investigation and prosecution of corporate actors 
could arguably be handled by prosecuting the 
few key decision makers of relevant corporations 
individually.
The Options for Justice report has useful lists of 
Key Questions to consider when designing juris-
diction.
C) MODES OF LIABILITY
Modes of liability should also be clearly spelled 
out within the Statute of any hybrid tribunal. 
Because modes of liability are an evolving and 
controversial area of international criminal law, 
careful attention to the current state of jurispru-
dence and experience in this area is advisable. As 
a general rule, national doctrine should apply if 
it adequately addresses the types of crimes and 
modes of involvement identified in the Needs As-
sessment. However, national law may not have 
been drafted to address situations of atrocity 
crimes and so may not sufficiently address the 
specifics of the conflict. In particular, interna-
tional modes of liability, including joint criminal 
enterprise, indirect (co-)perpetration, conspiracy 
(to commit genocide), and command responsibili-
ty, may better address prosecutions of high-level 
leaders who directed but did not personally en-
gage in atrocities, and so might be appropriate 
to include in the Statute of the hybrid. As noted 
above in the discussion of definitions of crimes 
under subject matter jurisdiction, it is import-
ant to consider questions of legality during the 
timeframe in question in determining modes of 
liability, to ensure non-retroactivity. For modes 
of liability not already specified within domestic 
legislation, amendments to national law may be 
required.
D) COMPOSITION
The sections below discuss the principal organs 
that must be established within hybrid mecha-
nisms, along with options for variation depending 
on context. This variation can also be seen in the 
diagrams of the structures of previous hybrids 
provided in Appendix A of these guidelines.
There are several key design choices that recur 
in staffing various organs of the tribunal. These 
include:
• Whether to include both international and na-
tional staff
• How to balance numbers of international ver-
sus national staff if including both, including 
whether the balance should shift towards 
more national staff over time 
• Minimum qualifications for each category of 
staff
• Staff characteristics that promote the smooth 
operation of the tribunal, such as staff lan-
guage ability, experience in a shared legal 
tradition, experience in other international/ 
hybrid tribunals, representation of national 
ethnic groups/ religions and/ or regional rep-
resentation
There are also several key aims that must be bal-
anced in making design choices:
• Independence of the tribunal
• Security of personnel and witnesses
• Efficient functioning of the court
• Facilitation of capacity building and coopera-
tion between national and international staff 
within the tribunal
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• Facilitation of external connections with na-
tional courts, civil society, and government 
for purposes of cooperation, publicity of the 
court’s activities, capacity building, and norm 
penetration within the wider system, legacy, 
and perceived legitimacy 28
There is no single model of national/ interna-
tional composition that suits all cases, though 
a useful principle to work from is ‘as national 
as possible and as international as necessary’. 29 
When establishing a hybrid that is intended to be 
a transitional institution and lend itself to great-
er domestic ownership and participation over 
time, consideration should be given to designing 
a temporally limited model (for example, 5-years 
reviewable for extension) in which authority, 
staff composition and responsibility for funding 
moves from the international to the national in 
controlled phases. This is the case, for example, 
with the War Crimes and Organized Crime Cham-
bers in the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina. See section 3(e) on Funding for further dis-
cussion.
i) Chambers
The powers of the Pre-Trial (where relevant), 
Trial and Appeals Chambers, as well as the Pre-
siding Judge (where one is appointed) should be 
established in the founding Statute. The gener-
al choice of model, particularly in the Pre-Trial 
Phase (Pre-Trial Chamber or a juge d’instruction/
investigative judge), should be influenced by the 
28 See Section 7(b) below for an extended discussion of capacity building.
29 The ICTJ’s Handbook on Complementarity sets out the arguments for the prosecution of atrocity crimes being as national as 
possible, see Seils, Paul, Handbook on Complementarity: An Introduction to the Role of National Courts and the ICC in Prosecut-
ing International Crimes ,  ICTJ, (2016), available at: https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ_Handbook_ICC_Complementari-
ty_2016.pdf
30 See Appendix A below.
prevalent legal system in the host state. Mirror-
ing the structure of the legal system in the host 
state has the potential to enhance local identifi-
cation with and support for proceedings. Of criti-
cal importance is to have a clear definition of the 
roles of the Pre-Trial versus the Trial Chamber 
(which maybe be elaborated in law or in relevant 
rules of procedure and evidence (RPE)).
Composition of Chambers: 
A key decision for the drafters of a hybrid tri-
bunal is the extent to which they choose to mix 
the composition of chambers between nationals 
and internationals. There is no universally appro-
priate approach to this issue, as reflected in the 
practice of hybrid courts to date. 30 Some tribunals 
employ a majority of national judges, while others 
have minorities, and the KSC has solely interna-
tional judges. Thus far, there have not been any 
hybrid courts that have begun their tenure with 
solely national judges, although and as noted 
above, the BiH WCC transitioned from a mix of in-
ternational and national judges to solely national 
judges over time. The ECCC has a different struc-
ture that has been widely criticised and should 
generally be avoided; it has a majority of national 
judges but requires that judicial decisions be ei-
ther unanimous or have a ‘super-majority’ (four of 
five in the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers or five of 
seven in the Supreme Court Chamber), meaning 
that national judges cannot outvote internation-
als even though they have a simple majority. This 
was a reasonable compromise to try to prevent 
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political pressure on national judges affecting de-
cisions of the ECCC, but it has led to deadlock.31
Deciding on the domestic-international split is no 
easy task and every choice here carries its own 
risks. But the prevailing principle must be to en-
sure that the court is insulated from undue polit-
ical influence. Considerations include:
• The number and availability of national judg-
es to serve
• The risk of political influence on, or threats 
to, national judges 
• The experience of national judges with inter-
national criminal law or complex cases 
• The resources of the national court system to 
investigate and try cases
• The availability of international judges with 
experience in international criminal law or 
complex cases 
• Factors affecting the independence, impar-
tiality, and expertise of international judges 
• The possibility of capacity building amongst 
international and national judges.
In situations where the tribunal is addressing a 
transitional state, with little political stability and 
potentially few remaining legal staff, there may 
be reason to favour a majority of international 
judges – at least at the initial stages. However, 
the court should not be an external imposition 
on the state and affected communities, and the 
inclusion of national judges and staff mitigates 
against this to some extent as well as offering 
potential local capacity building in the investiga-
tion, prosecution and adjudication of complex in-
ternational crimes. The model of the War Crimes 
Chamber in the Court of Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina was a creative way to ensure that authority 
31 Open Society Justice Initiative, Political Interference at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia ,  Open Society Insti-
tute (2010).
passed from international to domestic level over 
time: international judges were given a limited 
tenure, to be replaced by national colleagues.
In balancing these interests, the findings of the 
Needs Assessment will be of critical importance. 
In a situation in which political influence from the 
national government or other powerful national 
actors is a serious risk, the need to safeguard 
the impartiality of the court is paramount and it 
will be important to ensure a majority of interna-
tional judges in each panel, or even an entirely 
international bench in extreme cases. However, 
where the risk of national political influence is 
lower, greater proportions of national judges 
may provide the benefits of closer connections to 
the national justice system, as well as serving the 
general principle that international involvement 
should be the minimum necessary to achieve the 
hybrid’s goals. Attention should also be paid to 
whether there are risks of interference from out-
side the host state, and how these could be miti-
gated through the composition of Chambers.
If capacity building is a priority consideration 
(see also Section 7(b)), then there must be a mix 
of international and national judges within each 
panel or grouping. However, designers should 
be aware that simply placing national and inter-
national judges together in the same court or 
panel will not produce effective capacity build-
ing at either national or international level. Rath-
er, specific measures must be taken to promote 
these ends, such as investing in formal train-
ing sessions, selecting judges with experience 
in mentoring programs, or providing incentives 
for mentoring to take place. In addition, shared 
characteristics should be taken into account 
when selecting international and national judg-
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es, such as shared language and legal systems, 
or anything else that will facilitate collaboration. 
Finally, but critically, capacity building must be 
understood as a process of knowledge exchange 
that works both ways. Domestic legal systems in 
post-conflict contexts may lack capacity versus a 
well-resourced international system, but hybrid 
tribunals are an opportunity for mutual learning. 
National and international judges will each be the 
source of valuable but differentiated expertise.
In severely conflict-affected states, the selection 
of national judges and officers of the court should 
take into consideration the size and strength of 
the national legal community. Hybrids should 
undoubtedly capitalise on the expertise and skill 
of domestic legal practitioners. However, there 
is a real risk of a legal ‘brain drain’ in situations 
where the legal community is small. This can have 
adverse effects on transitional states, which ‘lose’ 
key legal figures to tribunals who would otherwise 
be potentially instrumental in the transition. This 
is a particularly salient risk where hybrid courts 
pay significantly higher salaries than that of pub-
lic institutions. Entering the higher-paid work of 
tribunals may also have the longer-term effect of 
keeping those legal professionals out of public 
service for extensive periods of time if they gain 
skills and capacities that lead to careers in inter-
national criminal law outside of the country.
Selecting Judges:
Key issues that should be considered in develop-
ing standards and processes for selecting judges 
include:
• Design of employment contracts (see section 
on HR/ administration)
• Consideration of having a roster of judges 
rather than judges on permanent salary
• Guarantees to protect impartiality and inde-
pendence
• Minimum qualifications of candidates
• Knowledge of ICL and/ or domestic criminal 
law and procedure
• Knowledge of the relevant conflict situation 
and other political and social contexts
• Whether to include international as well as 
national judges
• How to balance the use international and na-
tional judges, if including both
• National judges’ characteristics beyond mini-
mum qualifications, i.e. language ability, any 
experience with ICL or complex domestic cas-
es
• International judges’ characteristics beyond 
minimum qualifications, i.e. language ability, 
experience in a similar legal tradition to na-
tional judges, regional affiliation, any experi-
ence with ICL or complex domestic cases
• Representation issues, e.g., gender, ethnic, 
and religious representation
The quality and professionalism of judges is criti-
cal for the real and perceived legitimacy of inter-
national tribunals. In order to ensure that judges 
who will uphold the highest legal standards as-
sume positions in the tribunal’s chambers, hybrid 
courts should include minimum provisions for 
the qualification of judges.
It is particularly important that judges are se-
lected for their impartiality and independence. 
In conflict-affected states, the risk of judges sid-
ing with domestic political actors or being influ-
enced by political actors can be significant and 
can severely damage the credibility of a tribunal. 
As well as being able to demonstrate impartiali-
ty and independence, all judges who are selected 
should also:
• have experience as judges in criminal cases
• have a strong understanding of relevant 
law(s)
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• show sensitivity to relevant cultural norms 
(for instance around the disclosure of sexu-
al and gender-based crimes and awareness 
of the potential for cultural bias in legal pro-
ceedings
• demonstrate an understanding of the rele-
vant conflict situation
There is also a need to ensure, among judges as 
well as staff in general, gender balance in the 
chambers. Beyond minimum qualifications, the 
efficient functioning of the court and ability of 
the judges to collaborate will be facilitated by 
selecting judges who share a common working 
language to the extent possible, as well as by 
selecting judges who share a common legal tra-
dition with each other and the concerned state. 
The legitimacy of the court may benefit from se-
lecting judges representing the full range of eth-
nic groups, religions, and other important social 
groups when possible.
In addition to stipulating the minimum qualifica-
tions of judges, hybrid courts should also spell 
out the duration of terms of judges and establish 
a fully transparent and fair procedure of select-
ing judges and the President of the tribunal as 
well as allocating judges to the various chambers 
(pre-trial, trial, and appeals). The independence 
of the selection panel is of the utmost impor-
tance. Without exception, procedures that effec-
tively permit governments to appoint their own 
judges should be avoided. The judicial selection 
procedure of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers is 
an example of particularly good practice — see 
Article 28 of the Law on Specialist Chambers and 
Specialist Prosecutor’s Office.
32 Hobbs, Harry, “Hybrid Tribunals and the Composition of the Court: In Search of Sociological Legitimacy,” Chicago Journal of 
International Law ,  Vol. 16 (2016): 482-522. Available at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol16/iss2/5
In order to attract highly qualified internation-
al judges, several factors are important beyond 
setting minimum and desired qualifications. The 
location of the court, including its accessibility to 
international travel and its security will affect the 
interest of foreign personnel in serving as judges 
on the court. This is not to suggest that the ap-
peal of a location to international judges should 
be part of the considerations when deciding 
where to base a hybrid, but a court seen as inse-
cure will have more difficulty attracting high cali-
bre judges. The duration of the appointment and 
of the anticipated lifespan of the court is another 
factor.The type of employment contract offered, 
including salary, benefits, and other features will 
also matter.
Several of the recent tribunals, including the EAC 
and the SCC, have hired exclusively or primari-
ly from the concerned region (broadly defined). 
This may be useful in enabling the court to at-
tract highly qualified personnel who may have 
useful connections with national personnel, such 
as a shared language or legal background. In 
some circumstances, regional staffing may also 
enhance the perceived legitimacy of the court.32
Judicial Standards:
In order to maintain high professional standards, 
hybrid tribunals should adopt a Code of Judicial 
Ethics. The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Con-
duct, which have been endorsed by the UN Com-
mission on Human Rights, the UN Commission on 
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice and the UN 
Economic and Social Council, sets out six princi-
ples:
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• Independence
• Impartiality
• Integrity
• Propriety
• Equality
• Competence and diligence. 33
The International Principles on the Independence 
and Accountability of Judges, Lawyers and Pros-
ecutors contains practical guidance on the im-
plementation of judicial standards, along with 
the text of relevant international and regional 
standards and norms. 34 In addition, The Oslo Rec-
ommendations For Enhancing The Legitimacy Of 
International Courts lay out good practice stan-
dards and principles for the appointment and 
practice of judges.
ii) Office of the Prosecutor
The role of the Prosecutor should be clearly de-
fined in the Statute: is the Prosecutor to be a par-
ty, and thereby fully committed to finding incrim-
inating evidence? Or are they called on to seek 
incriminating and exonerating evidence in order 
to find the truth? Early ad hoc and hybrid tribu-
nals such as the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL tended to 
be highly adversarial, while other tribunals have 
used a less adversarial and more inquisitorial or 
truth-seeking approach. Such a strategy may help 
to mitigate concerns about the limited resourc-
es of the Defence, though past practice suggests 
that prosecutors will not always secure and dis-
33 Judicial Integrity Group, Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct  (2006). Available at: https://www.judicialintegritygroup.org/
jig-principles. See also the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Commentary on the Bangalore Principles (2007). Available at: https://
www.unodc.org/documents/nigeria/publications/Otherpublications/Commentry_on_the_Bangalore_principles_of_Judicial_Con-
duct.pdf
34 International Commission of Jurists, International Principles on the Independence and Accountability of Judges, Lawyers and Pros-
ecutors  (2007). Available at: https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4a7837af2.pdf
35 Pitcher, Kelly, Judicial Responses to Pre-Trial Procedural Violations in International Criminal Proceedings ,  T.M.C. Asser Press (2018).
36 International Commission of Jurists, International Principles on the Independence and Accountability of Judges, Lawyers and Pros-
ecutors (2007). Available at: https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4a7837af2.pdf
close exonerating (or generally useful) evidence 
to the Defence. 35
The independence of the Office of the Prosecu-
tor (OTP) is paramount to any tribunal’s success. 
It is fundamental to the integrity, credibility, and 
legitimacy of the court. In exercising their discre-
tion in case selection, the Prosecutor should not 
seek or act upon any instructions from external 
sources that would undermine the independence 
of the OTP. The International Principles on the 
Independence and Accountability of Judges, Law-
yers and Prosecutors includes a useful section on 
the role of prosecutors as well as the text of the 
UN guidelines on this issue.36
Separating politics from the selection of the Pros-
ecutor can, at times, be difficult insofar as states 
seek to have high-level representation at interna-
tional tribunals and courts, and often attempt to 
influence post occupancy through budgetary con-
tributions and political support. It is notable, for 
example, that every Chief Prosecutor of the SCSL 
was an American national, with the exception of 
one who was British. But all must be done to en-
sure that prosecutors are not selected in order to 
influence the decision-making of the OTP.
As with judges, the procedure to select the Prose-
cutor must be transparent, fair, and devoid of any 
political interference or manipulation. The ten-
ure of the Prosecutor must also be clearly spelled 
out. The Prosecutor must be a highly qualified in-
dividual with experience in international criminal 
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law or complex domestic cases, an ability to work 
in the main language of the court (see Section 
3(h)), and someone who will not be affected or 
susceptible to political interference.
As with all staffing decisions at hybrid courts, 
there remains the question of the division be-
tween national and international staff within the 
OTP. The considerations described above in the 
section on judges are important to consider here 
as well. One key option to bear in mind is a divi-
sion of labour whereby the chief prosecutor is a 
national and the deputy prosecutor is an interna-
tional, or vice versa. Again, this should be decided 
on a case-by-case basis depending on variables 
and information identified in the Needs Assess-
ment process. If there are deep national, eth-
nic, political, regional, or social divisions in the 
relevant country, for example, it may be wise to 
avoid a national chief prosecutor from any sector 
of society whose selection may stoke, rather than 
alleviate, communitarian divisions—irrespective 
of the other merits of their appointment. In the 
prospective Hybrid Court for South Sudan, for 
example, where political violence wrought upon 
civilians is the result of long-standing ethnic divi-
sions, the decision has been made that the Chief 
Prosecutor cannot be a citizen of South Sudan. 
In such cases, it may be feasible and wise to en-
sure that multiple communities are represent-
ed in the court by, for example, having multiple 
deputy prosecutors drawn from different groups. 
This could also help elevate productive working 
relationships across societal cleavages that could 
inspire similar collaboration outside of the court. 
There is also a general need to ensure gender 
balance among staff in the OTP.
Ultimately, there is no ‘Goldilocks Zone’ for mix-
ing international and national staff in the OTP or 
any other organ of a hybrid court; there is no ‘just 
right’. Designing hybrids is very much an imper-
fect science where any decision will have trade-
offs. But any decision-making on this subject 
should be led by an effort to select a constellation 
of actors, which can elevate national buy-in, pro-
mote judicial and prosecutorial independence, 
and enhance the effectiveness, fairness, and effi-
ciency of prosecutions.
As with the Chambers, in order to maintain high 
professional standards and demonstrate internal 
accountability, hybrid tribunals should adopt a 
code of ethics for counsel and investigators, to 
elucidate the ethical standards of the OTP. The 
Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel at the 
SCSL is available publicly, but does not include 
specific provisions on investigators. The Code of 
Professional Conduct for Counsel and Prosecu-
tors at the KSC has more detail on investigations. 
A procedure to disqualify the Prosecutor should 
be developed to handle situations where the 
Code of Ethics is breached. Article 42 of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court on the 
OTP may serve as a suitable baseline template.
iii) Defence Provisions
The overall priority of a court is not to achieve 
convictions but to ensure fair trials. It is thus im-
portant to focus on this primary aim in the plan-
ning and implementation phases and elaborate 
provisions for the Defence as well as for inves-
tigations and prosecutions. Article 14 of the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), the African Charter on Human and Peo-
ple’s Rights (ACHR) and the European Conven-
tions on Human Rights (ECHR) set the thresholds 
that must be met by courts with regards to provi-
sions for the rights of the Defence. In particular, 
an accused has the right to select counsel or, in 
the event that an accused is indigent or partially 
indigent, they have the right to have funds pro-
vided by way of a legal aid scheme provided by 
the court in order to enable their defence.
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From the start of the negotiations to establish 
a hybrid tribunal, it is important to ensure that 
the rights of the Defence are guaranteed in sub-
stantive and procedural law. Included in the legal 
framework should be the international standards 
of due process enshrined in relevant conven-
tions and treaties, such as the ICCPR and region-
al human rights conventions, as well as applica-
ble national constitutions. After the adoption of 
constituent documents and once implementation 
and deployment of personnel is initiated, the de-
fence component should be functional. In oth-
er words, throughout the planning and building 
phase, a defence component should be in place.
There are a number of models for defence struc-
ture, resourcing and support — see the Hybrid 
Justice website for a comparison between tribu-
nals. 37 The STL established its Defence Office as a 
separate organ of the court, and the Bosnia State 
Court established an independent defence office 
that had licensing authority over lawyers who 
wanted wanted to practice before the court. But 
most hybrids have relied instead on an indepen-
dent office attached to the Registry that supports 
both defence and victim counsel. The ICC follows 
a similar model with external defence counsel, 
although the Office for Public Counsel for the De-
fence is incorporated into the court structure and 
established to assist external defence teams.
It is imperative that the role of a defence office 
vis-à-vis  that of defence counsel is clarified from 
the outset, including the limits of the Defence Of-
fice’s (non-privileged) relationship with the vari-
ous accused. This is particularly so where, at the 
time of initial arrests, defence office staff may 
be required to step into the role of duty coun-
37 See the Hybrid Justice Project’s website at www.hybridjustice.com.
38 Prosecutor v. Sesay et al. ,  19 June 2006, SCSL-04-15-T-584, §§ 41-43. See also Ashraph, Sareta, “The Naked Defence Office”, in 
Charles Chernor Jalloh (ed.) The Sierra Leone Special Court and Its Legacy: The Impact for Africa and International Criminal Law , 
Cambridge University Press (2014).
sel until defence counsel have been appointed. 
Within the SCSL, the failure to properly delineate 
the role of the Defence Office led to recurring 
tensions between the Defence Office and the de-
fence counsel. This led to a written ruling on the 
institutional role of the Defence Office within the 
SCSL. 38
To guarantee the rights of the Defence, counsel 
should be well-resourced and as independent of 
the court as possible. A separate defence office 
is costly and can threaten the autonomy of the 
Defence. However, when defence support is in-
stitutionalised in this way it demonstrates that 
the rights of the defendants are being taken seri-
ously by ensuring that funds are available for ac-
cused who are indigent; it also creates pathways 
through which the Defence can raise institutional 
issues. Note, however, that the way that the De-
fence is treated structurally does not resolve the 
issues around equality of arms. Defence lawyers 
at previous hybrid tribunals have observed a con-
tinuing problem of unequal funding and resourc-
es regardless of the structural position of the De-
fence. A strong and properly resourced defence 
is one of the fundamental signs of legitimacy of 
any court.
As the hybrid court will be able to adopt its own 
rules of procedure and evidence, it is essential 
that it ensure that defence rights are represent-
ed during the drafting and review process, for in-
stance through inclusion of a defence lawyer in 
the process. It is also important that the court’s 
governing framework include the possibility for 
the formation of a defence association and for 
the association to be able to propose amend-
ments to the rules of procedure throughout the 
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duration of the court’s work. Such an association 
of defence counsel is key to ensuring that the 
voice of the Defence is properly represented in 
institutional decision-making, especially where 
the Defence remains outside the immediate court 
structure. Examples include the Association of 
Defence Counsel before the ICTY and ICTR, and 
now the International Residual Mechanism for 
Criminal Tribunals (MICT), as well as the ICC Bar 
Association before the ICC.
Defendants should have as much freedom as pos-
sible to choose their legal representatives. Again, 
there are a number of models, but often the Reg-
istry will generate a list of approved counsel. 
Examples of counsel selection and appointment 
procedures can be found in Rule 44 and 45 of the 
ICTY RPE and regulations 67-78 of the ICC’s Regu-
lations of the Court. Quality control is necessary 
to ensure that lawyers have the experience and 
expertise required to effectively defend their cli-
ents. They may be required to complete a training 
course in relevant areas of international criminal 
law as well as in the relevant amended domes-
tic legislation and to subsequently remain on a 
list of counsel available to accused persons at 
the tribunal. In the case of Bosnia, the office also 
provided mentoring and training programmes for 
lawyers. This is a model for hybrids that intend to 
use lawyers in a national bar association rather 
than incorporating the Defence Office as an inte-
gral part of the court.
Finally, defence counsel and investigators should 
be bound by a code of ethics for counsel and in-
vestigators (see Section 3(d)(ii) above).
iv) Registry
The Registry plays a critical role in the structure 
and operation of hybrid courts. Its powers should 
be clearly established within the legal framework 
of the tribunal. Generally, the Registry has two 
main functions: the provision of judicial support 
services and overall administration of the tri-
bunal. By centralising the many administrative 
functions into one organ, i.e. the Registry, it is 
possible to rationalise expenditure and build an 
effective and robust administrative framework for 
management of hybrid courts and donor funds.
In terms of the judicial support function, the 
Registry provides services required by judges 
and other parties to the proceedings. This en-
tails the management of day-to-day work in the 
courtrooms, along with additional responsibili-
ties that, in a domestic system, would be spread 
across various ministries and other authorities 
such as the ministries of justice and/ or security. 
Judicial support includes management of a legal 
aid scheme, administration of a victim participa-
tion scheme, management of detention services, 
court management, language services, as well as 
witness protection and support.
The Registry also provides security for the tri-
bunal’s premises, general services for all users 
of the court, procurement, as well as finance 
and human resources management. As a rule, 
the Registrar is responsible for preparation and 
management of the budget, including liaising and 
securing cooperation with donor States or other 
responsible bodies. In addition, the Registrar ex-
ercises a number of external relations functions 
with states and other partners. For example, it 
cooperates closely with states to finalise enforce-
ment of sentences agreements as well as witness 
relocation agreements. Lastly, outreach pro-
grammes are generally managed by the Registry.
An efficient registry can help to ensure that oth-
er organs stay focused on implementing their 
respective mandates rather than focusing on 
administrative matters. With the effective man-
agement of the witness and victim support func-
tion together with the court management and 
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language services function, the Registry can also 
ensure that proceedings run as smoothly as pos-
sible without encountering delays.
Staffing the Registry:
To fulfil its functions, it is essential that registry 
staff can work impartially in a model which incor-
porates both national and international staff. In 
general, it is beneficial to avoid having a majori-
ty of staff that are from one or faction or group 
involved in the conflict, as this can lead to fur-
ther and avoidable tensions or misperceptions of 
the tribunal. It is also important to avoid a sit-
uation whereby civil society or victims’ groups 
may perceive a bias or security risks due to the 
composition of the court’s management team. 
In situations where there is an existing national 
structure in place into which the hybrid tribunal 
is being added, it is critical to assess and deter-
mine if there is any history of leaking or any risk 
to the management and custody of the most con-
fidential court records.
v) Victim and Witness Unit
A robust system of victim and witness protec-
tion is essential to the operation of a court, in 
addition to being the ethical duty of hybrid court 
staff. As many hybrids operate in contexts in 
which there is minimal documentary evidence of 
alleged crimes, the quality of justice depends to 
a large extent on eyewitness testimony. To put it 
starkly: if witnesses and victims do not trust that 
they will be protected, they will not participate 
in proceedings, and cases will l ikely fail. Even 
worse, if witnesses and victims are not in fact 
protected, then their association with a court set 
up at least in part to advance their interests may 
lead to their experiencing intimidation, violence, 
and other harms.
The law establishing the tribunal must clearly 
spell out obligations in order to ensure the se-
curity, safety and well-being of people who tes-
tify or cooperate with the court, as well as their 
families, where relevant. This should include a 
commitment from the host state to provide an 
appropriate level of security. An example of such 
an obligation might read: ‘The government of 
[relevant state] shall ensure, within its territory, 
the protection of all parties and witnesses in the 
trial for the entire duration of the proceedings.’
The legal framework should also include the cre-
ation of a victim and witness unit (VWU) in order 
to provide protection and support for prosecu-
tion and defence witnesses and victims. 
In previous hybrids, VWUs have been indepen-
dent. For example, the Victim Support Unit at the 
ECCC sat in the Registry. In the IHT, BiH WCC and 
the EAC, the VWU was situated in administration. 
In others, specifically the SCSL and the STL, the 
VWU resided between the Office of the Prosecu-
tor and the Registry, and in the SPDDC, it sat in 
the equivalent of the OTP—the Serious Crimes 
Unit. Views on good practice vary—for some, the 
gold standard is for the VWU to sit within the Reg-
istry as a neutral body. Others encourage the cre-
ation and use of a unit within the national system 
using national police and government officers, 
with only a small number of security staff work-
ing directly for the Registry (particularly to secure 
confidential witness relocation, and occasionally 
also to facilitate victim participation). The latter 
option has the benefit of building national capac-
ity and costing far less, but it will not be under 
the direct control of the hybrid. If the national 
system is to be relied upon, a detailed Needs As-
sessment should be conducted to ascertain the 
capacity and trustworthiness of the national pro-
gramme and programme officers, and measures 
put in place to avoid draining the capacity of the 
national system. Ensuring the secure and inde-
pendent operations of the VWU should be a top 
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priority of the tribunal, and the Unit should be es-
tablished early to provide protection for victims 
from the time that they apply to be recognised 
as such.
The tribunal’s founding law and, importantly, the 
procedural rules, should also include judicial pro-
tective measures. Judges should be empowered 
to order voice distortion, face distortion, pseud-
onyms, video testimony, and the relocation of 
proceedings to another site to hear witnesses, 
if doing so is necessary for their safety. Specific 
provisions for the protection of vulnerable wit-
nesses (for instance, those who are traumatised, 
victims of sexual and gender-based crimes, chil-
dren, and elderly people) should also be imple-
mented.
Where victim participation is provided in the 
court’s legal framework, relevant provisions 
should make clear participating victims’ rights to 
protection not only in the event that they also  ap-
pear in court as witnesses, but also on account of 
their identity as a participating victim. Protection 
and security issues should be dealt with together 
in one office, section or unit, while tasking a sep-
arate office, section or unit with victim participa-
tion and related support (including legal repre-
sentation in the proceedings and, if provided for 
in the legal framework, reparations). See section 
3(i) below on Victim Participation.
E) FUNDING
There are two principal models of funding for hy-
brids: funding through voluntary contributions 
and through assessed contributions. As far as 
possible, hybrid tribunals should aim for uncon-
ditional, assessed funding as this would avoid 
the need to regularly ‘sell ’  the tribunal to donors 
and would prevent unnecessarily large amounts 
of time and energy being devoted to fundraising 
rather than core tribunal work. However, most 
hybrids to date have been funded through volun-
tary contributions, leaving them financially inse-
cure. If an assessed contributions model is possi-
ble, it should be chosen. If not, there are various 
options to structure voluntary contributions and 
minimise the disadvantages of this model. Fund-
ing should be secured as early in the establish-
ment process as possible, and objectives for both 
the donors and the hybrid staff should be man-
aged so that over-reaching and/ or under-funding 
are avoided.
Options for voluntary funding include:
• Voluntary funding by a group of member 
states with administrative oversight by a 
management committee of interested states 
with duties related to oversight of non-judi-
cial matters of the court.
• Voluntary funding by a group of member 
states with a percentage of the budget being 
paid by the state where crimes were commit-
ted into a general fund to be administered by 
the court. Once again, administrative over-
sight would be by a management committee 
of interested states with duties related to 
oversight of non-judicial matters of the court.
The issue of funding relates to the issue of select-
ing which regional and international partners the 
hybrid should engage with, as discussed above 
in the section on negotiating and implementing 
the legal framework. Affiliation choices with re-
gional and international organisations may affect 
funding options. For example, the African Union 
would be more likely to fund an initiative that it 
is sponsoring than one sponsored by the UN or 
another non-African entity.
As a best practice, it is advisable to secure a po-
litical agreement on record for support and fund-
ing for a number of years from donor states. For 
instance, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there was 
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a commitment for the five-year transitional pe-
riod at the BiH WCC. In Kosovo, there is political 
endorsement to fund based on a five-year bud-
get forecast for the KSC. This must not be under-
stood to mean, however, that the proceedings 
have to finish within five years or that the de jure 
mandate of the court is five years.
Funding may be raised from entities other than 
states, such as foundations or international or-
ganisations, for certain features and/or special 
projects run by the hybrid court. For example, 
the SCSL’s outreach programme was not funded 
from the tribunal’s core budget and struggled to 
raise money. 39 It is desirable to have all of the 
necessary resources in the core budget, but it is 
always an option to expand and explore alter-
native sources of funding for some functions of 
the court. However, certain core functions such 
as witness protection, IT, and courtroom man-
agement should be shielded from targeted ‘extra 
funding’, as this may come with an agenda to in-
fluence proceedings.
If the tribunal is UN-backed and funded by volun-
tary means, it is essential to include the provision 
that if the voluntary funds are not sufficient to 
fund the operations of the court, then the court 
can apply to the UN for a subvention grant. Sub-
vention grants have been used frequently by tri-
bunals, including at the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone.
A five-year programme model for funding should 
be considered when the hybrid is established, in 
order to assist in raising funds and, if appropri-
ate, in transferring authority to national systems. 
For instance, during the initial phase of a hybrid, 
international funds can be deployed, with the 
39 Kerr, Rachel & Jessica Lincoln, The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Outreach, Legacy and Impact ,  King’s College London (2008). 
Available at: http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/slfinalreport.pdf
budget of the hybrid gradually shifting to become 
the responsibility of the host state. Voluntary 
funds for international staff and infrastructure 
and running costs can be added to the national 
budget of the host state with assurance that, af-
ter the transitional mixed national-international 
staffing phase, the national staff remain on the 
national budget. This is the model followed by 
the BiH WCC.
Various aspects of hybrid tribunals can be ex-
tremely costly, and these costs should be built 
into the funding strategy from the start. For in-
stance, victim participation, protection, and 
reparation are high-cost, yet central, aspects of 
hybrid justice. Equally, separate defence offices 
and field offices add substantially to the funds 
needed.
Sufficient and reliable funding is essential for the 
independent and effective functioning of a hybrid 
court, and efforts should be made as early as the 
Needs Assessment phase to identify whether an 
assessed contributions model would be possible 
and, if not, who the likely funders would be.
F) LOCATION AND PREMISES
Location:
The possible and preferable location(s) of the 
hybrid court and tribunal proceedings should be 
determined during the Needs Assessment. One 
of the attractions of establishing a hybrid court 
is that it can operate in or close to the state in 
which the offences took place. As a general prin-
ciple, the court should be located as close to the 
location of the alleged crimes as possible. This is 
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l ikely to also be in proximity to the location of the 
victims of these crimes.
There are a number of reasons for locating the 
hybrid in-country. Hybrids are intended to sup-
port states in rendering justice for their own citi-
zens rather than usurping state power, which can 
happen if the hybrid is located outside of the af-
fected state. They are also intended to act as de-
terrents for future offenders and to support rule-
of-law and access-to-justice work more broadly. 
A distant court will l ikely have fewer effects that 
can outlast the trials themselves in terms of po-
tential deterrence, knowledge transfer, or bol-
stering domestic justice systems. It may also 
have less legitimacy or local relevance. Hybrids 
are also often intended to contribute to capac-
ity building within states (see also Section 7(b) 
below). This is possible from a distant location, 
but the more remote the institution is, the fewer 
national staff are likely to work in it. Additional-
ly, in-country hybrids are easier for the public to 
access, more convenient for witnesses to appear 
at, easier for victims to access and participate in, 
and, if the institutional design provides for it, to 
claim any reparations. In-country hybrids should 
be both cheaper and more financially beneficial 
for the country hosting the hybrid, as the courts 
can have local economic effects through the level 
of international funds they attract to a location. 
However, while some of these immediate impacts 
on cost, national participation and other short-
term factors can be observed, the long-term im-
pact of a domestic location on reconciliation, rule 
of law, and other aims is as yet unproven.
In terms of specific location(s) in-country, while 
access is important, it is not always necessary to 
house hybrids, or hold all trials, in capital cities. If 
atrocities are alleged to have taken place largely 
outside the capital city, or if location in the capi-
tal city would have deleterious political effects, it 
might be most appropriate to locate the hybrid, 
or at least to hold some parts of the proceedings, 
close to atrocity sites. If the security and financial 
situation permits it, partial proceedings can take 
place across different parts of the relevant state. 
Options for conducting parts of trials or proceed-
ings by video-link (in order to avoid inconvenient 
or dangerous movements for witnesses or the 
accused, and to avoid the high security costs of 
moving an entire trial chamber) should also be 
considered. In general, the opportunities provid-
ed by technology should be used as extensively 
as possible insofar as it brings relevant commu-
nities closer to the trial proceedings. If it is not 
possible to locate the hybrid in-country at the 
outset, the legal framework should stipulate that 
parts of the proceedings can be held in-country 
if it becomes feasible and economically viable to 
do so. Rule 100 of the ICC Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, which stipulates that the Chamber can 
take sit outside the regular premises of the Court 
where it is in the interests of justice for it to do 
so, could be used as a guide here.
There may also be reasons to locate the mecha-
nism outside of the country, including: if the risk 
assessment shows that an in-country location 
risks destabilising the state; if the administration 
of justice would be seriously compromised by the 
hybrid being located in-country (for instance be-
cause the risk of political influence is very high); 
or if the cost of doing so would be too high in 
terms of security. Ideally, the location in this in-
stance should have some link to the country in 
which the offences took place. For instance, the 
hybrid could be located in the wider region. The 
EAC was located in Senegal, which had custody of 
Habré. Location in Chad would have been better 
if politically possible, but the EAC still  satisfied 
many victims as it was located in the African state 
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where Habré had fled to exile. 40 The KSC and the 
STL are both located in The Hague, which has the 
advantage of being the seat of a number of in-
ternational courts and therefore has significant 
general capacity and experience in running trials 
under international criminal law and a friendly 
host government. However, their location makes 
engagement with relevant domestic actors from 
the affected states challenging, despite their ex-
tensive outreach programmes. If a hybrid cannot 
be held in-country, it is particularly important to 
maximise the use of national law and domestic 
actors with the operation of the court to offset 
the physical distance to some extent. Funding 
should also be allocated to bring victims and 
domestic journalists to the hybrid for important 
events within trials and to hold outreach events 
in-country where significant parts of the proceed-
ings are broadcast.
Wherever the hybrid is located, agreements will 
need to be negotiated with the host state and any 
other states whose cooperation will be integral to 
the justice process (see Section 8(a) on Host State 
Relations and Host State Agreements).
If the Registrar is appointed early in the process 
of establishing a hybrid, they should be consult-
ed during the decision-making process on loca-
tion and premises, as they will be ultimately re-
sponsible for the functioning of the hybrid.
Premises:
It is rare that premises are built specifically for a 
hybrid court. Most hybrids are located in repur-
posed existing structures, although the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone is a notable exception. Key 
concerns with regards to premises include:
40 Hicks, Celeste, The Trial of Hissène Habré: How the People of Chad Brought a Tyrant to Justice ,  Zed Books (2018).
• Security :  When designing or choosing a build-
ing in which to house the court, the primary 
concern must be physical and virtual security. 
This includes, for instance, the provision of: 
at least two holding cells; a secure vault for 
evidence; a secure entrance to and exit from 
the compound for secured vehicles; a se-
cure route from vehicles to holding cells and 
from holding cells to the courtroom for the 
accused; secure routes around the building 
for judges and witnesses that are separate 
to those for the accused. Also, the security 
of the premises should be regularly reviewed 
when the court is functioning and regularly 
checked for listening devices. 
• Privileges and immunities :  Full privileges 
and immunities need to be guaranteed for 
the premises and staff working on the prem-
ises. This is typically agreed in the Host State 
Agreement (see Section 8(a)) and includes 
provisions from the Vienna convention. Prem-
ises must be inviolable; staff and premises 
must have immunity. 
• Separation of court personnel :  There should 
be separate and secure offices for the use of 
the OTP and defence teams within the court 
building. Ideally the chambers, the OTP, de-
fence offices, and victim services sections 
should all have separate areas of the building 
and common access to shared services such 
as a cafeteria and resource library.
• Public access and outreach :  The court 
should allow for high levels of public access 
if it aims to achieve broad understanding of 
its work and local legitimacy. Cameras should 
be installed in the courtroom(s) and a sub-
stantial area provided for public seating. It is 
particularly important to broadcast proceed-
ings of trials in the main language(s) of the af-
fected population if the hybrid is not located 
Dakar Guidelines_v6.indd   37 15.07.19   07:51
D A K A R  G U I D E L I N E S
P A G E  3 8
in-country (see also Section 7(a) on Outreach, 
below).
• Effective working conditions :  The hybrid 
will require a large enough courtroom for all 
of the parties and staff who will need to use 
it, which will include victim representatives 
(where victim participation is permitted) as 
well as relevant registry staff such as court 
ushers, translators/ interpreters/ transcrib-
ers, and security. The court will also require 
reliable IT equipment and connectivity, in-
cluding video-link capacity between field of-
fices, central offices, the detention centre 
and the courtroom (for general communica-
tions, witness testimony, and provision of 
feed to detention centre if an accused person 
will not attend in the courtroom). The court-
room also needs the capacity to cater for all 
in-court witness protection measures.
• Cost :  The court should be run as cost-effec-
tively as possible, given that the criticisms of 
international(ised) trials often focus on their 
high cost. The SCSL, for instance, was regard-
ed by some as inappropriate in its surround-
ings—it sat above Freetown on a hill ,  was os-
tentatiously different to local architecture, 
was surrounded by high walls (suggesting a 
lack of access and transparency), and was 
strongly lit night and day before there was an 
electricity grid in place in Freetown (indicat-
ing an excessive use of oil to run the genera-
tors, in sharp contrast to what was available 
to citizens). The less ‘alien’ institutions of in-
ternationalised criminal justice appear, the 
more likely they will resonate with location 
populations and generate interest and sup-
port.
• Aesthetics :  The aesthetics of the court affect 
public perceptions. The hybrid should be as 
accessible to the public as possible and should 
be designed in such a way to facilitate local 
ownership. This might include, for instance, 
signage on the building being multi-language, 
with the local language listed first. It might 
also include designing the layout of the court-
room in such a way as to make it recognisable 
within the domestic system and usable in that 
system once the hybrid’s mandate has con-
cluded.
• Legacy:  It is important to consider at the de-
sign or refurbishment stage what the building 
is likely to be used for once the hybrid has 
completed its work. Will it become a court 
for the national legal system? A museum? A 
library? What will the remand facilities be 
used for? Hybrids are, by their very nature, 
temporary and the building should be de-
signed or refurbished to enable cost-effective 
repurposing once the hybrid ceases to func-
tion. This includes ensuring that the building 
can be run in a cost-effective way, as building 
maintenance will be funded through nation-
al rather than international budgets once the 
hybrid has completed its work. 
• Detention facilities and holding cells :  Re-
mand facilities will be needed before and 
during the trial. Remand facilities should 
meet international standards, which might 
mean that a budget should be allocated to 
build bespoke facilities or upgrade existing 
domestic facilities. Remand facilities should 
have high security protection. Unless remand 
facilities are on-site, holding cells will be 
needed within the court building for use by 
accused persons during proceedings. 
• Field offices :  If the hybrid is not located in 
the country in which the alleged offences 
took place, or if there are significant links to 
other states, such as location of witnesses 
or evidence, then field offices may be neces-
sary. These offices are expensive and security 
may pose a particular challenge. The offices 
must be equipped with secure IT to be able 
to move sensitive evidence quickly. The STL 
has significant experience here as it is locat-
ed in The Hague but has a large field office 
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in Beirut. The ICC, while not being a hybrid, 
has multiple field offices and may be a source 
of guidance in terms of up and downscaling 
of relevant structures in the life cycle of pro-
ceedings from investigation to the issuance 
of the verdict and beyond.
G) ACCESS TO THE TRIAL
The legal framework of the tribunal should ide-
ally include a specific commitment to access to 
trials. Article 33 of the EAC Statute is useful to 
draw upon in this regard. It reads: “All reasonable 
measures shall be taken to guarantee access to 
the trial for all concerned parties as well as to 
representatives of the press, to international and 
African Union observers, and to representatives 
of civil society.”
While location in-country is intended to facilitate 
access to the court, there has been considerable 
variation in attendance at trials by the general 
public. The ECCC has seen large audiences, while 
the SCSL generally did not, although both were lo-
cated in the concerned state’s capital city. Other 
measures may be necessary to encourage public 
attendance beyond simply locating the tribunal in 
the concerned country—see Section 7(a) on Out-
reach below. For instance, at the ECCC, civil so-
ciety organisations organised and funded a high 
number of Court visits for groups from affected 
communities.
H) OFFICIAL AND WORKING LANGUAGES
The working  language (or languages) of the hy-
brid is the language in which the majority of 
communication between parties, including in the 
courtroom, will take place and in which all court 
documents will be produced. Having more than 
one working language has significant budgetary 
and efficiency implications due to the cost in time 
and resources of interpretation and translation. 
The official  languages of the hybrid are all of the 
languages that the proceedings will be translated 
into and that key court documents will be trans-
lated into. The number of official languages also 
has budgetary and efficiency implications. The 
Statute might also make provisions for official 
languages to be changed during the course of 
proceedings if doing so is deemed relevant and 
necessary.
When determining the official and working lan-
guages of the court, the defendants’ rights and 
the objectives of the hybrid in terms of outreach 
and capacity building should be given high prior-
ity. All defendants have the right to have charges 
read to them in a language that they understand. 
Human rights legal instruments dictate that they 
should be able to follow the entirety of relevant 
proceedings in a language that they comprehend. 
To promote the court’s accessibility, legitimacy, 
and impact, the victim population and affected 
national populations should be able to under-
stand proceedings and the workings of the hy-
brid, as well as foster some national ownership of 
it. Ideally, therefore, the working language of the 
court will be a language that the defendants and 
the victims speak.
However, if the local language is not widely spo-
ken by court personnel (be they national or in-
ternational) it may be necessary to pick a more 
widely shared language as the working language. 
This works to make proceedings more efficient 
and also supports capacity building, as national 
staff do not need to work in a language foreign to 
them. In this case, all official national language(s) 
should be included as official language(s) of the 
hybrid in order to ensure that relevant popula-
tions comprehend its work. Any other languag-
es that would allow the work of the hybrid to be 
communicated to interested parties should also 
be adopted in such cases. At least one of the 
working languages of the ICC (English and French) 
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should be included as an official language in or-
der to ensure access to the hybrid proceedings to 
broader legal communities.
As noted above in the sections on judges and the 
prosecution, in selecting court personnel, consid-
eration should be given to their fluency in the of-
ficial and working languages of the tribunal. Hav-
ing a shared language among personnel working 
in the same office or work grouping greatly fa-
cilitates communication and collaboration among 
staff.
When participants do not speak one of the offi-
cial or working languages of the hybrid, the Stat-
ute should include a commitment to translate 
relevant proceedings and documents into a lan-
guage that participants understand, ideally via si-
multaneous interpretation or transcription in the 
courtroom, in order to make the full proceedings 
as accessible as possible.
In terms of broader communication goals, broad-
cast material should be made available in local 
languages in order to ensure wide public out-
reach. Another crucial objective when determin-
ing which languages to use for which parts of the 
hybrid’s work is to be able to communicate this 
work to the victim population and national pop-
ulation.
I) VICTIM PARTICIPATION
Victim participation is a key factor in terms of re-
parative impact, societal support and local own-
ership. As such, it should be a priority in the es-
tablishment and functioning of the hybrid. The 
details of victim participation should be worked 
out from the outset of the court’s establishment. 
The treatment of victims from the earliest stag-
es of the hybrid’s design can impact the real and 
perceived legitimacy of the tribunal, especially if 
court supporters claim that the tribunal is acting 
in the interests of the victims. Victim participa-
tion is complex and should be acknowledged as 
a cost driver, particularly if indigent victims are 
provided with counsel paid by for the court. It 
goes without saying that victims will l ikely have 
diverse views on who should be prosecuted and 
for what, and hybrids will therefore not be able 
to satisfy or repair all victims in a given situation.
Separate offices or sections in the Registry can 
facilitate victims’ access to the court as partici-
pants in the proceedings by collecting their in-
formation, registering them as participants, and 
supporting them administratively as they partic-
ipate in proceedings. Such offices may be called 
the ‘Victims Participation Unit/ Office’ (STL, KSC), 
‘Victims Support Section’ (ECCC) or ‘Victims Par-
ticipation and Reparations Section” (ICC). These 
sections assist victims in making their applica-
tions to the chamber, maintain contact and share 
information with victims throughout the proceed-
ings, and assist victims in the choice/ facilitation 
of their legal representation in court.
Regarding victims’ legal representation in tri-
bunal proceedings, different models have been 
developed to date, including the creation of des-
ignated registry offices created to support such 
representation, external counsel established 
to represent clients in court (as was the case at 
the ECCC), or in-house counsel provided through 
an independent office housed within the court’s 
Registry (as at the KSC).
i) Fundamental Statutory Provisions 
Empirical information regarding victim participa-
tion in practice is fairly limited amongst hybrid 
courts, and the experience of the ICC remains the 
most instructive in terms of jurisprudence and 
scholarly analysis of the record of a victim partic-
ipation system.
Dakar Guidelines_v6.indd   40 15.07.19   07:51
D A K A R  G U I D E L I N E S
P A G E  4 1
If a hybrid is vested with a victim participation 
function, the minimum statutory provision should 
ideally be akin to Article 17 of the STL Statute 
(which draws on Article 68(3) of the Rome Stat-
ute):
Where the personal interests of the victims 
are affected, the court/chamber shall permit 
their views and concerns to be presented and 
considered at stages of the proceedings deter-
mined to be appropriate by the court/chamber 
and in a manner which is not prejudicial to or 
inconsistent with the rights of the accused and 
a fair and impartial trial. Such views and con-
cerns may be presented by the legal represen-
tatives of the victims where the court/cham-
ber considers it appropriate, in accordance 
with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
The Statute should also provide a definition of 
the term ‘victim’. The definition applied in Rule 85 
of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence has 
been accepted and replicated by hybrid courts 
(see, for instance: Article 22 of the Law on the 
Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Pros-
ecutors Office; Article 25(1) STL Statute; Glossary 
of the Internal Rules, ECCC): victims are defined 
as natural persons who have suffered harm as a 
result of the commission of crimes within the ju-
risdiction of the court. Ideally, situational victims 
who fall within the jurisdiction of the mechanism 
should be provided for as well as victims of spe-
cific charges brought in a given case. A hybrid 
might also admit organisations or institutions as 
victims, following the example of Rule 85(b) of 
the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
Finally, while this has not transpired at tribunals, 
it is possible for the views of victims to be consid-
ered beyond victim participation in proceedings. 
41 https://www.stl-tsl.org/sites/default/files/victims/20110705_victims_application_form_EN.doc
For example, the OTP may want to consult vic-
tims as to which cases are of greatest relevance 
to affected communities and how to conduct in-
vestigations in a manner that is sensitive to vic-
tim needs and expectations. The OTP should not, 
of course, be swayed by political considerations, 
but a well-designed, victim-sensitive prosecuto-
rial strategy could cement the buy-in of victims, 
survivors, and affected communities.
ii) Victim Application Process
Victims should be provided with a clear proce-
dural framework detailing how they can apply to 
participate in court proceedings. In general, it 
should be for the Registry (by way of a specially 
designated section) to organise this process and 
report to the Chamber as appropriate. Rule 89 of 
the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence on the 
Application for Participation of Victims in the Pro-
ceedings sets a recognised and viable example 
(see also Rule 23bis  of the ECCC Internal Rules; 
Rule 86 of the STL RPE; and Rule 113 of the KSC 
RPE). An individualised application process, ide-
ally through a pre-established application, is ad-
visable in order to safeguard the transmission of 
the minimum required amount of victim data to 
assess the criteria of victimhood. An example of 
the STL application form can be found here.41 In 
order to reach the broadest range of victims, the 
assistance of civil society organisations should 
be sought, forms should be available in all local 
languages, and they should be worded to enable 
victims to describe in their own words the crimes 
they believe themselves to be victims of.
A commonly used standard threshold of proof 
administered by different chambers to decide 
over victims’ rights to participate is one of pri-
ma facie ,  i .e. victims are allowed to participate 
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in court proceedings if, on the face of the mat-
ter, the description of the harm suffered results 
from either the commission of a crime charged 
(in a case-based admission) or the commission of 
a crime within the jurisdiction of the court (for a 
situation-based admission).
Ideally, the assessment of victim applications 
against this standard is delegated to a designated 
registry section so that chambers do not have to 
assess potentially high numbers of applications. 
A specialised section within the Registry would 
also be appropriate as it is likely to be neutral 
towards the parties. The Registry’s assessment of 
victim applications should be subject to legal re-
view and challenge by the parties—Rule 89 of the 
ICC RPE provides for template language. Equal-
ly, the application procedure for victim recogni-
tion before the court should include provisions 
for a victim applicant’s appeal against a registry 
decision that an individual does not qualify as a 
victim, or the right to apply again with further in-
formation.
Where a designated section is established with-
in the Registry to facilitate victims’ access to the 
court through information, advice, and an appli-
cation process, it is crucial that relevant staff be 
adequately skilled and trained to sensitively en-
gage and work with victims and survivors. Train-
ing for all staff working in victim participation 
should be allowed for in the budget of the hybrid 
court, as staff will need a solid understanding of 
the relevant law(s) alongsid eadvanced interper-
sonal skills to ensure that interactions between 
victims and staff at the court do not retraumatise 
victims. This is particularly important for cases 
involving SGBC. In addition, staff working on vic-
tim participation need to have clear guidelines 
and training on how to approach potential victims 
and explain the court proceedings in a language 
that the affected person or group can under-
stand. National staff might be more appropriate 
than international in this area, though there are 
contexts in which outsiders are comparatively 
easier to disclose to. This may be the case when 
there are high levels of stigma attached to being 
the victim of particular type of crimes, which is 
often the case with SGBC, and disclosure to com-
patriots may feel shameful.
Finally, robust provisions in the court’s regulato-
ry framework need to cater for the protection of 
victims’ identity where there are prevalent secu-
rity risks (seeSection 3(d)(v)on VWU, above).
iii) Victim Participation in the Proceedings and 
Legal Representation
The various procedural rights of victims at the 
different stages of the proceedings should be 
laid down explicitly in the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence in order to avoid any ambiguity and ad 
hoc discretionary or contradictory decisions by 
different Chambers.Two key issues relating to 
victim participation need to be spelled out by a 
hybrid court’s legal framework: (a) the scope of 
participatory rights of victims; and (b) the ways 
that victims can interact with the proceedings.
a) Participatory rights:
Victims are generally permitted to participate in 
more recent hybrids by providing their “views and 
concerns” where “their personal interests are af-
fected” (Article 17, STL Statute). This necessitates 
a set of procedural rules, including on participa-
tion in hearings, access to the (confidential) case 
file; opening and closing statements; the right 
to submit oral and written observations during 
trial; the questioning of witnesses; and the pre-
sentation of evidence (see, for example, Rule 91 
ICC RPE; Rule 87 STL Rules; Rule 114 KSC RPE). At 
the ECCC, victims are even to “support the prose-
cution” (Rule 23(1) ECCC Internal Rules). The STL 
RPE contain the most detailed provisions on vic-
tims’ procedural rights.
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The scope of participatory rights may differ ac-
cording to the different procedural stages at 
which victims may be admitted to participate. 
At the ECCC, victims’ rights already exist at the 
investigation stage, while the STL and KSC allow 
for relevant rights at the pre-trial phase or con-
firmation of the indictment. The scope of victim 
participation should be focused and meaningful. 
This may entail that victims should be allowed to 
provide the Prosecutor or the Investigative Judge 
with information pointing to certain crime com-
plexes and potential sources of evidence in the 
elaboration of the charges, as at the ECCC.
It is worth highlighting that if victims are allowed 
to participate at the pre-trial stage, this may 
lead to frustration among affected communities 
where only a limited number of charges is actu-
ally brought forward and/ or further reduced if 
certain charges are not accepted by the judges. 
An effective communication, information, and 
outreach strategy of the relevant victim partici-
pation section of the court should help to man-
age victims’ expectations to some extent.
b) Legal representation:
Victims generally participate in the proceed-
ings through their legal counsel (also called ‘le-
gal representative’ (Rule 86(C) STL RPE); ‘Victims’ 
Counsel’ (Rule 114 KSC RPE); or ‘Civil Party Lead 
Co-Lawyers’ (Rule 23(3) of the ECCC Internal 
Rules). In most instances, they are organised into 
victim groups rather than represented individu-
ally. The representation of victim groups is effi-
cient in terms of the court’s proceedings and ap-
propriate if victims’ interests are aligned within 
relevant groupings. However, there may be con-
flicting interests of different victim groups (i.e. 
child soldiers as one group of victims and victims 
of crimes committed by child soldiers as anoth-
er) where a common legal representative could 
lead to a conflict of interest. In such cases, pro-
vision should be made for multiple common legal 
representatives  of victim groups to be admitted 
in the proceedings. Groups of victims who might 
be relevant to the hybrid’s work should be iden-
tified early in its establishment and at the outset 
of investigative work, along with likely interme-
diaries to access victims’ groups. Socio-economic 
and cultural inequalities present in the context in 
which the hybrid will operate should be consid-
ered to help ensure that some groups of victims 
are not privileged over others. Avoiding competi-
tion among victims and/ or establishing a hierar-
chy of victimhood should be a priority.
Ideally, the choice of a legal representative 
should be afforded to the victim. However, in 
practice, counsel have generally been chosen by 
hybrid courts. Where victim groups are unable 
to choose a (common) legal representative, the 
Registrar should be mandated choose one, or at 
least to make a relevant recommendation to the 
Chamber for a decision. In the choice of counsel 
for victims, the court should be respectful of the 
wishes and distinct interests of victims.
Where victims/victim groups lack the necessary 
means to pay for a legal representative due to 
indigence (which is often the case), the legal 
framework of the court should ideally provide for 
necessary assistance. This can be achieved, for in-
stance, by providing a legal counsel employed by 
the court or financial assistance for an external 
counsel to be hired to assist victims in the pro-
ceedings (see Rule 23(5) KSC RPE; Rule 51(C) STL 
RPE). The absence of a legal aid policy for victim 
representatives could result in a de facto  denial 
of effective victim participation in proceedings.
The decision as to how and to which groups legal 
aid is afforded can be either taken by the Regis-
try or the relevant chamber, based on the advice, 
recommendations and information received from 
the designated victim participation unit. If a hy-
Dakar Guidelines_v6.indd   43 15.07.19   07:51
D A K A R  G U I D E L I N E S
P A G E  4 4
brid court opts for group representation of vic-
tims through internal victim counsel, it would be 
for the Chamber merely to decide/ validate how 
many different victim groups may be admitted 
under the applicable legal aid scheme.
The qualification and remuneration of victim 
counsel should be comparable to defence coun-
sel, although note that the number of support 
staff required may be more extensive for defence 
teams.
J) REPARATIONS
The idea of providing reparations at the conclu-
sion of a criminal process and issued by the same 
court is alien to many national jurisdictions and 
relatively novel to hybrid courts.
Two general regimes of reparations can be distin-
guished: first, there are the more inclusive repa-
rations regimes of the ECCC, KSC, and the EAC (as 
well as the ICC), which have their own statutory 
means to issue a reparations order and award 
reparations. For the EAC, which follows the ICC 
model, this is carried out through a trust fund for 
victims. Second, there are internationalised court 
systems that merely refer to national courts and 
(potential) national compensation programmes, 
such as the STL and the KSC. 42 While a final judg-
ment can be used as an executable title ( ‘final 
and binding’, i .e. Rule 167(2) of the KSC RPE) for 
compensation claims in national proceedings 
before civil law courts, these internationalised 
courts play no further role in the allocation of 
reparations.
Whatever regime of reparations is chosen, those 
establishing and running the hybrid should man-
age victims’ expectations according to the fund-
ing available for the regime. Previous tribunals 
42 Article 25(3) of the STL Statute and Rule 86(G) of the STL Rules; Article 22(8) KSC Statute.
have experienced criticism after victims had been 
led to believe (by court actors or civil society or-
ganisations) that they were likely to receive more 
in reparations than was eventually forthcoming.
Key questions for a hybrid to consider are:
• Whether victims will be entitled to repara-
tions through that same court, and how these 
will be determined and funded
• Whether situational victims will be entitled 
to reparations or only victims of specific suc-
cessful charges
• Whether indirect victims, including the fam-
ilies of victims can receive reparations, or 
whether they will only be granted to direct 
victims 
• Whether individual and/ or collective repara-
tions can be awarded
• Whether assets from convicted persons can 
be seized and used for victim services and 
reparations
• Whether a Trust Fund for victims will be es-
tablished that can, in addition to administer-
ing reparations post trial, provide services 
to victims of crimes that fall into the hybrid 
court’s jurisdiction prior to final judgments.
Statutory Provisions:
The ICC has the most elaborate set of provisions 
with regards to reparation provisions at an inter-
national tribunal. Article 75 of the Rome Statute 
enables the competent chamber to “make an or-
der directly against a convicted person specify-
ing appropriate reparations to, or in respect of, 
victims, including restitution, compensation and 
rehabilitation”.
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If a hybrid chooses to provide for a full ( ‘ inclu-
sive’) set of reparation provisions, the scope of 
the reparations order and award also needs to 
distinguish between individual and collective rep-
aration awards. This means determining whether 
the tribunal intends to provide for one or the oth-
er, or a combination of the two. Article 27 of the 
Statute of the Extraordinary African Chambers 
and Article 22(8) of the KSC Statute follow this ap-
proach. The ECCC limits reparations measures to 
‘collective and moral’ reparations (Rule 23 of the 
Internal Rules), which arguably limits the budget-
ary strain on the implementation of reparations, 
though this has also led to disappointment from 
victims, in particular in Case 001.
As per the above, the term ‘victim’ needs to be 
carefully defined. Ideally, the same definition 
would be used for the purposes of victim partici-
pation. Regarding family members of victims, the 
term ‘indirect victim’ may be used. At the ICC, for 
an indirect victim to be linked closely enough to 
the direct victim(s) in order to benefit from the 
reparations scheme, the Chambers have held 
that there needs to be a ‘close personal relation-
ship between the indirect and direct victim, for 
instance as exists between a child soldier and 
his or her parents’. Note here that The Prosecu-
tor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo  decision at the ICC 
established the principles and procedures to be 
applied to reparations in such cases. 43
Reparations Experts:
A hybrid court with an inclusive reparations man-
date should cater for the option that the Trial 
Chamber may appoint experts to assist in de-
termining the scope of any damage and suggest 
43 International Criminal Court, Official Court Translation, ICC-01/04-01/06-2904, 7 August 2012, paragraph 195. See: https://www.
icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_01895.PDF 
44 https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/alHassan/2018-alHassanAppFormInd_ENG.pdf
options of appropriate—individual or collective—
reparations (i.e. Rule 168 KSC RPE; Rule 97(2) ICC 
RPE).
Standard of Proof:
While for victim participation, a prima facie  stan-
dard has been considered sufficient, this may 
differ for reparations, particularly where repara-
tions are afforded by the convicted person to in-
dividual victim beneficiaries directly. The ICC has 
applied a ‘balance of probability’ standard, which, 
while much less than ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, 
is still  more demanding than prima facie .  Repara-
tions-related information from victim applicants 
should be collected and synthesised to allow the 
Registry to make an assessment similar to the 
one for victim participation to the Chamber. This 
will allow the chamber to decide based on the 
Registry legal assessment and recommendations. 
The second half of this form gives an example of 
reparations-related information. 44 Parties should 
be afforded the right to challenge the Registry as-
sessment and/ or the Chamber’s decision.
Application Process:
An unproblematic way to deal with the issue of 
victim applicants for reparations is to stipulate 
from the outset that participating victims will be 
automatically potential reparation beneficiaries 
in case of a conviction (i.e. ECCC; KSC). If a hybrid 
were to choose two separate processes (for in-
stance following the ICC framework), then a pro-
cess akin to the victim application process should 
be handled by the designated section for victim 
participation and reparations. This should be 
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done in order to ensure continuity, synergies in 
data collection, and a speedy admission process.
Trust Fund for Victims:
Hybrid courts will have insufficient funds to af-
ford reparations to victims if the convicted per-
son has no assets. A possible solution is the es-
tablishment of a ‘trust fund’ for the benefit of 
victims. The trust fund should be financed by 
voluntary contributions from governments, inter-
national institutions, non-governmental organi-
sations, and other entities wishing to support the 
victims (see, for example, Article 28(1) EAC Stat-
ute; Article 79 ICC Statute).
If a trust fund is to be established, it should be 
done so as early as possible so that fundraising 
efforts can take into account additional expens-
es.
It may be contemplated to vest the trust fund 
with a ‘double mandate’, i .e. (i) to provide assis-
tance (rehabilitation services, counselling, psy-
chological care) to victims of violence within the 
hybrid’s jurisdiction already during ongoing judi-
cial proceedings ( ‘assistance mandate’); and (ii) to 
provide reparations as ordered by the Chamber 
in case of a conviction of an accused ( ‘reparations 
mandate’). This is the mandate of the ICC Trust 
Fund for Victims, and is good practice, albeit a 
resource-intensive one.
Where a Hybrid does not have its own Repara-
tions Scheme:
A provision that would allow the judgments of 
the hybrid to translate into reparations cases 
in domestic courts could be built into the host 
state agreement (the CAR agreement for the SCC 
is an example of this: Articles 56 to 62 of CAR’s 
Code of Criminal Procedure stipulate that repara-
tion measures can be sought through civil action 
claims before national courts).
These provisions should be drawn up with poten-
tial national proceedings (either concurrent or 
transferred by the hybrid) in mind, so that rep-
arations can be coordinated between the hybrid 
and domestic courts, and/or any state-sponsored 
compensation programmes for victims of rele-
vant crimes.
Freezing of Assets:
The Host State Agreement (see Section 8(a)) and 
agreements with other interested states should 
also, if possible, include provisions that the 
state(s) will: (i) freeze an accused’s assets at the 
request of the hybrid court; and (ii) waive rights 
to claim the assets of convicted persons in order 
that these assets might be used to afford repara-
tions to victims.
K) TRIALS IN ABSENTIA
The Statute should make clear whether the Tri-
al Chamber permits trials in absentia .  Generally, 
these have been prohibited at hybrids because 
of concerns over fairness of proceedings and the 
cost to the perceived legitimacy of the tribunal. A 
notable exception is the Special Tribunal for Leb-
anon, which permits them. When deciding wheth-
er they should be permitted, it is useful to refer 
to precedent in the relevant national system, as 
the STL did, and to consider the possibility that, if 
defendants present themselves while an in absen-
tia  trial is ongoing, it may have to be restarted. As 
a general rule and due to the inherent tensions 
between in absentia  trials and fair trial rights, it is 
advisable to avoid trials in absentia  unless there 
is some overwhelming reason for doing so in the 
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particular circumstances, such as the suspect(s) 
being extremely unlikely to appear before the 
court for the duration of its existence. 45
L) THIRD PARTIES AND AMICI CURIAE
Third parties and amici curiae  ( ‘friends of the 
court’) should be generally allowed to participate 
in proceedings, subject to relevant procedur-
al safeguards, unless there are context-specific 
reasons not to. It can be beneficial for hybrids 
to be able to call on a wide range of expertise, 
especially on complex legal issues that have lit-
tle jurisprudence. The procedures for participa-
tion of third parties and amici curiae  should be 
set out in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
The STL has issued a Practice Direction on amici 
curiae  submissions that may be of use, which is 
available here. 46
M) PENALTIES
Sentencing practices in hybrids have in the past 
been inconsistent internally as well as across hy-
brids and relevant domestic courts. This has an 
impact on the legitimacy of the institution, as 
the public sees defendants receive dramatically 
different sentences for similar behaviours within 
the same contexts.
The legal framework of a hybrid should contain 
details of the applicable penalties and the factors 
that the Trial Chamber should consider when im-
posing sentences. This includes, in general, the 
gravity of an offence and individual circumstanc-
es of the convicted person. Ideally, a sentencing 
guideline would be included for transparency, 
45 For a summary of recent debate on in absentia  trials see the International Bar Association International Criminal Court and 
International Criminal Law Programme Report on the ‘Experts’ Roundtable on trials in absentia in international criminal justice 
(2016) available at: https://www.ibanet.org/ICC_ICL_Programme/ICL_Trials_in_Absentia_2016.aspx
46 https://www.stl-tsl.org/en/documents/internal-regulatory-documents/court-management-2/1402-practice-direction-on-amic-
us-curiae-submissions-before-the-special-tribunal-for-lebanon
making clear what will be done if domestic and 
hybrid practices clash, or if the practices of the 
hybrid in question clash with those of previous 
international or internationalised criminal mech-
anisms. For instance, will the hybrid’s powers 
override national law? Will the law more favour-
able to the convicted person be applied? And will 
the hybrid be permitted to innovate on sentenc-
ing?
It would also be useful to add to the mandate a 
clause on forfeiture, for instance the SCSL Statute 
19(3) or Rome Statute 77(2b)/ Rule 147 of the ICC 
RPE. The Rome Statute version might be prefer-
able to the SCSL clause as it permits the tribunal 
to decide what to do with the assets rather than 
requiring their return to their rightful owners. 
They could, for instance, be used towards a repa-
rations scheme where the hybrid caters for one.
The overwhelming consensus in international 
criminal law mitigates strongly against the use of 
the death penalty. Support from the UN or other 
relevant international organisations with a hu-
man rights commitment will almost certainly be 
denied if the death penalty is permitted in sen-
tencing. None of the existing hybrids permit the 
death penalty.
N) ENFORCEMENT OF SENTENCES, PARDON, 
AND COMMUTATION
Early in the process of establishing a hybrid, 
consideration should be given as to where sen-
tences will be enforced. Will convicted persons 
serve custodial sentences in the state in which 
the hybrid is located or in a third-party state? In 
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the past, sentences have mostly been served on 
the territory of a third state, making this anoth-
er area in which state cooperation is critical to 
the success of the hybrid. When sentences are 
served in-country, victims and witnesses will l ike-
ly be reticent to participate unless they can be 
reassured as to the security of remand and custo-
dial sentencing facilities (see also the Detention 
Subsection under the Registry in Section 3(d)(iv), 
above).
The RPE should establish procedures for decid-
ing on matters to do with sentence enforcement. 
This will be particularly important once the hy-
brid has ceased its work. One of the main func-
tions of the residual mechanism, the body that 
will remain in existence to undertake any work 
that arises following the official closure of the hy-
brid (see Section 3(p) below), will be to determine 
issues concerning convicted persons. If no resid-
ual mechanism is envisaged, procedures should 
be established for dealing with questions of en-
forcement, pardon, and commutation through 
national authorities. Generally, existing agree-
ments on the enforcement of sentences for the 
UN ad hoc tribunals and/ or the ICC can be used 
as drafting guidance.
Any mechanisms for pardoning or granting ear-
ly release to convicted persons, by the hybrid or 
third parties, should be established in the Stat-
ute in order to provide reassurance to victims 
and witnesses that pardons will not be issued for 
political reasons. To avoid political pardons, a 
review mechanism for the possible reduction of 
sentencing could be used instead of a pardoning 
provision.
Similarly, the hybrid’s regulatory framework 
should include a provision on the transfer of a 
person upon completion of sentence if the en-
forcement is carried out in third party states.
O) LIFESPAN
The intended lifespan of the tribunal should be 
identified from the outset. Hybrids are meant to 
be temporary institutions, usually designed to 
aid in some form of political transition away from 
conflict, authoritarianism and/ or a regime which 
has participated in or failed to prevent atrocities. 
A well-defined and realistic timespan can help 
to attract funding, as there is less risk of costs 
escalating far beyond initial estimates. However, 
a shorter timespan could compromise the oper-
ation of the hybrid if it is likely that gathering 
evidence will take considerable time and if per-
petrators work to ‘outlast’ the hybrid in order to 
escape justice. Estimates of how long the hybrid 
would need to function properly and to achieve 
its objectives should be generated in the initial 
Needs Assessment phase.
It is notable that all of the hybrid tribunals es-
tablished to date have significantly outlasted the 
initial estimates of their lifespans. This has been 
a source of controversy with both national and 
international constituencies. It is important to be 
realistic that the process of establishing a new in-
stitution and then investigating and trying cases 
is extremely long. It is further important to recog-
nise that whatever anticipated lifespan is identi-
fied will be controversial with some stakeholders. 
Some will want the hybrid to do a limited amount 
of work as fast as possible and then cease, but 
others will be more ambitious for the court, par-
ticularly if they believe it is more likely to bring 
justice over time than the national system could.
The development of relevant performance indi-
cators setting out action and time benchmarks 
can be a powerful mechanism to make realistic 
estimates as to a hybrid’s lifespan from relatively 
early in its functioning. See Section 9(b) below on 
Benchmarking and Key Performance Indicators.
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P) RESIDUAL MECHANISM
A commitment to establishing a residual mecha-
nism should be in the Statute, unless the inten-
tion is to pass residual functions onto the nation-
al system. There has been some discussion of a 
possible general residual mechanism for hybrids 
run through the UN, similar to the Internation-
al Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals 
(IRMCT), although this presents many challenges 
and therefore has not come to fruition to date.
Residual mechanisms are necessary in order to 
carry out a range of ongoing and ad hoc func-
tions. Ongoing functions, which draw upon the 
experiences of IRMCT and the Residual Mech-
anism for the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(RSCSL), include:
• Maintenance, preservation and management 
of the archivesof the court
• Witness protection and support 
• Assistance to national prosecution authori-
ties (for instance managing requests for evi-
dence and information)
• Supervision of prison sentences/ pardons/ 
commutations/ early release
• Monitoring cases that have been referred to 
national jurisdictions.
Ad hoc functions include:
• Tracking remaining fugitives and conducting 
any outstanding trials or referring outstand-
ing cases to national jurisdictions
• Review of convictions and acquittals 
• Contempt of court proceedings
• Defence counsel and legal aid issues (for in-
stance, the RSCSL provides defence counsel 
for residual proceedings)
• Claims for compensation
• Prevention of ‘double jeopardy’.
Plans for residual functions should be made while 
the hybrid is being established in order to ensure 
a smooth transition.
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Section 3) Summary and Key Recommendations
Constituent Legal Documents, Jurisdiction, and Structure
Jurisdiction
Concurrent:
• Relationship between the hybrid and domestic courts should be formalised, in 
order to clarify which justice system has jurisdiction in which circumstances. 
Subject matter:
• In most cases, hybrid courts will handle core international crimes (war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and genocide), but could also include others, such as 
transnational organised crimes or domestic crimes. 
• There may be cases where national laws conflict with core international crimes. 
Drafters have two options: Rely on international standards (faster and easier) or 
work to amend domestic law (slower, but possibly advantageous to longer-term 
justice reform goals). 
• Prosecutors must develop guidelines that establish a means of prioritising cases 
and clearly define the “gravest” crimes. These guidelines should be made public 
to avoid criticism of biased case selection. 
Temporal:
• There are risks associated with excluding crimes that led up to (and perhaps ex-
acerbated) the conflict or atrocity. However, if the temporal jurisdiction is overly 
expansive, the tribunal will be burdened with an impossible mandate. 
Territorial:
• Jurisdiction should reflect the geographic location of the conflict as well as the 
location of key actors.
Modes of Liability
National doctrine should apply as far as possible, unless the specifics of the context 
require a more systemic approach.
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Composition
Hybrid court designers must make key sets of decisions about the composition of 
the Chambers, the Office of the Prosecutor, the Defence Office, the Registry, the 
Victim and Witnesses Unit. These include:
• Balance of national and international staff: ‘as national as possible and as inter-
national as necessary’. Special consideration should be given to key roles such 
as judges and head prosecutors.
• Recruitment, hiring, retaining, and dismissal processes for staff, particularly 
judges, prosecutors, and registry staff. 
• The role of the Office of the Prosecutor: an inquisitorial prosecutor may be more 
in line with the objectives of hybrid courts and can mitigate concerns about the 
limited resources of the Defence, but past practice suggests that prosecutors do 
not always secure and disclose exonerating evidence.
• Whether defence will be an independent organ or embedded in the Registry. 
• How to ensure victims and witnesses are best protected.
Ultimately, these choices should be informed by the Needs Assessment and con-
sultations with a range of national actors, and clearly articulated in the hybrid’s 
foundational legal documents.
Funding
Hybrid tribunals should aim for unconditional assessed funding as opposed to vol-
untary funding by donor states. Unfortunately, most hybrid tribunals are funded 
through voluntary contributions and are therefore financially insecure. 
If a court must rely on voluntary funding, it is advisable to secure a written agree-
ment for financial support from a donor country or group of countries for a set 
number of years.
Location and access
The location of the tribunal should be determined by the Needs Assessment as well 
as a risk assessment. Because hybrids are intended to bring justice closer to affect-
ed populations, it is preferable to situate the court in country wherever possible. 
Other considerations for the location include security, accessibility, working condi-
tions, and available detention facilities.
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There has been significant variation in participation and attendance between hy-
brids—for example, the ECCC had large audiences whereas the SCSL did not, despite 
both being located in-country. Outreach and communication may be important to 
improve access.
Official and working languages
The rights of the defendant and the objectives of the hybrid should be the main 
considerations when choosing the official and working languages of thecourt. De-
fendants must understand the charges against them, and ideally, affected popula-
tions would be able to understand the proceedings. Outreach and communications 
materials should be made available in local language(s).
Victim participation
Victim participation can impact the legitimacy of the hybrid. Efforts should be made 
to include victims in proceedings. 
• Offices or sections in the Registry should be set up to help victims navigate the 
tribunal and access assistance when needed. 
• Ideally, victims should be assisted with legal representation if they are indigent. 
As much as possible, victims should be allowed to choose their own lawyers; 
however, in practice tribunals often select counsel. 
• Robust provisions in the court’s regulatory framework should protect victims’ 
identities, in situations where they are at risk.
• Relevant hybrid staff should be trained so as not to re-traumatise victims
Reparations
Reparations may be built into the framework of the hybrid court or hybrid courts 
may refer victims to national courts for potential compensation through civil or 
other legal processes.
• The hybrid should manage victims’ expectations around reparations carefully. 
• The hybrid should distinguish between collective and individual reparations.
• ‘Victims’ must be clearly defined. 
• While prima facie  is sufficient for victim participation, reparations may require a 
slightly higher burden of proof. The ICC uses a ‘balance of probability’ standard.
• While asset seizure and forfeiture may be one option for securing reparations 
payments, if the convicted person has no more assets, a trust fund for victims 
may need to be established. A trust fund can be supported by voluntary contri-
butions.
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Trials in absentia
Generally, trials in absentia have not been permitted at hybrid courts, with the ex-
ception of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Unless there is an obvious reason for 
doing so, trials in absentia are generally not recommended.
Third parties and amici curiae 
Third parties and amici curiae  should generally be allowed, unless there are obvious 
reasons not to permit them in particular cases.
Penalties and enforcement of sentences
Sentencing jurisprudence or practice often differs between the hybrid court and the 
national justice system. In these cases, sentencing guidelines would ideally clarify 
key questions about which practice the hybrid ought to adopt based on particular 
circumstances.
To avoid politicised pardons or commutations after the life of the hybrid is over, the 
hybrid’s Statute should clearly articulate any mechanisms for pardon or commuta-
tion to reassure victims and witnesses.
Lifespan
The drafters should decide on the ideal lifespan of the hybrid court at the outset 
and seek to define realistic timelines and secure necessary funding. However, most 
hybrids have exceeded their lifespans. Benchmarking may be one way of setting 
realistic timelines for particular activities and objectives of the court.
Residual mechanism 
If a residual mechanism is established, it should be included in the hybrid’s Statute, 
and planned for during the establishment phase. Residual mechanisms have been 
used in hybrids like the SCSL to in order to: continue offering witness and victim 
protection; safeguard the court’s archives; offer assistance to national prosecuting 
authorities; monitor cases referred to national courts; and supervise prison sen-
tences.
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4) RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) should 
be developed as soon as possible after the hy-
brid’s statute is promulgated. A well-defined and 
inclusive procedure is extremely important in or-
der to ensure efficient proceedings, the proper 
management of trials, fairness, and to generate 
beneficial legacies, given that procedural rules 
and expertise often live on in domestic systems. 
Previous hybrids have been criticised for poor 
procedural regimes (at least at the outset), or 
even judged to have been failures because of seri-
ous procedural shortcomings. Rational processes 
to define applicable procedural law should there-
fore be agreed upon during the establishment of 
the hybrid, with reference to local standards and 
to existing international good practice. 47 Ideally, 
the RPE should be drafted by representatives of 
all Parties, including Prosecution and Defence, 
rather than by judges alone.
Where possible, local RPE should be used to en-
sure that national judges play a full part in pro-
ceedings, that affected populations understand 
the legal proceedings, and so that the potential 
for cross-fertilisation with the national system 
as a legacy of the hybrid is maximised. Using lo-
cal RPE also means that the same standards are 
likely to apply to perpetrators who are tried in 
the national system as at the hybrid, which could 
bolster the legitimacy of the tribunal. It is nota-
ble that international standards have tended to 
overwhelm domestic procedure in past hybrids. 
For instance, the ECCC agreement provided that 
procedure was to be in accordance with Cambo-
dian law and only if there were gaps could the 
ECCC refer to international procedure. Howev-
er, Cambodian law was rarely used at the ECCC. 
Safeguards against the dominance of internation-
al procedure can be put in place through careful 
47 See, for instance: Sluiter, Goran, Hakan Friman, Suzannah Linton, Sergey Vasiliev, and Salvatore Zappala (eds.), International 
Criminal Procedure: Principles and Rules ,  Oxford University Press (2013).
wording in the tribunal’s legal framework. This 
does not, however, require that national stan-
dards should always be prioritised:at all times, 
the most progressive standards should be given 
preference, be they national or international. In 
general, as much detail as possible on the pro-
cedural law to be used should be included in the 
legal framework itself to guide the hybrid’s func-
tioning.
Particularly important contributions of RPE are 
to:
• Ensure that the rights of defendants are up-
held through the court process
• Establish procedures for effective and expe-
ditious trials 
• Ensure that the rights of victims are upheld 
through the court process 
• Avoid putting victims, in particular those who 
appear as witnesses, at risk of re-traumatisa-
tion
• Provide for the effective protection of wit-
nesses 
• Establish a clear and straight-forward victim 
application and participation regime 
• Prescribe robust evidence gathering and han-
dling procedures (including clear rules on dis-
closure and relevant procedural timelines) in 
order to strengthen the presentation of cases 
• Allow for organised and efficient disclosure 
of evidence between the parties and to the 
judges.
The RPE may also be used to regulate the use of 
intermediaries, which has proved challenging for 
past hybrids and the ICC, although this could also 
be regulated by internal protocols rather than 
through procedural law. Intermediaries facilitate 
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access to victims and witnesses, and are there-
fore necessary for effective prosecutions, but the 
use of intermediaries needs to be guided by the 
RPE, which should:
• define the status of intermediaries 
• define the scope of their use 
• set out the ethical expectations for intermedi-
aries’ engagement with victims and witnesses 
• manage the potential tensions between con-
fidentiality and disclosure that their use gen-
erates.
Serious questions about the engagement of in-
termediaries in witness tampering as well as 
non-disclosure of evidence provided by inter-
mediaries on a confidential basis have arisen in 
cases at the ICC, so hybrids should give careful 
attention to their policies and practices concern-
ing intermediaries (see also Section 5(b) below on 
Running Investigations). 48
The RPE should additionally determine admissi-
bility standards for forms of evidence. This might 
include evidence derived from unconventional 
sources. A growing phenomenon is the develop-
ment of smartphone apps that people who ob-
serve violence can use to record what they are 
seeing and upload it for review and storage by 
an international NGO. The Eyewitness Project is 
a good example here. If well designed, such apps 
can protect the integrity of evidence captured by 
them, while helping to ensure a clean chain of 
custody and the admissibility of the evidence. If 
such apps were in use during the concerned con-
48 A valuable discussion of the roles of intermediaries and the challenges that their use poses in international criminal prosecu-
tion can be found here: Open Society Justice Initiative, Intermediaries and the International Criminal Court: A Role for the Assembly 
of States Parties ,  Open Society Foundations (2011), available at: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/publications/interme-
diaries-and-international-criminal-court-role-assembly-states-parties, and the International Criminal Court, Code of Conduct for 
Intermediaries  (2014), available at: https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/lt/CCI-Eng.pdf
49 Donlon, Fidelma, “Positive Complementarity in Practice: ICTY Rule 11bis  and the Use of the Tribunal’s Evidence in the Srebrenica 
Trials before the Bosnian War Crimes Chamber”, in Carsten Stahn and Mohamed M. El Zeidy (eds.) The International Criminal 
Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice ,  Cambridge University Press (2014).
flict, investigators (and eventually other organs 
of the court) will need to determine how to treat 
such recordings. Additionally, in situations where 
conflict and atrocities were captured and dissem-
inated on social media platforms, it will be crucial 
to employ investigators who are specifically able 
to discern the probative value of open-source ev-
idence.
The RPE can also be important for the transfer 
of evidence and cases between the national and 
hybrid systems, and the use of hybrid evidence in 
national cases. However, such transfers can also 
be dealt with through separate law, as it is at the 
BiH WCC. If evidence is gathered, catalogued and 
stored in different ways between the two sys-
tems, it may not be admissible in both. Laws on 
process may also be stricter at the national level, 
meaning that a transfer of cases from hybrid to 
national courts can be compromised if the hybrid 
RPE do not mirror national RPE. 49
The act of transferring cases creates links be-
tween the hybrid and national systems and is an 
important aspect of the hybrid’s legacy. The abili-
ty to transfer cases also helps to limit the lifespan 
of the tribunal. The potential transfer of evidence 
and cases should form part of the negotiations 
with the host country, with an awareness of the 
challenges this will pose in terms of how much of 
the hybrid’s evidence is shared and with whom. 
Proper protections for affected parties should be 
built into the RPE. Ideally, investigatory material 
would only be shared when the hybrid has devel-
oped a strong working relationship with the party 
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that the material will be shared with and can trust 
that the material will be used and stored respon-
sibly. Conversely, as hybrid trials are likely to be 
more expeditious if testimony from other cases 
(in national or international proceedings) can be 
used without recalling witnesses, standards reg-
ulating the use of testimony and evidence from 
other proceedings should be included in the RPE.
The practice of establishing the RPE at the STL 
was commendable according to many in the field 
of international criminal law. Justice Cassese, as 
President of the STL, issued an explanatory mem-
orandum explaining “the President’s view as to 
the principal procedural problems likely to arise 
before the STL and the rationale underpinning 
their solutions in the RPE.” 50 This functioned to 
explain the relationship between national and in-
ternational rules, and to outline how the tribunal 
could interpret its own rules, though critics re-
gard it as demonstrating procedural bias on the 
part of the President. Perhaps more commend-
able was the process at the KSC. The RPE for the 
KSC went through various rounds of scrutiny, in-
cluding a review by the Supreme Court of Kosovo, 
before being adopted. 
Useful Resources:
Donlon, Fidelma, “Positive Complementarity in 
Practice: ICTY Rule 11bis and the Use of the Tribu-
nal’s Evidence in the Srebrenica Trials before the 
Bosnian War Crimes Chamber”, in Carsten Stahn 
and Mohamed M. El Zeidy (eds.) The International 
Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory 
to Practice ,  Cambridge University Press (2014).
 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Rules of Proce-
dures and Evidence, STL-BD-2009-01-Rev.10 
50 Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Rules of Procedures and Evidence, STL-BD-2009-01-Rev.10 (2009), available at: https://www.stl-
tsl.org/en/documents/rules-of-procedure-and-evidence/explanatory-memoranda 
(2009), available at: https://www.stl-tsl.org/en/
documents/rules-of-procedure-and-evidence/ex-
planatory-memoranda
 
International Criminal Court, Code of Conduct for 
Intermediaries (2014), available at: https://www.
icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/lt/CCI-Eng.pdf
 
Open Society Justice Initiative, Intermediar-
ies and the International Criminal Court: A Role 
for the Assembly of States Parties ,  Open Soci-
ety Foundations (2011), available at: https://
w w w . o p e n s o c i e t y f o u n d a t i o n s . o r g / p u b l i c a -
t ions/ in termediar ies -and- in ternat iona l - c r imi -
nal-court-role-assembly-states-parties
 
Sluiter, Goran, Hakan Friman, Suzannah Linton, 
Sergey Vasiliev, and Salvatore Zappala (eds.), 
International Criminal Procedure: Principles and 
Rules ,  Oxford University Press (2013).
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Section 4) Summary and Key Recommendations
Rules of Procedure and Evidence
Procedural law should be defined at the outset, with reference to local standards 
and international good practice. Where possible, RPE should mirror local RPE to 
make it easier for national justice officials to partake in proceedings, and to ensure 
that the same processes and standards apply to perpetrators tried in the national 
system. However, there may be circumstances where national law and procedure 
is lacking, and international standards may be necessary, e.g. for sexual and gen-
der-based crimes. 
 
When selecting or drafting RPE, hybrids should seek to ensure that defendants’ 
rights are upheld through the court process, that procedures are in place to ensure 
expeditious trials, that victims and witnesses are protected, that victims are not 
re-traumatised by the proceedings, and that clear protocols and procedures for 
handling evidence are in place.
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5) LEGAL FUNCTIONING
A) CASE SELECTION
While case selection is the primary prerogative 
of the independent prosecutor and OTP, the legal 
framework of the hybrid should outline the likely 
categories of crimes to be prosecuted and basic 
principles of selection. This should be relative-
ly broad in order to avoid dictating prosecutori-
al strategy, but should both guide and constrain 
the OTP’s work. Note, however, that all parties 
to a conflict (for a conflict-based hybrid) should 
be under the jurisdiction of the hybrid, in order 
to ensure the legitimacy of the tribunal (see the 
discussion of case selection in Section 3(b)(ii) on 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction above.)
Decisions should be made on the basis of the ini-
tial Needs Assessment for the hybrid, and should 
include the following contextual factors:
• Consideration of the nature of the context in 
which the alleged atrocities occurred. In par-
ticular, the drafters should consider whether 
the principles of selection should indicate a 
preference for representation of all parties to 
any conflict among defendants and whether 
the principles of selection should indicate a 
preference for representation of all types of 
crimes.
• The nature of the offences which were fea-
tures of the conflict (for instance, mutilations; 
forced marriage; child conscription, etc). The 
drafters should ensure that all potentially rel-
evant categories of international crimes are 
included, and in particular that the categories 
of crimes include any crimes that represent 
distinctive aspects of the conflict, where rel-
evant. Drafters should consider whether to 
emphasise such crimes as part of its princi-
ples of selection, particularly if they concern 
under-protected persons or represent histor-
ically under-examined aspects of internation-
al criminal law.
• The level of seniority of the likely accused 
persons. The drafters should consider wheth-
er the principles of selection should indicate 
a preferred focus on high-level perpetrators 
or not.
• The likely spoilers in terms of powerful actors 
who might have (or seek to have) influence 
over the hybrid’s proceedings. 
• The approximate number of trials envisaged 
(which helps to establish duration and fund-
ing requirements) or, if available funding is 
better known, the number of trials that will 
be possible given the funding likely to be 
available. 
• Whether the principles of selection should fo-
cus on those most responsible or provide an 
alternative guiding principle for prioritising 
cases and limiting the number of trials.
• The availability of jurisprudence from nation-
al or other international courts on relevant 
cases which the hybrid’s cases can build upon 
(this might be particularly useful if there have 
been successful cases against lower-level 
perpetrators upon which cases against more 
senior people can be built).
• The availability of relevant crimes defined by 
the national legal system (see the discussion 
in Section 3(b)(ii) on Subject Matter Jurisdic-
tion).
Another set of factors to consider is whether there 
might be national trials held simultaneously with 
those at the hybrid court and, if so, whether and 
how the hybrid court’s case selection might best 
complement and contribute constructively to cur-
rent or future national trials, by:
• Prosecuting high level or influential defen-
dants whom the national courts might not 
prosecute for reasons such as political stabil-
ity and national security.
• Identifying and addressing key legal issues 
for which the court can produce jurispru-
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dence and legal analysis that might provide 
guidance for national courts. Here, it is im-
portant to note that, if this is a priority for 
the hybrid court, the tribunal will also need 
to devote resources to its connections with 
national courts and judges, as discussed fur-
ther in Sections 7(a) and 8 on Outreach and 
External Relations below.
• Conducting investigations that might be diffi-
cult for national courts due to complexity or 
lack of resources. Here, drafters should con-
sider that the hybrid might play one of two 
roles: it might replace a national investigation 
and trial through its own investigation and 
trial(s), or it might enable additional national 
trials by conducting an investigation, holding 
its own trial(s), and then sharing the court’s 
findings of fact or evidence collected through 
its investigations with national authorities or 
courts. The role it plays will depend on the 
circumstances, and especially on the national 
system’s ability to ensure victim and witness 
security.
Based on the experiences of past hybrids, issues 
to take into consideration when drafting the rel-
evant sections of the Statute and planning hybrid 
practices include:
• Representation versus gravity :  Does the hy-
brid aim to prosecute those crimes that are 
determined to be the most grave? Is justice 
more likely to be served by seeking to pros-
ecute representative crimes on all sides of a 
conflict? Should the focus be on leaders or 
will mid-level perpetrators also be targeted? 
Statutes can refer to both the ‘most respon-
sible’ and ‘senior leadership’ in order to give 
the OTP broad scope in its procedural strat-
51 Ribeiro, Sara Ferro and Danaé van der Straten Ponthoz, International Protocol on the Documentation and Investigation of Sexual 
Violence in Conflict: Best Practice on the Documentation of Sexual Violence as a Crime or Violation of International Law ,  UK Foreign 
& Commonwealth Office (2017)
egy. As another example, the SCC refers to 
those with a “key role” and is functioning con-
currently with the ICC (see also Section 3(b)(ii) 
on Subject Matter Jurisdiction above).
• Historically under-prosecuted crimes :  Sex-
ual and gender-based crimes have histori-
cally not been an area of focus for hybrids, 
despite the pervasive harms that result from 
these crimes. The EAC’s reclassification of the 
charges against Habré to include sexual vio-
lence was a notable development in this re-
gard. One of the contributions that hybrids 
can make towards international law more 
broadly is to provide jurisprudence on un-
der-prosecuted crimes. The SCSL jurispru-
dence on the use of ‘bush wives’ as a distinct 
crime against humanity is an instructive ex-
ample. The International Protocol on the Docu-
mentation and Investigation of Sexual Violence 
in Conflict  outlines the different forms of ac-
countability that can be pursued.51
• Prosecutorial independence :  This should 
be guaranteed within the Statute in order to 
safeguard the OTP from political interference.
• Spoilers :  Most hybrids have had to withstand 
high levels of pressure and attempts to influ-
ence their case selection. This is particularly 
the case if persons likely to be accused by the 
tribunal hold senior positions or connections 
to the current government of the host state, 
or if the current government wants to see its 
adversaries targeted. There may be pressure 
to avoid targeting those currently in power, 
as their cooperation is likely to be needed 
for the hybrid to function. There may also 
be pressure not to target powerful external 
states, particularly funders, or their allies.
• Funding implications of mandate :  A nar-
rower mandate which constrains the likely 
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cases that the hybrid can take might make it 
easier to get funding, as funders will be bet-
ter able to predict the timespan of the hybrid 
and its likely targets. Mandate limitation for 
budgetary reasons should, however, be con-
sidered as ultima ratio  (the final argument) 
and avoided through solid cooperation with 
and deferral options to national courts. This 
is not necessarily limited to the courts of the 
country concerned; the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction by national courts should be en-
couraged.
• Number of trials :  It will inevitably be only 
feasible for the hybrid to prosecute a small 
number of trials in comparison to the number 
of offences and potential defendants. Thus, it 
is important for the OTP to not only be able 
to articulate some defining principles for case 
selection, but also to openly acknowledge 
that its prosecutions will be limited in scope. 
It also important for the OTP to articulate how 
it may be able support the development of 
other justice and accountability mechanisms 
such as national trials or a truth commission 
to address the many unprosecuted offences.
The OTP should put into writing and make public 
its case selection strategy. This renders its work 
more transparent and should ward off some of 
the criticism that previous hybrids have faced. 
It also strengthens the hand of the OTP in the 
face of powerful actors attempting to influence 
its case selection. 
The OTP should ideally continue to communicate 
with relevant groups (particularly victims and do-
52 Sellers, Patricia Viseur, The Prosecution of Sexual Violence in conflict: The Importance of Human Rights as Means of Interpre-
tation ,  OHCHR (2008). Available at: https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document/the-prosecution-of-sexual-violence-in-con-
flict-the-importance-of-human-rights-as-means-of-interpretation/; Grey, Rosemary, Prosecuting Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes 
at the International Criminal Court ,  Cambridge University Press (2019).
53 Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes  (2014). Available at:
 https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/otp-policy-paper-on-sexual-and-gender-based-crimes--june-2014.pdf
mestic civil society) as its prosecutorial strategy 
evolves in order to maintain transparency and fa-
cilitate domestic buy-in.
i) Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes
The challenges of prosecuting sexual and gen-
der-based crimes as international crimes as 
well as the reasons that they are historically 
under-prosecuted, are extensive and well-es-
tablished. 52 The challenges will not be overcome 
by piecemeal approaches. Hybrid courts should 
therefore adopt an explicit policy on the court’s 
approach to SGBC that articulates the role of the 
institution as a whole, including all tribunal or-
gans. If the institution as a whole is unable to 
adopt a policy on SGBC, the OTP should consider 
adopting one, as the OTP and its staff have signif-
icant influence on the success or failure of SGBC 
prosecutions. The policy paper issued by the ICC 
OTP is a useful reference point here. 53 A policy 
on sexual and gender-based crimes should cover 
all stages of proceedings from victim application 
through victim support, investigation, prosecu-
tion, adjudication and reparations, and should 
ideally commit the Principals and staff of the 
hybrid to integrating a gender perspective into 
all of their work. The policy might also commit 
the OTP to ensuring that charges for sexual and 
gender-based crimes are brought, as crimes per 
se  (rather than only charging as other forms of 
criminal conduct), wherever there is sufficient ev-
idence to support such charges. As part of its po-
sition on SGBC, the hybrid should also undertake 
to ensure effective and appropriate consultation 
with victims’ groups and their representatives in 
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order that the interests of victims of SGBC are 
taken into account at each stage of proceedings.
B) RUNNING INVESTIGATIONS
Fair trials rely on solid investigations. There have 
been challenges in the previous hybrids and in-
ternational courts in ensuring that investigations 
are conducted to the required standard to sup-
port counsel.
In order to improve the standards of investiga-
tions, hybrids need to employ highly qualified and 
well-trained investigators. Ideally, joint investiga-
tion teams should be established so that nation-
al and international investigators work alongside 
each other, with nationals either being employed 
solely at the hybrid and/ or being seconded from 
national investigation teams. This worked well at 
the BiH WCC. Building this kind of team will be re-
source-intensive, not least as it will l ikely require 
the provision of language classes as well as other 
training, but it is likely to lead to more robust and 
effective prosecutions.
To safeguard the rights of the defendant, the 
role of investigators (and more fundamentally 
the scope and mandate of the OTP) needs to be 
established clearly and early in the process of 
setting up a hybrid. Specifically, it is crucial to 
clarify whether OTP investigators are required to 
look for exculpatory as well as inculpatory evi-
dence, or whether their job is to provide evidence 
to support prosecution. In addition, defence in-
vestigations should be properly resourced. They 
should have similarly highly-qualified and well-
trained investigators, with the concomitant pos-
sibility of using both national and international 
investigators.
54 Ribeiro, Sara Ferro and Danaé van der Straten Ponthoz, International Protocol on the Documentation and Investigation of Sexual 
Violence in Conflict: Best Practice on the Documentation of Sexual Violence as a Crime or Violation of International Law ,  UK Foreign 
& Commonwealth Office (2017).
Special attention should be paid to the relevant 
skill set of investigators working in hybrid tri-
bunals. Investigators are often the first point of 
contact from the hybrid court to victims and sur-
vivors. They are the professionals tasked with in-
terviewing witnesses and engaging victims. Hav-
ing well-trained and professional national staff is 
of the utmost importance as they will have to be 
sensitive to the situation facing victims and sur-
vivors, must be able to speak with victims in their 
native language, and must also have the ability 
to engage with interlocutors such as the nation-
al police and security services in order to access 
potential witnesses and evidence. Again, in sit-
uations with deep social and/ or identity-based 
divisions, care must be taken to ensure that in-
vestigators are, and are seen to be, independent. 
Everything necessary must be done to ensure 
that they respect the privacy of witness, victims, 
and survivors. Sensitivity training may be re-
quired to ensure that traumatised victims are not 
adversely affected by their contact with investi-
gators. There are excellent resources available to 
support the documentation of SGBC that should 
investigators should be aware of. 54
National and international actors may have dif-
ferent roles to play in investigations as victims 
and witnesses may prefer to engage with differ-
ent actors in different contexts. National inves-
tigators, for instance, may be more attuned to 
the needs and views of victims and survivors, and 
may have better knowledge of the context of the 
alleged crimes. However, in some situations, af-
fected communities may be more trusting of in-
ternational investigators and prosecutors, view-
ing them as having greater independence and/ 
or not being from institutions that previously 
committed harms or ignored the suffering of af-
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fected communities. Such sentiments should be 
ascertained in the Needs Assessment phase and 
subsequently inform relevant staffing decisions.
Investigators need to operate according to trans-
parent and well-established standards, and there 
must be adequate provisions for accountability 
to ensure that this is the case. The admissibility 
threshold at trial provides important checks and 
balances. Evidence obtained through ill icit means 
will be tested by the judges as to its admissibility. 
In addition, a hybrid should also have an explic-
it provision sanctioning offences against the ad-
ministration of justice. Such a provision applies 
to all parties to the proceedings and thus binds 
the OTP and the Defence. A useful template pro-
vision is provided in Article 70 of the ICC Statute. 
See also the discussion in Section 3(b)(ii) above.
Training should also be provided to investigators 
and counsel on the use of intermediaries, i.e. 
individuals or organisations who facilitate con-
tact between one of the organs of a court, or its 
counsel, and victims, witnesses or affected com-
munities. Investigators should be encouraged to 
work with other actors who have gathered rel-
evant evidence — for instance civil society or-
ganisations (CSOs), victims’ groups and interna-
tional investigatory bodies. Third parties such as 
CSOs or private investigation organisations can 
be very useful for hybrids, as they may have al-
ready gathered important evidence prior to the 
establishment of the court. Where private in-
vestigative bodies operate in the field, potential 
admissibility challenges of evidence collected by 
the latter may arise. However, working with such 
bodies may also boost the capacity of the tribu-
nal to investigate in areas where the court’s staff 
55 International Criminal Court, Guidelines Governing the Relations between the Court and Intermediaries  (2014). Available at: https://
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/lt/GRCI-Eng.pdf
would otherwise be unable to access due to se-
curity or non-cooperation issues. The challenges 
of working with civil society organisations should 
be thought through early in the process. For in-
stance, some of the evidence might not have 
been gathered using relevant standards for crim-
inal proceedings (i.e. chain of custody rules for 
evidence), and CSOs might be reluctant to share 
information among organisations with which they 
compete for funding. See also Section 4 on RPE 
above, and the Guidelines issued by the Interna-
tional Criminal Court for a discussion of the chal-
lenges of working with intermediaries. 55
Finally, to run effective investigations for the 
prosecution, cooperation is required between the 
OTP and the Registry. In particular, experience at 
past hybrids suggests that investigators need to 
be trained not to promise anything to victims and 
witnesses in return for their cooperation. This is 
also essential in order to manage the expecta-
tions of victims and survivors.
The resources listed in Section 5(c) on Running 
Trials, below, are useful to consult during the in-
vestigation phase.
C) RUNNING TRIALS
The Dakar Guidelines are focused on the many 
other aspects of establishing and running hybrid 
tribunals outside of trial practice. Excellent re-
sources already exist discussing good practice 
in running trials, alongside other prosecutorial 
functions. These include:
• The Manual of Developed Practices  developed 
at the ICTY, which has useful sections on trial 
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management and on Pre-Trial, Trial Manage-
ment and Drafting Trial Judgments 56
• The Manual on International Criminal Defence , 
also from the ICTY, which has sections on all 
aspects of criminal defence 57
• Prosecuting Mass Atrocities ,  from the Offices of 
the Prosecutor at the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL, ECCC 
and STL, which includes sections on infor-
mation and evidence management, evidence 
analysis, indictment and trial preparation as 
well as running trials 58
• Prosecuting Conflict-Related Sexual Violence 
at the ICTY and the Best Practices Manual for 
the Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual Vi-
olence Crimes in Post-Conflict Regions: Lessons 
Learned from the Offi ce of the Prosecutor for 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda , 
which document the challenges of prosecut-
ing SGBC and lessons learned at the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunals. 59
56 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research In-
stitute, ICTY Manual on Developed Practices ,  UNICRI (2017). Available at: http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/  Reports%20and%20
Publications/ICTY_Manual_on_Developed_Practices.pdf
57 United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) and the Association of Defence Counsel Practising 
Before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ADC-ICTY), Manual on International Criminal Defence , 
UNICRI (2011). Available at: http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/manual_developed_practices/
ADC_ICTY_developed_practices_en.pdf
58 Petit, Robert et al (eds.) Prosecuting Mass Atrocities: A Compendium of Lessons Learned and Suggested Practices from the Offices 
of the Prosecutors ,  International Association of Prosecutors (2014). Available at http://www.iap-association.org/ (membership 
required)
59 Brammertz, Baron Serge and Michelle Jarvis (eds.), Prosecuting Conflict-Related Sexual Violence at the ICTY ,  Oxford University 
Press (2016); Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTR, Best Practices Manual for the Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual Violence 
Crimes in Post-Conflict Regions: Lessons Learned from the Offi¬ce of the Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwan-
da, ICTR (2014) Available at: http://www.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/legal-library/140130_prosecution_of_sexual_violence.
pdf
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Section 5) Summary and Key Recommendations
Legal Functioning
Case Selection
Case selection should be the prerogative of the prosecutor’s office, and the court’s 
legal framework should clearly outline the categories of crimes to be prosecuted, 
as well as a basic selection and prioritisation information. The initial Needs Assess-
ment should inform case selection decisions. In particular, drafters should consider:
• Whether the selection process focuses on all parties to the conflict, as well as 
all levels of command. 
• The nature or gravity of the offence, or whether certain offences present oppor-
tunities to develop international jurisprudence.
• National legal capacity to handle certain kinds of cases.
• If national proceedings are ongoing, how can the hybrid’s cases contribute con-
structively to them? 
• Representation vs. gravity – good practice suggests that all parties to a conflict 
should be under the jurisdiction of the hybrid; however, there may be instances 
where more grave offences were perpetrated by one side to the conflict. 
• Wider vs. narrower mandates – limiting the number of cases a hybrid will take 
on may make it easier to secure funding but may subject the court to criticism.
The Office of the Prosecutor should make public its case selection strategy to ward 
off criticism of bias.
Investigations
Hybrids should employ highly qualified investigators trained in the particularities 
of atrocity crimes. Joint investigation teams are preferable to build local capacity 
and enhance international investigators’ understanding of the context. Investiga-
tors should be trained to interact with victims and witnesses in a sensitive and 
constructive manner.
Third parties may be useful to investigators but working with intermediaries should 
be governed by the Statue and by relevant training. Standards of evidence collec-
tion and admissibility should be considered from the outset.
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Running trials 
A number of resources already exist on running effective and efficient trials in inter-
national contexts. Drafters and hybrid staff should refer to these for good practices 
around information and evidence management, trial preparation, and trial proce-
dure.
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6) ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONING
The Registry fulfils a wide range of administra-
tive and support functions within a hybrid court, 
which are dealt with in turn in this section.
A) ADMINISTRATION
i) Human Resources
Human Resources (HR) are a key part of hybrids 
as they deal with a number of important issues, 
including: safeguarding transparent and properly 
regulated recruitments of staff and guaranteeing 
a comprehensive and accessible administrative 
framework regarding recruitment, rights and en-
titlements, and issues around pensions. Pension 
guidelines are particularly important where some 
staff are integrated into the UN Pension Fund, as 
in the STL and the SCSL. HR is also responsible for 
the efficient recruitment of staff with the right 
qualifications as the need arises for the tribunal, 
and for staff training. These considerations are 
more relevant for a hybrid tribunal that cannot 
afford the often excessive duration of recruit-
ments characteristic of larger organisations.
There is a general need to attract people with 
strong qualifications and to avoid high levels of 
turnover among staff as a means to ensure effec-
tive and efficient functioning of hybrids. There-
fore, conditions of employment must be made 
appealing to prospective staff. Of particular im-
portance are:
• The length of employment contracts and the 
certainty of those contracts being renewed. 
Ideally, employment contracts should be for 
a period of at least one year and should be 
renewed regularly. When the length of em-
ployment contracts is less than one year, or 
when renewal is uncertain, staff are often re-
luctant to accept positions and tend to search 
for new positions throughout their tenure at 
the court, producing disruptive levels of staff 
turnover. This can be particularly problematic 
when a tribunal is shutting down and posi-
tions are being eliminated.
• The availability of opportunities for promo-
tion and/or professional development within 
the tribunal. A hybrid tribunal’s lifespan can 
be quite long and individual trials may last 
for years. As such, if staff do not have an op-
portunity for promotion and the development 
of new skills within the tribunal, they will be 
likely to look for employment elsewhere while 
trials are still  ongoing. This can be disruptive 
to the progress of cases and undermine insti-
tutional knowledge about those cases. More-
over, such turnover can become particularly 
problematic when new international or hy-
brid tribunals are founded, creating a large 
set of new openings all at once and risking 
brain drain from other tribunals.
• The quality of living conditions, including se-
curity, level of comfort, and accessibility for 
travel.
In addition to managing conditions of employ-
ment, the tribunal’s HR staff should also estab-
lish other mechanisms for discouraging disrup-
tive turnover among staff, particularly mid-trial. 
Additional useful measures may include:
• Drafting employment rules that enable over-
lap between outgoing and incoming staff in 
order to permit the training and transfer of 
institutional knowledge.
• Streamlining hiring processes so that vacan-
cies can be filled efficiently in order to avoid 
gaps in staffing.
• Drafting employment rules that allow the tri-
bunal to respond to offers from other em-
ployers with counteroffers in a timely manner 
to retain key personnel.
• Offering financial or other incentives for staff 
to remain with the tribunal through certain 
milestones or through the end of their cases. 
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This may include financial bonuses, prefer-
ences for promotion, or preferential selection 
for moving to other capacities of the hybrid. 
In the past, UN salary scales have been used 
as a guideline (for example, in the SCSL, ECCC, 
and STL). So too have EU salary scales, as in 
the case of KSC. African Union-supported 
hires have also followed broadly relevant UN 
salary scales. Secondment from national ser-
vices is another possibility, but secondment 
is heavily reliant on the support of relevant 
states and thus connected to the risk of being 
slow and difficult to scale where secondments 
are for a shorter duration than the trial.
• Offering financial or other incentives for em-
ployees to continue employment until their 
positions are eliminated when the anticipated 
life span of the tribunal is winding down, in 
order to avoid a wave of pre-emptive depar-
tures. The SCSL, for example, used this strat-
egy.
• Attempting to create a cultural norm by explic-
itly stating during the hiring process that the 
tribunal wishes to retain personnel through 
the end of cases and asking for a commitment 
in principle from staff to do so.
The recruitment process of judges and staff 
should be transparent and robust. This can in-
clude making criteria for judges and staff pub-
lic, possibly publicising a ranking system of can-
didates as is used by the ICC in the election of 
judges), and making the names and qualification 
of candidates, especially for high-level positions, 
known prior to their election in order to encour-
age public debate.
If part of the administrative structure of the tri-
bunal is made up of staff that have been second-
ed from state and government institutions, then 
it is essential that the administrative regulations, 
i.e. regulations on the recruitment and staff 
rules, explicitly state that there is no priority giv-
en to seconded staff. All staff must go through 
the recruitment process in the same manner as 
contracted staff. Job vacancies must be published 
and the posts open to both seconded and con-
tracted individuals. Some tribunals have opted 
for only having certain staff contracted. At the 
Kosovo Specialist Chambers, for example, all of 
the judges are contracted in order to ensure the 
equality of treatment among staff.
In some situations, secondments may be prefera-
ble to directly employed staff. This is particularly 
true in contexts where there may be a significant 
disparity between the salaries of national and 
international staff. Managing this issue can be 
difficult and requires deft and sensitive consid-
eration. The Special Criminal Court in the CAR is 
using a system whereby some staff are seconded 
from other states and continue to receive salary 
and benefits from the seconding state, while oth-
er posts are funded on UN pay scales through the 
budget of United Nations Multidimensional Inte-
grated Stabilization Mission in the Central African 
Republic (MINUSCA). However, when deployed, all 
international and national staff receive the same 
risk allowance.
If the tribunal seeks to incorporate seconded 
staff into its human resources plan, the tribunal 
should do everything possible to avoid the an-
nual rotation of seconded staff by states. In or-
der to avoid high staff turn-over and excessive 
re-training, the tribunal should negotiate with 
states to ensure that seconded staff can work at 
the tribunal for a set number of years. It is critical 
that these staff are bound by relevant provisions 
of the staff rules and the code of conduct of the 
court. In order to operate a regime with second-
ed staff, special rules will have to be incorporat-
ed for discipline and removal, which will entail a 
role for the member state from which the staff 
member was seconded.
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Another often overlooked component of HR is the 
hiring and employment of interns. Many interna-
tional and hybrid tribunals have numerous legal 
interns employed on a volunteer basis for six-
month to one-year stints. Provisions should be 
made for the terms of such internships. The Reg-
istrar may wish to include the hiring of interns 
with experience at other tribunals, especially at 
the outset. Such interns can be a useful source 
of information about recent jurisprudence in the 
cases they have worked on and provide a point 
of connection to other tribunals. Interns should 
be remunerated for their work. At the very min-
imum, they should have their expenses covered 
in order to ensure that internships are accessible 
to individuals from diverse financial backgrounds 
and to those who may otherwise not be able to 
afford to work without pay.
Capacity building and training:
 
If capacity building is an aim of the tribunal (see 
Section 7 below), then this role should be built 
into job descriptions of court staff and the hu-
man resources structure. One way that this can 
be done is by incentivising mentoring, i.e. by 
including mentoring responsibilities in job de-
scriptions, establishing formal mentoring rela-
tionships, and including mentoring activities in 
performance reviews as well as consideration for 
promotion. Similarly, team structure and office 
placement can be designed in ways that are con-
ducive to mentorship. For example, international 
and national staff should be physically located in 
the same office space in order to enable collab-
oration to take place and should be assigned to 
the same teams, although one-to-one pairing of 
internationals and nationals in decision-making 
positions has been problematic at the ECCC and 
60 Ciorciari, John D, & Anne Heindel, Hybrid Justice: The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia ,  University of Michigan 
Press (2014).
should be avoided in relevantly similar circum-
stances. 60 Capacity building functions will also be 
served by prioritising certain staff characteristics 
in hiring that promote effective communication 
and shared legal concepts. This might include 
hiring international staff who share a common 
language with national staff (which should pref-
erably be a working language of the tribunal) and 
hiring international staff who have been trained 
or worked in a legal system similar to that of the 
concerned country (for example, common law or 
civil law systems). These characteristics are im-
portant for the efficient functioning of the tribu-
nal as well as capacity building.
The tribunal should also provide mandatory 
training for all incoming international and na-
tional personnel concerning key components of 
the tribunal’s structure and mission, as needed, 
i.e. the relevant international and national law, 
the national legal system, the concerned conflict, 
the national culture and politics, the tribunal’s 
aims and structure, and so on. Past hybrids have 
not always provided sufficient training, particu-
larly for international personnel. The fact that in-
ternational lawyers who have not been educated 
or practiced in the relevant national system may 
have to apply national law is an indicator that 
they must be trained. Likewise, if national law has 
been amended to cater for a hybrid, national law-
yers should also be trained. Appropriate training 
of all personnel helps to promote the experience 
of nationals and internationals working together 
and to combat the presumption that internation-
al practitioners are considered superior. Many 
hybrid staff will need further training, and this is 
also likely to be a function of HR to coordinate, if 
mandated as such in the regulatory framework.
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Useful Resources:
Baylis, Elena, “What Internationals Know: Improv-
ing the Effectiveness of Post-Conflict Justice Ini-
tiatives”, Washington University Global Studies Law 
Review ,  Vol. 14 (2015): 243, 259-65 & 301-303, 
available at: 
https://openscholarship.wustl .edu/law_globals-
tudies/vol14/iss2/6/
Baylis, Elena, “Function and Dysfunction in 
Post-Conflict Justice Networks and Communities”, 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law ,  Vol. 47 
(2014): 625, 636-38 & 667-70, available at: 
h t t p s : / / p a p e r s . s s r n . c o m / s o l 3 / p a p e r s . c f m ? a b -
stract_id=2345394
 
Bibas, Stephanos and William W. Burke-White, 
“International Idealism Meets Domestic-Crimi-
nal-Procedure Realism”, Duke Law Journal ,  Vol.59 
(2010): 637, available at: 
h t t p s : / / s c h o l a r s h i p . l a w . d u k e . e d u / d l j / v o l 5 9 /
iss4/1/
ii) Fundraising and Budget Management
 
If there is no option but to fund the hybrid court by 
means of voluntary contributions, the Principals 
of the court—typically the President, the Chief 
Prosecutor, and the Registrar (as well as some-
times the Head of the Defence Office)—should be 
involved in efforts to raise funds from relevant 
states. In general, it is preferable that the Pros-
ecutor continue to focus exclusively on relevant 
cases, but situations where there is a shortfall 
of funding will require an ‘all hands on deck’ ap-
proach. At the same time, it is also essential that 
the tribunal recruit a person with extensive fund-
raising experience. This individual should be able 
to prepare and adapt funding proposals, arrange 
events, and tie fundraising into the overall stra-
tegic priorities of the institution. This requires a 
deft combination of traditional fundraising and 
engaged diplomatic relations which, at all times, 
also preserves the independence of all organs of 
the tribunal.
Where funding is conditional, safeguards need to 
be built into the functions of the tribunal. This in-
cludes ensuring that relevant codes of ethics and 
conduct are signed by all staff and that, where 
there is improper behaviour on the part of staff 
in such situations, this can be investigated and 
appropriately reprimanded and/ or sanctioned.
The drawing up of the budget of a tribunal must 
be conducted with full transparency, with all ex-
penditures clearly justified. There must also be 
robust internal governance by way of financial 
regulations and audits with, at a minimum, an-
nual external audits conducted by independent 
auditors. At the STL and the SCSL, management 
committees were formed, comprising state do-
nors to the courts and the Registrar. In the KSC, 
the Registrar signs a grant agreement with the 
European Commission and works closely with a 
number of EU committees responsible for funds 
provided from the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy instrument.
There should likewise be a designated office/ sec-
tion dealing with budget management, including:
• Establishing relevant activity assumptions 
per budgetary year and matching this with 
expenditure assumptions.
• Expense tracking throughout the year.
• A reporting and evaluation function in order 
to provide transparent reports to the stake-
holders.
• A contingency planning function in case un-
foreseen activities generate unforeseen ex-
penses leading to over-implementation of the 
budget.
• A performance indicator/risk roster that can 
explain the reasons for any budgetary anoma-
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l ies. The budget office needs to have a strong 
strategic planning forum to liaise with Cham-
bers, the OTP, and other offices that repre-
sent major cost drivers (such as legal aid or 
witness protection). See Subsection (ii i) ,  be-
low, on internal accountability.
iii) Internal Accountability, Governance, and 
Audits
The functioning of hybrids will be heavily scru-
tinised by donors and interested parties, includ-
ing the media, civil society actors, and academ-
ics. It is therefore imperative to plan for strong 
internal governance and accountability from the 
outset. This includes the early establishment of:
• Rigorous and clear internal accountability 
processes, including the identification of who 
is accountable for which aspects of the insti-
tution’s functioning.
• A coordination council or group of senior 
managers (usually one level below the Princi-
pals) who will work on institutional manage-
ment issues, to avoid these being left to staff 
with insufficient authority.
• A schedule of regular coordination meetings 
between principals in order to coordinate the 
administrative activities of the court.
Internal accountability mechanisms should in-
clude a robust code of judicial ethics as well as 
codes of conduct for counsel and staff. These 
should be enacted as soon as the institution be-
gins its work. Having these systems in place is a 
useful means to show the host state and citizens 
that tribunal personnel can be held accountable 
if necessary. This is particularly important when 
a hybrid operates in a state where citizens per-
ceive that the national judiciary is corrupt or that 
international agencies are corrupt and/ or poorly 
managed. Clear and reasonable guidelines for the 
issuance of complaints regarding the conduct of 
staff by citizens or other staff should be in place.
The Kosovo Specialist Chambers are innovative 
in this respect as, for the first time, the model 
includes a constitutional court chamber as well 
as an ombudsperson, which provide additional 
remedies to persons who maintain their rights 
are being violated by the court itself. If the court 
does not apply the highest standards of human 
rights, then cases can be filed before the Consti-
tutional Chamber as well as the Ombudsperson. 
This model strengthens institutional accountabil-
ity. The ICC has an internal audit office as well 
as an independent oversight mechanism. Hybrids 
should have a single audit/oversight mechanism 
with a robust mandate that includes the ability to 
effectively address staff grievances.
Internal financial governance is imperative for 
attracting and managing funds. When building a 
hybrid court, it is important to be able to demon-
strate to donors that the money they entrust to 
the institution will be spent responsibly. Finan-
cial rules and regulations must be in place for the 
independent administration of the court.
In addition to internal financial governance rules 
and procedures, stringent auditing is essential. 
In transitional environments, it is not unusual for 
courts to be criticised for wasting money, and ac-
tors who want to attack the credibility of the court 
may allege the misappropriation of funds. Exter-
nal audits are an effective defence against this. 
They also establish a credible management track 
record that is essential for successful fundrais-
ing. Audits should be carried out regularly (annu-
ally at a minimum) and should ideally be carried 
out by external auditors or under the oversight 
of the Office of Internal Oversight Services at the 
United Nations.
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See Section 9 on Evaluation and Benchmarking, 
below.
B) JUDICIAL SUPPORT SERVICES
i) Court Management
It is vital to ensure information and court record 
security as well as the preservation of hardcopy 
and digital court records in a safe and secure 
manner. To achieve this, an important step for 
hybrids is to develop and implement policies and 
practice directions which prescribe the classifi-
cation of administrative and judicial records (i.e. 
confidential, sensitive, and public records) in-
cluding regulations on management, access, and 
the declassification of records.
Equally important is the adoption of regulations 
on filing of court documents in proceedings be-
fore the court. Ideally, practice directions on fil-
ings and classification and security of court re-
cords will be adopted in coordination with judges 
and the Office of the Prosecutor prior to com-
mencement of proceedings as a means to ensure 
a consistent approach to the management of re-
cords and the same system and standards are 
employed across tribunal functions.
Ideally, a hybrid court will have the resources and 
technology available to create and maintain an 
electronic system to manage court fil ings. A so-
called “e-court system” can save costs in the long 
term and enhance the security of court records. 
However, this may not be suitable in all cases due 
to the lack of relevant infrastructure as well as 
the costs of maintaining such a database. Courts 
reliant on paper records must pay the utmost at-
tention to the reproduction and distribution of 
court records as well as selecting appropriate 
vaults for court records.
It is essential to have court reporters/ tran-
scribers who provide accurate transcription of 
the proceedings. Preferably, court proceedings 
should be transcribed so that drafts are avail-
able on the same day and transcripts can go to 
the Chambers and relevant parties for review 
and revision if required. Audio-visual record-
ing of proceedings is highly desirable and very 
useful for judges in the course of deliberations 
as well as for outreach efforts. Where possible, 
streaming court proceedings online is advisable 
so that interested persons and communities can 
follow them. Accessible proceedings lend a sense 
of transparency to court functions. Streaming 
will require an effective IT staff that can manage 
audio-visual equipment for recording purposes. 
Given the sensitivity of atrocity crime prosecu-
tions, it is further crucial that the tribunal have 
IT equipment that can enable voice and face dis-
tortion systems and time delays in streaming in 
order to guarantee witness protection measures.
If there are no national court management staff 
or systems present, it is important to use exist-
ing rule of law and development programmes in 
order to support establishment and training. If 
there are staff but they need training, tribunal 
employees can draw on the expertise and prac-
tices of existing international/ hybrid courts (the 
STL system is a model here) or a foreign national 
system that may be familiar to the country.
ii) Victim and Witness Protection and Support
Critical components and duties of a Victims and 
Witnesses Unit (VWU) include providing protec-
tion, support, and psychological counsel for vic-
tims and survivors. This section deals with pro-
tection and support, while victim participation 
is dealt with separately in Section 3(i)(i i i)). The 
establishment of a VWU within the court’s legal 
framework is discussed in Section 3(d)(v).
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As a great deal of the success of the hybrid will 
depend on the quality of evidence obtained as 
well as the safety of participants in trials, protec-
tion of victims and witnesses is one of the most 
important functions of the Registry. Qualified 
staff must be recruited for protection. This en-
tails the ability to conduct and manage risk as-
sessments. Qualified staff must also be recruited 
for support functions, which includes managing 
the wellbeing of persons who testify by providing 
them with any necessary psychological support. 
Recruiting staff who have extensive experience in 
providing psychological support to victims of sex-
ual violence and trauma, children, and child sol-
diers is vital, as is providing specific and tailored 
services for victims of sexual and gender-based 
crimes, victims who are children or older per-
sons, or other particularly vulnerable victims of 
conflict. A review of the crimes and determina-
tion of the likely support services to be provided 
as well as the skill and professional experience of 
staff should be carried out early in the establish-
ment of the mechanism.
Further points to consider:
• Medical services for witnesses are very likely 
to be needed. It is important to ensure that 
there are funds in the budget to cover costs 
of witnesses’ health when they are in the care 
of the tribunal. If possible, this should be ne-
gotiated as part of health insurance schemes 
and policies.
• Legal services for witnesses may also be nec-
essary. While it will be a counsel support unit 
that caters for duty counsel as and when 
required, it is for VWU staff to ensure that 
victims are cognisant of their right to coun-
sel under certain circumstances (i.e. risk of 
self-incrimination).
• Facilitation of any other in-court protective 
measures as stipulated in the legal frame-
work and psychological stand-by support. 
• Ensure low-key operations of the unit. Train 
staff in appropriate security measures such 
as witness escort work.
• Information management: ensure systems 
and procedures are put in place to guarantee 
confidentiality of all information and records. 
• Ensure in-house expertise in monitoring so-
cial media for threats.
• Provisions for safe houses should be made, 
including for accommodation for witnesses 
who may not have protective measures but 
will need accommodation. At all times ensure 
that these locations are secure and appropri-
ate.
• Cooperation with host states and neighbour-
ing states is needed in order to have agree-
ments on relocation. Long-term arrange-
ments will be needed for some witnesses as 
well as short-term arrangements for others.
It is important to note that the duty to protect 
arises at the point at which a potential witness/ 
victim is identified or approached. Therefore, it 
initially falls upon the OTP or the Defence to pro-
tect witnesses — or, in case of the Defence, to 
notify the VWU of relevant protection needs. The 
duty moves to the Registry once the individual in 
question has been registered as a victim or wit-
ness. The OTP and the Registry staff providing 
services for victims and witnesses therefore need 
to coordinate their work during the investigation 
phase when the OTP is approaching potential 
witnesses. Such cooperation also extends to the 
relevant victim participation section if it is identi-
fying potentially vulnerable victims. There should 
be full disclosure of information from all sides in 
order to protect the security and welfare of po-
tential victims and witnesses. Linked to this and 
in order to avoid bias, the VWU should determine 
clear and independent protection programmes, 
including criteria related to the circumstances 
under which they will relocate victims and wit-
nesses.
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See also Section 3(d)(v) on the establishment of a 
VWU and Section 3(i)(i i i) on Victim Participation.
iii) Defence Support
Following the Needs Assessment phase, hybrid 
tribunal designers can decide on the most ap-
propriate structure that a defence office or de-
fence counsel support section may take. In the 
event that a Defence Support Office is made a 
part of the Registry, this organ’s responsibility 
relates in particular to the management of a le-
gal aid scheme and liaising with counsel assigned 
to represent the accused facing trial. This is the 
case for the ECCC, STL, and the KSC, in varying 
degrees.
Whether or not defence counsel (and their sup-
port staff) remain external to the institution or 
have the status of staff of the court, the Regis-
try support function is a necessary minimum and 
should: provide relevant administrative services 
to the defence team(s); provide a list of (duty) 
counsel as the need may arise; and monitor the 
legal aid scheme (for both defence and victim 
counsel).
Budget planning must always incorporate funds 
for defence counsel and the staff of the defence 
teams will need to properly investigate and pre-
pare their case, including the necessary resourc-
es to manage the case and records. It is also im-
portant to incorporate reasonable costs for the 
Defence to conduct their own investigations. This 
will include travel and translation costs. Appro-
priate office space should be also provided for 
defence teams with all equipment and general 
services and support.
Finally, if there is a need to train defence lawyers, 
doing so should be organised through the Regis-
try. Training can focus on, for instance, the areas 
of advocacy skills, drafting, as well as procedural 
and substantive law.
The aforementioned equally applies to victim 
counsel and their support structure, particularly 
where they are organised externally to the court.
iv) Translation Services
Depending on the languages used in the conflict 
and affected areas and as mentioned above, si-
multaneous interpreters would be required for 
the translation of proceedings. Interpreters and 
translators will need adequate training in the le-
gal terminology that will be applied in proceed-
ings, including in both substantive as well as 
procedural law. They will also require training to 
ensure familiarisation with the conflict area, in-
cluding place names, individual names, and other 
relevant terms and facts, that will be commonly 
used in courtroom. There should be extremely 
close coordination between the Court Manage-
ment Unit and the Interpretation and Transla-
tion Unit in order to develop and implement a 
system of prioritisation of translations, and also 
with the Records Management Unit in order to 
ensure non-duplication of document translation 
(see also Section 3(h) on Official and Working 
Languages).
v) Security
A hybrid’s security section needs to fulfil a di-
verse mandate, which includes: securing the 
premises and staff therein; vetting and assess-
ing the situation in the region/ country in order 
to provide relevant advice to parties outside the 
court perimeters; and providing security to the 
court’s IT structure (providing IT security can also 
be part of the IT unit). In addition, the section has 
to ensure that all staff follow relevant security 
protocols in their private life, since court employ-
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ees may be targeted due to their affiliation when 
on leave/ away from the premises.
Relevant training needs to be provided to securi-
ty staff, and transparent recruitment procedures 
need to be established in order to create a solid 
security network within the tribunal.
vi) Detention
Shortcomings in the management of detention 
conditions, detention facilities, and prisons can 
lead to human rights violations and jeopardise 
the integrity of the proceedings and the tribunal 
itself. Typically, accused persons should be held 
in a high-security environment when in custody 
during trial. Everything must be done in order to 
ensure that international standards are met and 
that those in custody are unable to interfere il-
legally with the proceedings or to intimidate wit-
nesses. Failure to achieve these goals may ulti-
mately undermine the tribunal’s credibility and 
potentially lead to witnesses, victims or affected 
communities losing confidence in the court.
In order to guarantee the highest standards of 
detention, tribunal designers should conduct a 
Needs Assessment with prison experts and law-
yers to determine if there is a relevant detention 
facility that can ensure the custody of suspects 
in a maximum-security environment and which 
can guarantee custody in line with the UN Nel-
son Mandela Rules on detention, formerly known 
as the “Minimum Standards on Detention”. The 
rules require, for instance, that all accused must 
be protected from torture, cruel and inhuman or 
degrading treatment. There must be respect for 
privacy and dignity. There must also be adequate 
space in cells, sanitation facilities, medical, venti-
lation and light, food, water and freedom to prac-
tice religion.
If a suitable facility does not exist, the hybrid 
may need to build or refurbish its own detention 
facility that meets international standards and 
has the requisite level of security. This has often 
been the case for prior hybrids. For instance, the 
SCSL built its own detention facility and addition-
ally used international facilities in The Hague. 
The BiH WCC and Kosovo Specialist Chambers 
also have their own detention facilities.
If the court is managing its detention function 
(which would be part of the Registry’s role), then 
rules of detention and complaints will need to be 
drafted and adopted. Draft rules should be pre-
pared in order to ensure that the minimum stan-
dards are in line with the Nelson Mandela Rules. 
It is generally advisable to present the draft rules 
to the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) for review and comments as they have spe-
cific and highly-regarded expertise in this area.
In hybrids and international tribunals, the ICRC 
is frequently mandated in law to supervise the 
conditions of detention. It is therefore advisable 
to coordinate with the ICRC from the early stages 
of the tribunal creation process in order to ascer-
tain if they are to be the supervision authority. If 
they are, an agreement will be required with the 
ICRC on the scope of supervision and the submis-
sion of confidential reports to the court on the 
Committee’s supervision visits.
With regard to hybrid tribunal staff operating in 
the detention facilities, they will generally be a 
mix of national and international actors. The ap-
propriateness of that mix can be ascertained at 
the early stages of tribunal design and creation, 
as well as during the Needs Assessment phase. 
During the Needs Assessment, it is important to 
determine if there are well trained national pris-
on officers who can deliver custodial services in 
line with minimum standards separate and apart 
from the standards at existing prisons.
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In general, it is essential that all international and 
national staff are trained on the Registry’s rules 
of detention, humanitarian restraint, as well as 
conducting general and cell searches.
It is also important to consider the location of the 
detention facility vis-à-vis family visits. There has 
been considerable debate about funding family 
visits for the accused. Overall, in deciding on lo-
cation it is important to consider a location that 
can facilitate family visits. However, there should 
be no general statutory obligation on the court 
to fund family visits. Establishing a trust fund for 
family visits funded by voluntary contributions is 
one option to fund such visits.
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Section 6) Summary and Key Recommendations
Administrative Functioning
Human Resources
Registry staff must be able to work impartially in a model that either incorporates 
international staff into a domestic system or is comprised of both international and 
national staff in a separate office.
Hybrids will need to attract qualified, dedicated staff, and will need to design con-
tracts and employment packages that entice staff to stay. The length of the contract 
should be at least one year, and subject to renewal. To avoid high turnover, con-
tracts should include opportunities for professional growth and promotion, and the 
court might consider incorporating financial incentives into contracts in order to 
encourage staff to stay for the duration of a trial.
Recruitment processes should be transparent and robust, and the court may benefit 
from making hiring criteria public to avoid accusations of nepotism or politicised ap-
pointments. Secondments from national institutions should still  go through a stan-
dardised hiring process for these same reasons, and these arrangements should be 
negotiated with the host governments for a set period of time.
Fundraising and budget management
If a court must rely on voluntary contributions, the Principals of the court should be 
involved in fundraising efforts. The tribunal should also hire someone with exten-
sive fundraising experience who is able to engage diplomatically with donor coun-
tries. Codes of ethics should govern fundraising, and conditional donations should 
be avoided. Budgeting should be transparent, and spending should be monitored 
regularly. All finances should be subject to regular audits.
Hybrids will be heavily scrutinised by external parties and must plan for strong in-
ternal governance and transparency. Establishing a coordination council of senior 
managers may be helpful in this respect. An ombudsperson model may also be con-
sidered for reporting corrupt or otherwise problematic practices.
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Judicial support services
Filing and preserving court documents is important for the court’s effectiveness and 
legacy. Ideally, e-court systems will digitise court records. If paper fil ing is used, 
the court should develop a system for managing hard copy documents. To help af-
fected communities access court proceedings, a hybrid should consider streaming 
proceedings online.
Victim and witness units should provide protection and support, which may entail 
counselling services, health care, legal services, and physical protection. Costs asso-
ciated with these supports should be built into the hybrid’s budget from the outset.
Budgets should always include funds for defence counsel as well as their staff in or-
der to properly carry out investigations. Beyond ensuring the safety of victims and 
witnesses, security considerations range from the physical protection of the court’s 
premises, to protection of staff, and IT infrastructure.
Detention facilities should comply with the Mandela Rules on the Minimum Stan-
dards for the Treatment of Prisoners. If detention facilities in-country do not meet 
these conditions, then the hybrid may need to build and manage its own detention 
facility. Rules governing the use of detention should be drafted by the court, ideally 
in consultation with the ICRC. The Needs Assessment should help drafters deter-
mine needs and challenges around detention facilities.
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7) OUTREACH, CAPACITY BUILDING, 
AND LEGACY
Outreach, capacity building, and legacy pertain 
to the tribunal’s engagement with domestic con-
stituencies, including communities affected by 
the crimes being prosecuted, the domestic legal 
community, and the general public(s). A common 
feature among these three activities is that they 
are all concerned with promoting the court’s pos-
itive impacts in the concerned state, beyond its 
trials. Outreach is concerned predominantly with 
information sharing with all three constituencies 
listed above. Capacity building is concerned with 
enhancing the ability of national authorities to 
investigate and prosecute relevant crimes by en-
gaging with the legal community. Legacy also re-
lates to the tribunal’s long-term effects following 
the conclusion of its cases.
Of course, there is significant overlap among 
these categories, especially where the legal com-
munity is concerned, as well as between this dis-
cussion and that of the External Relations section 
that follows it.
A) OUTREACH
Outreach activities have emerged as a corner-
stone activity of hybrid and international tribu-
nals. They are generally aimed at affected com-
munities as well as interested communities inside 
and outside of the state.
The outreach and public information offices of 
tribunals, typically located within the Registry, 
have many tasks, including:
• Increasing awareness of the court’s activities
• Disseminating knowledge of the judgements 
and decisions of the court
• Bridging any disconnects between legal prior-
ities and processes with local understandings 
of atrocity, conflict, and justice
• Engaging relevant constituencies in the work 
of the court
• Challenging popular but damaging or poten-
tially dangerous narratives about the context 
of crimes or the hybrid
• Providing education regarding human rights 
standards and norms
• Facilitating communities in spending time 
with the tribunal’s staff
Effective outreach can be achieved in a multitude 
of ways, including:
• Organising community dialogues between tri-
bunal staff and relevant public(s)
• Engaging directly with victims’ associations
• Radio, newspaper, and television program-
ming
• Art exhibitions
• Developing grade-school programmes and ac-
tivities
• Peer-to-peer meetings between local legal 
and judicial actors and staff from the tribunal
• Designing and implementing an interactive 
and user-friendly website where key events 
are publicised and proceedings are live-
streamed
• Maintaining an engaged social media pres-
ence
• Engaging journalists regularly and in accessi-
ble language
• Surveying relevant communities and constit-
uencies, etc.
The most appropriate and effective means of 
reaching various constituencies can be, in large 
part, ascertained during the Needs Assessment 
phase and therefore identified prior to the cre-
ation of the tribunal. In general, outreach must 
form a key component of the hybrid tribunal’s 
work and its broader communications strategy.
The central importance of outreach activities re-
flects the adage that ‘ justice must not only be 
done but must also be seen to be done’. If the 
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work of the tribunal is to have a significant im-
pact beyond the courtroom, sophisticated and 
effective outreach activities need to be planned 
and implemented. Importantly, the design of an 
outreach programme for a hybrid court should 
be initiated at the earliest stages of planning the 
establishment of the tribunal—and not only once 
the court is up and running. Outreach should be 
seen as a core function of the tribunal from its 
outset and, beyond its importance to affected 
and interested communities, as a means for the 
tribunal to build support for its work.
Outreach should be aimed at the communities 
affected by atrocity and conflict as well as the 
wider interested public. The Needs Assessment 
process will inform where the affected and inter-
ested communities reside, and therefore where 
outreach activities should be primarily focused. 
Given the complexity of violent political conflicts 
and other situations of mass atrocity, this may 
not be straightforward. For example, for the Ex-
traordinary African Chambers, outreach activi-
ties relating to the trial of Hissène Habré were 
aimed at affected populations in Chad, but also 
to the Senegalese public and the wider interna-
tional community interested in the court’s work. 
Crucially, specific outreach activities must be de-
signed to reach victims and survivors who will not 
or cannot be represented in court or who cannot 
participate directly in the tribunal’s proceedings.
If the hybrid is to gain legitimacy amongst key 
constituencies, it is critical for outreach pro-
grammes to be designed so as to genuinely in-
teract and engage with affected and interested 
populations. This requires first building a com-
prehensive understanding of the specific commu-
nities that will be engaged in outreach activities. 
Here, it is important to note that there is an ev-
er-present risk of using outreach as a means to 
promote particular values and to tell constituen-
cies — which generally have a rich diversity of 
views on justice, conflict, and atrocity — what is 
‘good for them’. Outreach efforts must seek to 
be democratic, reach beyond local elites, and not 
only accept the diversity of views from affected 
populations but engage with, and respect, them 
— even if they are not in line with the underlying 
aims of the hybrid tribunal.
The advantage of hybrid tribunals with respect 
to outreach activities is that they are often lo-
cated closer to affected communities than other 
international courts. In such cases, it is important 
to ensure that staff responsible for outreach ef-
forts include local actors. This will ensure great-
er sensitivity to local and regional dynamics and 
improve the chances of successful outreach pro-
gramming.
While outreach should be a core function of any 
hybrid court and all tribunals should have an out-
reach office with dedicated expert staff, it is not 
necessary for the tribunal to do all of the out-
reach work itself. Indeed, tribunal staff are often 
poorly equipped to conduct effective outreach 
activities as they require significant communica-
tions expertise and resources. Moreover, there 
is no need to develop or duplicate expertise 
that may already exist amongst friendly organi-
sations and institutions outside of the tribunal, 
and which the hybrid court itself may tap into. 
Instead, hybrid courts may be able to outsource 
some outreach responsibilities to organisations 
that already house significant communications 
expertise. The EAC, for example, outsourced its 
outreach activities to a consortium of communi-
cations foundations and organisations who were 
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well suited to conduct outreach activities aimed 
at all of the relevant constituencies. 61
An important risk for hybrid tribunals to mitigate 
is that outreach activities may be perceived as 
promising certain outcomes to affected popula-
tions and thereby falsely raising expectations of 
what the court is able to achieve. For example, 
tribunal staff involved in outreach efforts may 
speak to the issue of reparations that could be 
provided by the court following convictions. How-
ever, giving the impression that reparations will 
be provided risks building support for the tribu-
nal based on monetary gain and incentives rather 
than on values of justice, accountability, or the 
deliverance of fair trials themselves. It also risks 
creating expectations that may not be met. Out-
reach efforts should avoid inflating expectations 
of what tribunals can deliver or creating perverse, 
monetised incentives to support the tribunal.
In addition to public outreach, hybrid tribunals 
should give particular attention to reciprocal 
engagement with national courts—especially if 
those courts are hearing or may hear related cas-
es. Studies of the influence of international courts 
on national courts suggest that such engagement 
is among the key factors in promoting greater 
national impact of the international court. 62 This 
engagement may take several forms. Hybrid tri-
bunals should ensure that national courts have 
access to their decisions and other key docu-
ments. Depending on the circumstances, this may 
mean translating the decisions into the appropri-
ate language(s) and providing physical copies di-
rectly to the courts or to judges, not merely post-
ing the decisions on the tribunal’s website. There 
may be networks of national and international 
61 Obara, Brian, “Outreach in the Hissène Habré trial was an exercise in winning hearts and minds”, Justice Hub (2017), available 
at: https://justicehub.org/article/outreach-in-the-hissene-habre-trial-was-an-exercise-in-winning-hearts-and-minds/
62 Baylis, Elena “The Persuasive Authority of Internationalized Criminal Tribunals”, American University International Law Review , 
Vol. 32 (2017): 611
NGOs that can facilitate these exchanges, as has 
occurred with key ICC documents in the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In addition, direct 
engagement between hybrid and national judges, 
attorneys, and other staff facilitates exchanges 
over relevant standards of law that are useful 
for both sides of the exchange. Staff in regional 
courts such as the European Court of Justice and 
the European Court of Human Rights have par-
ticipated in this kind of direct engagement with 
national court judges. While the outreach office 
will take the lead on many aspects of outreach 
activities, outreach with counterparts in the na-
tional court system requires leadership and par-
ticipation by other organs of the court.
See also Section 8(f) on relations with Civil Soci-
ety.
B) CAPACITY BUILDING
Hybrid tribunals may not be specifically mandat-
ed to conduct capacity building for the national 
system or domestic judiciary. However, in cas-
es where they are so mandated, they are widely 
seen as having an advantage over other interna-
tional courts due to the mixing of international 
and national staff. Working in a hybrid can repre-
sent an opportunity for national staff to develop 
skills and expertise in the practice of internation-
al criminal justice which can, in turn, strength-
en national capacity. However, it is important to 
stress that lasting and enhanced national capac-
ity cannot be achieved via mere osmosis. In or-
der to ensure effective and durable capacities, 
relevant efforts must be well-designed and avoid 
common pitfalls.
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First, a decision should be made at the outset 
of whether capacity building is a priority for the 
tribunal or not. Not all hybrid tribunals priori-
tise capacity building. The KSC plays no nation-
al capacity building role since it has no nation-
al staff. This choice is grounded in a context in 
which there have already been extensive capacity 
building efforts within the Kosovo legal system 
and in which there were countervailing concerns 
about influence on any national staff. Similarly, 
capacity building was not a priority of the EAC, 
which functions within the Senegalese legal sys-
tem and not within the legal system of Chad, the 
concerned country (although EAC staff did con-
duct capacity-building exercises with staff from 
the SCC, organised by the Wayamo Foundation; 
see below). Whether capacity building is an ap-
propriate aim will depend on circumstances that 
should be determined in the Needs Assessment. 
The existing strength of the concerned state’s le-
gal system should be assessed, and this should 
be considered when deciding whether to include 
both national and international staff. Similarly, 
the Needs Assessment should note other efforts 
aimed at rebuilding the concerned state’s legal 
system, such as ongoing rule of law programs in 
that state. Whether it would be possible to hire 
international staff who have experience of sim-
ilar legal systems and have relevant language 
skills, to enable them to collaborate in depth with 
national staff, should also influence decisions 
about including a capacity building mandate for 
the court.
Another key consideration in the initial determi-
nation about whether and to what extent to en-
gage in capacity building should be whether the 
tribunal is able and willing to devote resources 
to incentivise capacity building activities. As not-
63 Capacity Building Workshop for the Members of the SCC in the CAR, Wayamo Foundation, Dakar, Senegal, July 2017, http://
www.wayamo.com/africa-group-for-justice-and-accountabil ity/capacity-building-workshops-for-the-members-of-the-special-
criminal-court-in-the-central-african-republic/
ed above in Section 6(a)(i) on Human Resources, 
simply hiring national staff will not suffice. Rath-
er, the structure of offices and teams must be de-
signed to permit capacity building and personnel 
must be trained and encouraged to engage in ca-
pacity building activities.
As previously noted, there is a risk in post-con-
flict and conflict-affected societies of a brain-
drain from the national legal community into the 
hybrid court and, subsequently, into the inter-
national system. If this transpires, national staff 
won’t be part of an enhanced national system 
(though they may be pursuing careers that they 
prefer). Hybrid courts must try to avoid hollowing 
out local capacity whilst claiming that they are 
building it.
In addition to internal capacity building, anoth-
er means of helping to ensure that capacity is 
enhanced, even if some nationals pursue inter-
national careers, is to facilitate national staff to 
build capacity in, and provide training for, oth-
ers in the domestic legal community as well as 
at other hybrid tribunals. The latter is another 
important but oft-forgotten element of capacity 
building—trans-tribunal capacity building and ex-
changes with other courts. A good example of this 
were the Wayamo-organised capacity building ex-
ercises and professional exchanges between the 
senior staff of the Extraordinary African Cham-
bers and the judges and prosecutors of the CAR’s 
Special Criminal Court in 2017.63 
There are often rule of law initiatives ongoing in 
post-conflict states, including training for judg-
es and attorneys, legislative initiatives, as well as 
support for transitional justice mechanisms be-
yond the hybrid tribunal. Rather than engaging 
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in its own external capacity building initiatives, 
the hybrid may better expend its limited resourc-
es by supporting rule of law initiatives by these 
external international and national actors. At a 
minimum, hybrids should be conscious of these 
initiatives and the need to avoid drawing focus 
and resources away from them.
Moreover, staff from hybrids interested in capac-
ity building must ensure that their efforts do not 
simply narrow the capacity of national institu-
tions and officials. This can be avoided by focus-
ing not only on building capacity regarding core 
international crimes, but on other transferrable 
knowledge and skills that are relevant to the in-
vestigation and prosecution of other crimes, in-
cluding:
• The collection and preservation of evidence
• Building prosecution-led joint-investigation 
teams 
• Investigation and prosecution best practices 
that may be relevant to other forms of crim-
inality facing the relevant state, be it trans-
national organised crimes, terrorism, corrup-
tion, or high rates of ‘ordinary’ crimes
• Conducting politically sensitive investiga-
tions.
Above all, what capacity is needed should be 
defined by the domestic legal community and 
experts — and not by external staff with little 
knowledge of the state and the wider challenges 
facing it.
In some contexts, it may also be possible for hy-
brid courts to move their work into the relevant 
domestic court system over time. This may be 
particularly useful when a hybrid court is able to 
only investigate and prosecute a small subset of 
perpetrators, but a multitude of less senior per-
petrators remain at large or in detention. This 
transfer from the hybrid to the national system 
can act as a unique vector for effective cross-in-
stitutional and national-international collabo-
ration, training, and capacity building, and has 
been successful in the BiH WCC.
Finally, it should go without saying that interna-
tional staff will also develop their skills and ex-
pertise through their work at a hybrid. Capacity 
building is not a one-way process, despite capaci-
ty-building mandates usually focusing on enhanc-
ing national capacity. Opportunities for coopera-
tion and knowledge exchange among a range of 
staff should result in capacity being built well be-
yond the host state.
C) PLANNING FOR LEGACY
There is little evidence available as to whether 
previous hybrids have left successful legacies, 
but there is increasing support for the idea that 
legacy is in principle important for legitimacy — 
i.e. that hybrids should leave something useful 
behind when they cease to function. To maximise 
the capacity of a hybrid to achieve positive leg-
acies, the desired legacies should be identified 
in the initial Needs Assessment. These might in-
clude:
• Capacity building
• Support for a rule-of-law culture (if it is not 
already present)
• Support for local civil society 
• A physical legacy (the court building, prison 
and any physical assets)
• A historical archive
Ideally, the hybrid will leave more than fair trials 
and strong jurisprudence as its legacy. However, 
if accountability is the principal objective of the 
hybrid, then the integrity of proceedings and the 
quality of its jurisprudence would be a very sig-
nificant legacy, and not one to be compromised 
for other forms of impact.
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The Office of the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights has published an excel-
lent guide to legacy. The report emphasises the 
importance of planning at the outset for differ-
ent types of legacy, for instance in planning for 
capacity building. It notes that: “Ideally, justice 
sector assessment missions should undertake a 
comprehensive overview of the criminal justice 
sector and the state of the national legal frame-
work, which may take longer than the few weeks 
often set aside for this purpose. Planning mis-
sions should seek to engage with a wide variety 
of actors, including civil society, and may devise 
a checklist to this end.” 64
Experience so far suggests that, in terms of com-
paring potential legacy priorities, national staff 
often do not return to the national system to 
complete the process of capacity building, as dis-
cussed in Section 7(b) above. Notably, there has 
been relative success in establishing public ar-
chives via, for instance, peace museums where a 
copy of all the public records are available.
Useful Resources:
OHCHR, Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: 
Maximizing the Legacy of Hybrid Courts, United Na-
tions ,  New York, USA, HR/PUB/08/2 (2008), avail-
able at: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Pub-
lications/HybridCourts.pdf
 
Jalloh, Charles Chernor, The Sierra Leone Special 
Court and its Legacy: the Impact for Africa and In-
ternational Criminal Law,  Cambridge University 
Press (2013).
 
ICTJ, Exploring the Legacy of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone ,  New York, USA (2012), available at: 
64 OHCHR, Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Maximizing the Legacy of Hybrid Courts ,  United Nations, New York, USA, HR/
PUB/08/2 (2008): 9, available at: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HybridCourts.pdf 
https://www.ictj .org/sites/default/fi les/subsites/
scsl-legacy/.
 
Dittrich, Viviane, “Building a Legacy: Lessons 
Learnt from the Offices of the Prosecutors of 
International Criminal Tribunals and Hybrid 
Courts”, Wayamo Foundation, Conference Re-
port, Nuremberg, Germany (2013), available 
at: http://www.wayamo.com/wp-content/up-
loads/2018/02/2013 .11 -F INAL-REPORT-BUILD -
ING-A-LEGACY-Lessons-Learnt - f rom-the-Of f i c -
es -o f - the -Pr osecutors -o f - In ternat iona l -Cr i mi -
nal-Tribunals-and-Hybrid-Courts.pdf
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Section 7) Summary and Key Recommendations
Outreach, Capacity Building, and Legacy
Outreach
Outreach activities should help affected populations and the general public under-
stand and access the court’s activities. They should also help to disseminate knowl-
edge of judgments to the local legal community and help to shift damaging narra-
tives about the conflict. Among other methods, effective outreach may be achieved 
by:
• Engaging with victims’ associations and civil society groups
• Partnering with media outlets, particularly local media platforms using local 
languages
• Facilitating peer interactions between tribunal staff and the domestic legal com-
munity, and ensuring that hybrid staff reach out to domestic courts
‘Justice must not only be done, but must also be seen to be done’. Outreach should 
be seen as a core function of the tribunal for the outset. However, the hybrid does 
not necessarily need to take on all outreach responsibilities on its own — other or-
ganisations may be better at disseminating information, and hybrids should try to 
partner with them, when possible.
Outreach efforts should seek to shape the hybrid’s message and should focus on 
managing expectations about what the court could achieve — this is particularly 
important in managing expectations about reparations.
Capacity building
If a hybrid court has capacity building as part of its mandate, drafters should con-
sider what kinds of capacity building the hybrid should focus on. These choices 
should be informed by the Needs Assessment, and decisions about what kind of 
support is needed should be determined by the domestic legal community and rel-
evant experts. Hybrids should also be aware of rule of law efforts that are in prog-
ress in the country already — in some cases, the hybrid could offer support to these 
efforts rather than conducting its own.
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Capacity building efforts should focus on investigation and prosecution skills that 
could be helpful for national staff handling domestic cases, rather than focusing 
solely on core international crimes.
Planning for legacy
There is no consensus about what legacy hybrids should leave behind, nor evidence 
to evaluate the legacies of previous hybrids. However, legacy is increasingly seen 
as important for the legitimacy of tribunals. Legacy should be defined at the outset 
and might include jurisprudential development and accountability, or it might ex-
tend to building the capacity of the domestic justice system, or building a historical 
record of the conflict or atrocity.
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8) EXTERNAL RELATIONS
All external relations should be conducted in a 
manner that preserves the independence of the 
tribunal. The external relations duties of the rele-
vant organs in the tribunal should be clearly stip-
ulated from the outset so as to avoid any party 
overstepping its mandate and creating avoidable 
conflicts with colleagues in other organs.
There is broad consensus that relations with ex-
ternal actors and institutions should be divided 
among the various organs of the court. Most tech-
nical communications with external actors will be 
conducted by the Registry and will pertain to the 
court’s regular operations, including: the trans-
portation of staff, witnesses, and suspects; logis-
tical issues; security of staff; host state adminis-
tration matters, etc. Additional external relations 
activities can be housed with the Presidency of 
the court and the Office of the Prosecutor, which 
will deal with relations at a diplomatic level with 
the aim of increasing cooperation and building 
diplomatic support for operational activities that 
may be required to fulfil the hybrid court’s man-
date.
The designers of hybrid courts need to decide 
who will be the public face of the institution. In 
many instances, that will be the Prosecutor. If this 
is the case, a second public face should also be 
present during external relations exercises, such 
as the President of the tribunal, who will stress 
the importance of fair trials and the quality of de-
fence. The risk is to otherwise be perceived as an 
institution solely interested in prosecution rather 
than fair justice and accountability.
Defence counsel will,  in most cases, go through 
the Registry in order to engage with external ac-
tors as their engagement will be tend to be of a 
technical nature. However, where the Defence is 
a distinct organ of the court, it may also be en-
gaged in external relations, including outreach, 
seeking relevant cooperation from states, etc. In 
some instances, this is carried out through an as-
sociation of defence counsel that is established 
independently of the court. The limited mandate 
of a hybrid may, however, make the establish-
ment of such an external body impractical, es-
pecially if only a handful of external counsel will 
ever be involved with the court.
As the above makes clear, the ability of hybrids to 
effectively conduct and coordinate with external 
actors interfaces directly with a tribunal’s internal 
governance and relations. Certain activities, such 
as those in the ‘field’ pertaining to investigations 
and outreach, must be coordinated between the 
Presidency, the OTP, and the Registry. It is there-
fore advisable for the hybrid to set up a commit-
tee or group, composed of senior members of all 
of the court’s organs, who meet regularly to co-
ordinate efforts, ensure open communication be-
tween organs, and minimise any misunderstand-
ings, competition and/ or duplication of efforts. 
In addition to this, the Principals of each organ 
should be required to meet regularly (e.g. once 
per month or more frequently if the need arises) 
in order to discuss and resolve any arising issues. 
In general, effective internal governance of the 
hybrid court should be a priority from the outset 
as a means to ensure that the tribunal has pro-
cedures in place to reduce internal frictions and 
that it does not need to play ‘catch-up’ when ten-
sions or conflicts subsequently arise.
A) HOST STATE RELATIONS AND HOST STATE 
AGREEMENTS
and its domestic institutions is crucial for the 
proper functioning of the court, especially for 
hybrids located in the country in which the al-
leged crimes took place. The relationship will de-
termine the level of cooperation and access that 
investigators, prosecutors, outreach officers, and 
other tribunal staff will receive. National govern-
ments can also be essential in supporting securi-
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ty and witness protection arrangements at hybrid 
tribunals. Good working relations between hy-
brid court staff and national governments is thus 
critical for evidence gathering, logistics, securi-
ty, outreach, and capacity-building activities. At 
the same time, however, hybrid tribunals should 
avoid developing too much of an institutional 
dependency on national authorities, as doing so 
could subject the court to the risk of external in-
terference, threatening their independence and 
legitimacy.
A comprehensive and strong host state agree-
ment, regulating all areas of cooperation and 
support, including privileges and immunities, 
should guide cooperation. Specific to privileges 
and immunities, an agreement should be con-
cluded with the Host State that encompasses not 
only the premises but also its property, funds and 
assets, as well as any archives and documents. It 
is important that this is spelled out in sufficient 
detail to shield a hybrid court from any poten-
tial influence, particularly if established in a host 
state with strong political interests in or around 
the court’s potential activities. Immunities should 
also apply to all actors – from the Principals to all 
relevant staff of the court. This includes defence 
counsel and their assistants (as far as they are 
accredited with the court), as well as witnesses 
and victims participating in the proceedings (as 
far as a victim participation scheme is encom-
passed in the hybrid’s regulatory framework). 
Immunity provisions may vary in terms of rights 
encompassed (mostly depending on the level 
of seniority and function of the rights holder), 
but certain minimum immunity rights should be 
guaranteed for all of the aforementioned groups. 
These include immunities from arrest and de-
65 Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the Assembly of States Parties, 
First session, New York, 3-10 September 2002, Official Records ICC-ASP/1/3.
66 Part 9 of the Rome Statute provides guidance on the most relevant provisions and dispute resolution mechanisms.
tention; from seizure of personal baggage; from 
legal proceedings; and from immigration restric-
tions when entering on business for the court. 
The ICC Agreement on Privileges and Immunities 
provides helpful guidance here. 65 Similarly, all 
communication facilities of the hybrid court need 
to be encompassed by an immunity clause. The 
Memorandum of Understanding of the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon with its host state on the 
Lebanon Office provides guidance here, as does 
the ICC Agreement on Privileges and Immunities 
(at Article 11). Finally, the conditions of waiver 
should be clearly laid out to avoid potential fu-
ture complex litigation with the host state.
The cooperation with national governments (as 
well as with foreign governments – see below) 
on administrative status and other institution-
al matters is generally coordinated through the 
Registry. When it comes to technical cooperation 
on investigations regarding traditional police 
assistance such as searches and seizures, data 
provision, and location of persons, cooperation 
operates directly through the Office of the Prose-
cutor or the investigating authority of the hybrid. 
Once judicial proceedings have commenced, the 
Registry may take a more prominent role, either 
in executing measures ordered by the Chamber, 
or assisting the parties in their efforts. The entire 
cooperation regime, as well as the distribution of 
roles depending on the procedural stage, needs 
to be well established and articulated. 66 If the au-
thority of the Registry is not sufficiently strong 
to guarantee cooperation and a lack of state co-
operation becomes an issue affecting due pro-
cess and fair trial standards, then the Chambers 
should take up the issue.
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Host state agreements are available online for 
the KSC and SPO (at https://www.scp-ks.org/en/
documents/host-state-agreement-between-neth-
erlands-and-kosovo) and the STL (at https://www.
stl-tsl.org/en/documents/legal-documents/coop-
eration). 
B) FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
The Office of the Prosecutor will have the capac-
ity to engage in cooperation agreements with 
foreign governments, international organisa-
tions, and other relevant actors and institutions. 
Courts require state cooperation on a host of is-
sues, not least the enforcement of witness pro-
tection agreements, providing visas for staff, and 
providing legal assistance to court staff, etc. Such 
agreements may pertain to specific technical co-
operation measures in terms of investigations, 
information exchange, and the ability for inves-
tigators to conduct operations on another state’s 
territory. Such cooperation agreements often 
also contain provisions on privileges and immu-
nities. Early in the life of the court, the Office of 
the Prosecutor and the Registry should identify 
the countries in which the hybrid might operate, 
in order to have relevant agreements in place in 
a timely manner. This can provide protection and 
independence in the face of changing political 
tides and levels of state support.
Agreements with neighbouring states are par-
ticularly important in order to enable witness 
protection and potential provisional release/ en-
forcement of sentences. These agreements are 
frequently concluded by the Registry, often in 
parallel to relevant OTP cooperation agreements.
C) REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL BODIES
Hybrid courts are regularly created in situations 
where regional and international bodies and in-
stitutions are already active. These may include 
peacekeeping, stabilisation, humanitarian, or 
other missions whose express purpose lies with-
in the domains of peace, security, and civilian 
protection. These efforts may overlap, to some 
degree, with the aims of the hybrid tribunal. In-
deed, in some situations, like the Central African 
Republic, a United Nations peacekeeping force 
is providing the security in the capital of Bangui 
where the Special Criminal Court has been estab-
lished. Without that provision of security, hous-
ing the tribunal in Bangui would not be a viable 
option. In other cases, such as the DRC, UN mis-
sions are involved in supporting the investiga-
tive activities of the ICC. In some cases, regional 
and international bodies may not only provide 
important security measures but also come into 
contact with and gather evidence of relevance to 
possible investigations and prosecutions at the 
tribunal.
In such contexts, coordination and cooperation 
between institutions, missions, and the hybrid 
tribunal will be essential. Where possible, the 
hybrid should try to secure relevant cooperation 
(and protection) agreements. Such agreements 
would usually be concluded by the Registrar of 
the court, along with the court President’s au-
thority, as appropriate.
D) DONORS
While bearing in mind the ever-present need to 
be, and appear to be, independent, staff at hy-
brid tribunals must have close relationships with 
the representatives and ambassadors of donor 
countries within the host state as well as with 
the donor states themselves. It is important to 
regularly hold donor conferences and to provide 
donors with good budget forecasts which in-
clude milestones and plans of activities in order 
to maintain their support for the court. Putting 
together effective fundraising strategies in key 
states is also important.
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The court’s Principals should, in this context, 
reach out to the diplomatic community and hold 
bilateral meetings with key donors in order to en-
sure that the donors feel part of the process and 
can gain an appreciation of the court’s work, of 
course without providing them with privileged or 
sensitive information about the tribunals’ opera-
tions. As per the recommendations above, hous-
ing specific fundraising capacity at the hybrid is 
encouraged, to bolster and follow up on the Prin-
cipals’ diplomatic efforts to garner vows of finan-
cial support.
It is critically important to separate the source 
of money and method of receiving funding from 
the operations of the tribunal. Moreover, judges 
should not take any part in fundraising efforts at 
all and should be insulated from such efforts. 
Court officials must do everything in their pow-
er to avoid transactional situations where donors 
ask tribunal staff for an outcome in exchange for 
funding—be it a judicial outcome or a second-
ment of a national of the donor state.
See also Section2(e) on Funding, above.
E) OTHER COURTS AND RELEVANT ORGANISA-
TIONS
As noted above, hybrid courts may not be the 
only institution seeking to address the harms of 
political violence. Hybrids are often embedded in 
a landscape that includes other institutions that 
broadly share hybrid tribunals’ aims of peace, 
67 The ICTJ’s handbook on complementarity is focused on relationships between national courts and the ICC, but many of the 
issues covered are equally relevant to hybrid/ICC relations. See: Seils, Paul, Handbook on Complementarity: An Introduction to 
the Role of National Courts and the ICC in Prosecuting International Crimes ,  ICTJ, (2016), available at: https://www.ictj.org/sites/
default/files/ICTJ_Handbook_ICC_Complementarity_2016.pdf
68 Labuda, Patryk I.,  “ ’Open for Business’: The Special Criminal Court Launches Investigations in the Central African Republic”, Blog 
of the European Journal of International Law (2019), available at: https://www.ejiltalk.org/open-for-business-the-special-crimi-
nal-court-launches-investigations-in-the-central-african-republic/.
justice, and security. In this context, hybrids may 
not even be the only institution specifically seek-
ing accountability for crimes in the relevant state. 
Relations between hybrids and other institutions, 
including the International Criminal Court or oth-
er tribunals active in the region, the Internation-
al Committee of the Red Cross (see Section 6(b)
(ix) above on Detention), and other mechanisms 
of justice and accountability, such as national 
courts, truth commissions or commissions of in-
quiry, need to be spelled out and managed. Many 
of the relevant entities present in the situation 
state can be identified in the Needs Assessment 
phase, although some new ones may arise during 
the lifespan of the tribunal. External relations 
with these bodies can be usefully outlined in 
memoranda of understanding (MOU), which can 
ensure clarity, bolster mutual respect, and help 
to avoid ‘turf-wars’ between them.
In general, relations should seek to enhance co-
ordination and cooperation between these insti-
tutions but, critically, without undermining the 
mandate and, in particular, their independence. 67 
MOUs between tribunals with overlapping juris-
diction can encourage positive cooperation be-
tween investigators and prosecutors, as is the 
case between the ICC and the Special Criminal 
Court in CAR. 68 In Sierra Leone, the SCSL and the 
Truth and Reconciliation (TRC) also had an agree-
ment to ensure that evidence presented by par-
ticipants in the TRC process was not subsequent-
ly used in trials, in an attempt to avoid a situation 
where the work of the SCSL would disincentivise 
participants from fully and genuinely participat-
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ing in TRC proceedings for fear of being subse-
quently prosecuted.
Plans should be made from the outset for the 
possible transfer of cases between tribunals and 
national courts where relevant and appropriate, 
as discussed above in Section 4 on Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence. To make such transfers effec-
tive, legislation is required to enable the trans-
fer of cases and evidence to courts. Maintaining 
strong relations with the local judiciary also plays 
a constructive role. The relationship between the 
ICTY and the BiH WCC is a good example here.69
In situations where the OTP engages and cooper-
ates with other courts and relevant organisations 
in support of their investigation and prosecution 
activities, it is important that these do not con-
flict with those external relations procedures and 
agreements established by other organs, such as 
the Registry. Whatever the OTP does with regards 
to (co)operation agreements with other actors, 
the office should share with the designated of-
fice in the Registry, as the Registry is a neutral 
organ and should be fully capable of keeping OTP 
operations and agreements confidential. This is 
particularly true with regard to the protection of 
victims and witnesses. Cooperation between the 
OTP and Registry services must be one of full dis-
closure of relevant information and full confiden-
tiality between the two. As noted above, inter-
nal governance meetings between the Principals 
could be useful in avoiding such conflicts, and in 
preventing ambiguity of roles.
69 Donlon, Fidelma, “Positive Complementarity in Practice: ICTY Rule 11bis  and the Use of the Tribunal’s Evidence in the Srebrenica 
Trials before the Bosnian War Crimes Chamber”, in Carsten Stahn and Mohamed M. El Zeidy (eds.) The International Criminal 
Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice ,  Cambridge University Press (2014).
70 Baylis, Elena, “What Internationals Know: Improving the Effectiveness of Post-Conflict Justice Initiatives”, Washington University 
Global Studies Law Review ,  Vol. 14, (2015), available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2700832; Bay-
lis, Elena, “Function and Dysfunction in Post-Conflict Justice Networks and Communities”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnation-
al Law ,  Vol. 47, (2014), available at: https://www.vanderbilt.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/78/Baylis_Function-and-Dysfunc-
tion-in-Post-Conflict-Justice-Networks-and-Communities1.pdf
In addition to such formal cooperation with oth-
er courts about particular cases, hybrid tribunals 
will also benefit from informal relationships and 
collaborations with other tribunals and courts, so 
as to facilitate an exchange of jurisprudence, pro-
cesses and practices, technical expertise, and so 
on. On the international level, new hybrids can 
benefit from the experience of their counterparts 
at existing hybrids. Staff may well bring with them 
interpersonal connections with colleagues at oth-
er tribunals and should be encouraged to lever-
age these for the purpose of collegial information 
sharing. There are also some multilateral formal 
mechanisms in place, such as the International 
Association of Prosecutors and the Annual Inter-
national Humanitarian Law Dialogs, which host 
international and hybrid court prosecutors. On 
the national level, such mutual exchange of  in-
formation, expertise, and jurisprudence will also 
be beneficial both in extending the hybrid court’s 
impact on the national system and in enabling it 
to gain from the national courts’ expertise. 70
F) CIVIL SOCIETY
Strong relations with civil society can assist hy-
brids in accessing relevant populations and may 
boost domestic perceptions of their legitimacy. 
Section 7(a) on Outreach has discussed some as-
pects of this relationship, in particular regarding 
the dissemination of information. This section 
recommends establishing a formal mechanism 
for consultation with civil society so that infor-
mation flows both ways between the hybrid and 
relevant CSOs.
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The first step in planning relations with civil so-
ciety is to map the territory. This requires asking 
numerous questions, including:
• Which organisations represent which stake-
holders or constituencies?
• Which organisations have legitimacy and 
credibility?
• Which organisations are natural allies with a 
hybrid, and which are not? 
• Are NGOs the most suitable interlocutors for 
the court, or should it build relationships with 
other organisations such as labour unions?
Local knowledge and expertise should be relied 
upon to answer these questions. Once appropri-
ate partners have been identified, a court support 
network (as in the case of Bosnia) or an inter-
active forum (as with the SCSL) or periodic NGO 
roundtable meetings (as with the ICC) should be 
established, with key organisations invited to 
regular (e.g. monthly) meetings with senior staff 
at the hybrid, including the Principals. Where or-
ganisations are dispersed around or across coun-
tries, information can be shared and consultation 
requested virtually. However, senior staff should 
make efforts to travel to meet the main organisa-
tions several times a year.
Attention should be paid to the distribution of 
power in civil society and organisational relation-
ships should be periodically reviewed in light of 
these power distributions. Those organisations 
judged by the hybrid to be the most appropriate 
to consult will have their status raised by their 
relationship to the mechanism. Efforts should 
therefore be made to look beyond the most obvi-
ous or established civil society partners to iden-
tify, in addition, smaller or less powerful groups 
who have legitimacy among victims or publics, 
rather than working only with the most powerful 
organisations.
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Section 8) Summary and Key Recommendations
External Relations
As with the hybrid court’s other responsibilities, external relations duties should 
be clearly defined in the court’s founding documents. Broad consensus is emerging 
that particular organs may be better suited to play particular roles in external rela-
tions. For example:
• Technical communications related to trial proceedings and logistics with exter-
nal actors should be the Registry’s responsibility. 
• The Prosecutor is often well positioned to be the ‘public face’ of the institution.
• A second public face, such as the President, should also engage in external 
relations activities in order to avoid giving the impression that the court is 
unduly focused on prosecutions versus fair trials.
Host state relations and host state agreements 
Good working relationships between national governments and hybrid courts is es-
sential for their functioning. Finding an appropriate level of cooperation with the 
host state will be crucial to avoid potential political interference. A host state agree-
ment should regulate the areas of cooperation and support, particularly privileges 
and immunities.
Foreign governments, regional, and international bodies
The OTP should be able to engage with foreign governments and other relevant re-
gional and international institutions. Where relevant, the OTP may need to secure 
agreements on witness protection, extradition, visa issues, etc. The Registry should 
also help to manage these agreements. In countries where there are peacekeeping 
efforts underway, the hybrid should seek to coordinate with relevant actors to se-
cure protection agreements.
Donors
Principals of the hybrid should engage closely with the diplomatic community in 
order to ensure that donors understand the hybrid’s work. The hybrid must avoid 
transactional support from donor countries in order to preserve its independence 
and credibility.
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Other courts and relevant institutions 
Hybrids are embedded in an environment with other institutions that share the 
aims of peace, justice, and security. The Needs Assessment should identify other 
relevant bodies and efforts (e.g. truth commissions, domestic justice efforts and 
ICC investigations) and should draft relevant MOUs in order to enhance cooperation 
and avoid unnecessary competition between them. Hybrids should also ensure that 
plans to transfer cases between courts are defined from the outset.
Civil society
Relationships with local civil society organisations are helpful in terms of gathering 
and disseminating information and hybrids should ensure that they engage with a 
representative cross-section of civil society. Similarly, they should be cognisant of 
the political affiliations and power distributions between civil society groups and 
review their relationships periodically.
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9) EVALUATING AND BENCHMARKING 
HYBRID MECHANISMS
Planning for evaluation and the identification of 
performance indicators, notably in the form of 
benchmarks, should take place relatively early in 
the establishment of a tribunal. Informal but of-
ten influential evaluations of the work of the hy-
brid work will be made regularly by the press, vic-
tims, donors, researchers, and so on. Hybrid staff 
should conduct internal evaluations, including in 
response to benchmarks. Staff can also enable 
more accurate external evaluations by gathering 
and sharing of relevant information.
A) EVALUATION
As far as possible, the hybrid tribunal should be 
evaluated according to fair criteria which should 
include its stated aims and goals. At the design 
stage, efforts should be made to ensure that the 
goals of the hybrid are reasonable and achievable 
in order to avoid negative evaluations against un-
realistic standards. Identifying individuals who 
are accountable for the achievement of the iden-
tified aims and goals is also advisable.
Hybrids can be evaluated according to a wide 
range of criteria:
• Outcomes :  Positive outcomes are the ulti-
mate goal of hybrid mechanisms, though out-
comes cannot generally be evaluated until the 
majority of the mechanism’s work has been 
completed. These outcomes may be immedi-
ate or long-term; they may relate directly to 
the hybrid’s own work, such as the fairness of 
proceedings or the quantity of investigations 
71 Kersten, Mark, Justice in Conflict: The Effects of the International Criminal Court’s Interventions on Ending Wars and Building Peace, 
Oxford University Press (2016).
72 United Nations and the World Bank, Pathways for Peace ,  World Bank Publications (2018), available at: https://www.pathwaysfor-
peace.org/
73 Clark, Janine Natalya, International trials and Reconciliation: Assessing the Impact of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia ,  Routledge (2014).
74 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/un_rule_of_law_indicators.pdf
or trials, or they may concern external im-
pacts on the concerned state or communities. 
Outcome evaluation is made challenging by 
intervening variables—outcomes such as the 
socio-political impact of a hybrid are too far 
outside of its own control for it to be held ac-
countable for them. This does not mean that 
evaluation of socio-political impact is unfair. 
It is extremely important to try to understand 
the wider impact of justice mechanisms, in-
cluding the extent to which they contribute to 
or hinder peace, 71 conflict, 72 or reconciliation 73 
so as to feed into decisions on whether and 
how to establish hybrid courts in future situ-
ations. Evaluations of wider impacts can also 
explore the rule of law effects of the hybrid 
(the 2011 UN Rule of Law Indicators Imple-
mentation Guide and Project Tools, available 
here, 74 gives details on how to measure Rule 
of Law impacts). Such evaluations can also 
usefully assess the extent to which external 
actors made appropriate contributions to en-
suring that the hybrid generated positive out-
comes. These might include supplying funds, 
staff, resources, services and evidence, turn-
ing over accused persons, advocating for the 
tribunal, generating and maintaining the po-
litical will to ensure its success, etc.
• Mandates :  Evaluation against mandates is 
one of the fairest ways to evaluate a mech-
anism and underscores the need for a clear 
and realistic legal framework, which sets out 
the mandate of the court.
• Goals :  Goals might be expressed in the legal 
framework or derived within the institution 
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and should be broken down by organ where 
relevant. Goals should be linked back to the 
initial Needs Assessment. Which needs were 
identified and to what extent is the hybrid 
meeting them? Care should be taken in all 
communications from the mechanism not to 
overclaim on goals or unfairly raise expecta-
tions. 
• Processes :  Evaluation against processes is 
fair and reasonable. Processes should aim at, 
and demonstrably achieve, the highest stan-
dards of justice. They might also be evaluat-
ed against standards of efficiency in terms of 
use of resources.
• Values :  See below for discussion of how core 
values can drive standards. Values should 
be derived in such a way as to allow for on-
going evaluation on how well they are being 
achieved.
• Deterrence :  Deterrence is a common goal 
of international criminal justice, though the 
conditions under which is it achieved are not 
well understood. Some studies suggest that 
prosecutions of atrocity crimes or serious hu-
man rights violations do lead to decreased in-
cidents of atrocity crimes or increased obser-
vance of human rights law in future, but these 
studies remain controversial. 75 In general, it 
is thought that the likelihood of prosecution 
is a determining factor in some decisions to 
75 For example, see: Kim, Hunjoon, “Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights prosecutions for Transitional Countries”, 
International Studies Quarterly ,  Vol. 54 (2010): 939-963, available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40931149?seq=1#page_scan_
tab_contents; Vinjamuri, Leslie, “Deterrence, Democracy, and the Pursuit of International Justice”, Ethics and International 
Affairs ,  Vol. 24 (2010): 191-211, available at: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ethics-and-international-affairs/article/
deterrence-democracy-and-the-pursuit-of-international-justice/98DA0BB6062AA43121628E0AE929316A; Jo, Hyeran and Beth 
A Simmons, “Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity?”, International Organization ,  Vol. 70 (2016): 443-475, avail-
able at: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/can-the-international-criminal-court-de-
ter-atrocity/0A64E6F29E839427A0A5398EBD2273CB; Schense, Jennifer and Linda Carter (eds.), Two Steps Forward, One Step 
Back: The Deterrent Effects of International Criminal Tribunals ,  International Nuremberg Principles Academy (2016).
76 Milanovic, Marko, “Establishing the Fact About Mass Atrocities: Accounting for the Failure of the ICTY to Persuade Target Au-
diences”, Georgetown Journal of International Law,  Vol. 47 (2016), available at: https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?han-
dle=hein.journals/geojintl47&div=42&id=&page=&t=1558652611.
commit criminal activity, so any work that a 
hybrid can do to develop and/ or support ef-
ficient, powerful and independent national 
systems, which have much greater reach than 
temporary institutions, may be more likely to 
lead to long-term deterrence than the judg-
ments of the tribunal itself. The lack of clear 
evidence on the ways that courts do or do not 
deter future crimes make it very difficult to 
evaluate hybrids on their deterrence value.
• History writing :  Hybrids might reasonably be 
expected to uncover and test evidence that 
extends our understanding of the nature and 
context of the crimes prosecuted. However, 
the history told within international trials and 
judgments is unevenly accepted by affected 
societies, so the production of an authorita-
tive narrative should not be a primary goal of 
a hybrid. 76
• Conviction rates :  It is common but inappro-
priate to evaluate mechanisms according to 
conviction rates. The quality of justice is best 
measured through standards such as fair-
ness, transparency, provision of reparation 
to victims, and equality of arms than by the 
number of convictions.
Article 7 of the African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights (ACHPR) and Article 6 of the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights give further 
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criteria that evaluations can be designed around, 
for instance: 77
• The fairness of the proceedings
• The (reasonable) duration of the proceedings
• The publicity of the judgment/ decision and 
transparency of the process
• The protection of minors (and other subjects 
for whom it is appropriate to provide a form 
of assistance) 
• The comprehensibility of the prosecution, the 
course of the procedure, and of judgments/ 
decisions 
• The right to legal assistance and access to 
justice in general 
• Legal aid (when all the conditions are met)78
In all evaluations, a baseline for comparison 
should be established. No judicial mechanism 
will perform to an ideal standard, so comparisons 
to a realistic baseline (for instance, the relevant 
performance of other hybrids) as well as to an 
ideal should be undertaken. Some consideration 
should also be given of counterfactuals, that is: 
what justice outcomes do stakeholders believe 
might have been achieved if the hybrid had not 
been established? What were the alternative uses 
of the resources that have been invested in the 
mechanism? Is the existence of the hybrid an im-
provement on credible alternatives? A consider-
ation of counterfactuals (recognising that they 
can never be known with certainty in complex 
contexts) can help to build logical links between 
the existence or work of the hybrid and tangible 
change.
77 For more information, see: European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, Measuring the Quality of Justice,  Council of Europe 
(2017), available at: https://edoc.coe.int/en/index.php?controller=get-file&freeid=7500.
78 From European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, Measuring the Quality of Justice,  Council of Europe (2017), available at: 
https://edoc.coe.int/en/index.php?controller=get-file&freeid=7500.
B) CORE VALUES
A valuable way to support goals and drive high 
standards and an ethical culture is to identify and 
communicate (internally and externally) a series 
of core values for the hybrid. The values should 
be enshrined within codes of conduct for all staff 
and the code of judicial ethics as well as a code 
of ethics for counsel. There is broad international 
agreement regarding the core values that courts 
should apply in carrying out their roles. The key 
values to the successful functioning of courts are 
those that guarantee due process and equal pro-
tection under the law to anyone who has busi-
ness before the court.
Values suggested in The International Framework 
for Court Excellence include: 
• Equality before the law
• Fairness
• Independence of decision-making
• Impartiality
• Integrity
• Transparency
• Competence
• Accessibility 
• Timeliness 
• Certainty
C) BENCHMARKS AND KEY PERFORMANCE INDI-
CATORS
Benchmarking can be a useful way to conduct on-
going evaluations and is increasingly expected by 
funders. Benchmarks assist in building a trans-
parent and auditable court from the outset and 
appropriate benchmarks should be chosen as the 
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hybrid is being established. These benchmarks 
should be chosen in consultation with stakehold-
ers, such as victim communities, as well as do-
nors and the court’s Principals.
Benchmarking is most efficiently done using key 
performance indicators (KPIs). KPIs are usual-
ly items that can be measured as a binary (i.e. 
“Has a particular policy been drafted? Yes/ no”), 
a number (i.e., the number of active trials), or 
percentages (i.e., “what percentage of budget has 
been spent on particular items?”). KPIs are a sim-
plistic measure, and there are tensions between 
using KPIs to improve court legitimacy versus as 
a means of budgetary control, but regular data 
gathering through court management systems 
will ensure that the mechanism can establish 
baseline values and track changes over time. 79
The ICC has developed extensive performance in-
dicators, discussed in its reports on the develop-
ment of performance indicators for the ICC. The 
2017 report is available here. 80 Helpful bench-
mark indicators can also be found in the ICTY’s 
and IRMCT’s yearly reports to the UN on the tri-
bunals’ completion strategy. Further examples of 
benchmarks and KPIs can be found in the Useful 
Resources Section below.
Sufficient resources to conduct benchmarking 
and evaluations will need to be allocated to the 
Registry and, to a lesser extent, to the OTP. While 
these tasks might not appear to be a high priority, 
making efforts to evaluate the performance and 
impacts of courts should enable court principals 
and staff to improve performance if necessary, 
79 Ambach, Philipp, “Performance Indicators for International(ised) Criminal Courts – Potential for Increase of an Institution’s 
Legacy or ‘ Just’ a Means of Budgetary Control?”, International Criminal Law Review,  Vol. 18 (2018): 426 – 460, available at: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325328835_Performance_Indicators_for_Internationalised_Criminal_Courts_-_Po-
tential_for_Increase_of_an_Institution’s_Legacy_or_’Just’_a_Means_of_Budgetary_Control.
80 https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/171115-Third-Report-performance-indicators-ENG.pdf
and should contribute to the court being seen by 
stakeholders as a legitimate and effective actor.
Useful Resources:
 
There are a number of useful resources available 
for designing evaluation and benchmarking, in-
cluding:
 
Ainley, Kirsten, Rebekka Friedman, and Chris 
Mahony (eds.), Evaluating Transitional Justice: Ac-
countability and Peacebuilding in Post-Conflict Sier-
ra Leone,  Palgrave (2015).
 
Ambach, Philipp, “Performance Indicators for 
International(ised) Criminal Courts – Potential 
for Increase of an Institution’s Legacy or ‘ Just’ 
a Means of Budgetary Control?”, Internation-
al Criminal Law Review,  Vol. 18 (2018): 426-460, 
available at: https://www.researchgate.net/
p u b l i c a t i o n / 3 2 5 3 2 8 8 3 5 _ P e r f o r m a n c e _ I n d i c a -
tors_for_Internationalised_Criminal_Courts_-_Po-
tential_for_Increase_of_an_Institution’s_Legacy_
or_’Just’_a_Means_of_Budgetary_Control.
 
European Commission for the Efficiency of Jus-
tice, Measuring the Quality of Justice ,  Council of 
Europe (2017), available at: https://edoc.
coe. int/en/ index.php?control ler=get- f i le&free-
id=7500. Prepared by the CEPEJ-GT-QUAL on the 
basis of the preparatory work of Mr. Fabio Bar-
tolomeo. 
 
European Commission for the Efficiency of Jus-
tice, Checklist for Promoting the Quality of Justice 
and the Courts ,  CEPEJ 11th Plenary Meeting (2008), 
available at: https://rm.coe.int/european-com-
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m i s s i o n - f o r - e f f i c i e n c y o f - j u s t i c e - c e p e j - c h e c k -
list-for-promo/16807475cf.
Goldstone, Richard and Christine Van den Wyn-
gaert, “Evaluating the Performance of Interna-
tional Tribunals and Courts”, Brandeis Institute 
for International Judges (2016), available at: 
https://www.brandeis .edu/ethics/pdfs/ interna-
tionaljustice/biij/Performance_BIIJ2016.pdf.
 
Jalloh, Charles Chernor, The Sierra Leone Special 
Court and its Legacy: the Impact for Africa and In-
ternational Criminal Law,  Cambridge University 
Press (2013).
 
Kotecha, Birju, “The ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor 
and the Limits of Performance Indicators”, Jour-
nal of International Criminal Justice ,  Vol. 15 (2017): 
543-565, available at: https://academic.oup.com/
j ic j/art ic le-abstract/15/3/543/4061089?redirect-
edFrom=fulltext. 
 
National Center for State Courts, The Internation-
al Framework for Court Excellence ,  2nd Edition, 
International Consortium on Court Excellence 
(2013), available at: http://www.courtexcellence.
com/~/media/Microsites/Files/ICCE/The Interna-
tional Framework 2E 2014 V3.ashx.
 
Squatrito, Theresa, Oran R. Young, and Andreas 
Follesdal (eds.), The Performance of International 
Courts and Tribunals ,  Cambridge University Press 
(2018).
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Section 9) Summary and Key Recommendations
Evaluation and Benchmarking Hybrid Mechanisms
External, influential evaluations of the hybrid’s work will regularly be made by the 
media, donors, host governments, among others. Conducting regular, transparent 
evaluations may help the court describe its progress on its own terms.
Helpful evaluation criteria include:
• Outcomes—defined by goals in the court’s founding documents, which fall with-
in the court’s sphere of influence. Evaluating hybrids’ performance against so-
cio-political outcomes (like sustained peace) may not help the court understand 
its success given the number of intervening variables that influence societal-lev-
el outcomes. 
• Mandate—to what extent is the hybrid acting according to its mandate? 
• Goals—Is the hybrid achieving the goals it has set for itself? 
• Processes—how effectively are cases being handled (quality of investigations, 
efficiency of proceedings, witness and victim care, etc)?
Common criteria that should be avoided include:
• Deterrence—while this is a common goal for international justice, there is in-
sufficient evidence on the link between prosecution and deterrence even in reg-
ular criminal justice. 
• Conviction rates—these do not capture fairness, transparency, independence, 
competence, equality of arms, reparations, or other values of justice that a hy-
brid seeks to uphold.
Benchmarks and KPIs
Benchmarking through KPIs can help build a transparent and auditable court. How-
ever, KPIs tend to be simplistic, binary measures that may not provide court admin-
istrators with information to evaluate their performance. Gathering and analysing 
data through court management systems can at least ensure that the hybrid estab-
lishes baseline measures and tracks changes over time.
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10) CONCLUSION
The Dakar Guidelines are part of wider, ongoing 
efforts to capture and share lessons learned in 
past and present hybrid tribunals to aid in the 
design of future hybrids.  They should support 
attempts to achieve more meaningful account-
ability in contexts where a mix of national and 
international criminal justice has been chosen 
as a response to mass atrocities. The aim of the 
Guidelines was to set out key decision points and 
design options that should be considered when 
establishing and running a hybrid court. In par-
ticular, we sought to: (1) highlight particularly 
complex issues in the functioning and indepen-
dence of hybrid courts, and issues that have had 
long-term implications for previous hybrids and 
so should be given special consideration in the 
design phase; and (2) suggest design components 
that may increase the resilience of the court (i.e. 
the court’s capacity to act independently and to 
resist political, financial, and other pressures), 
and the resilience of affected communities 
through engagement with the court. We hope, 
therefore, that the Dakar Guidelines will be of 
use to anyone interested in designing as well as 
studying hybrid tribunals. 
In drafting the Dakar Guidelines, four Guiding 
Principles for actors involved in the establish-
ment of hybrid courts were identified: 
alised criminal justice.
1. The overriding design objective of hybrid 
court founders should be to build a genuinely 
independent institution, properly established 
in law, to maximise the integrity, effective-
ness and legitimacy of its organs.
2. The design of the hybrid court should respond 
as much as possible to the particular needs 
and circumstances of the concerned state(s) 
and to the conflict or situation that gave rise 
to the crimes at issue.
3. Hybrid designers will need to make choic-
es about prioritising certain aims or bene-
fits over others, rather than attempting to 
achieve all of the potential goals or benefits 
of internationalised criminal justice.
4. Continuous evaluation should be planned in 
from the outset, including by designing ap-
propriate, and where possible measurable, 
aims, goals, and benchmarks by which to as-
sess the tribunal.
Extensive further resources on hybrid tribunals, 
including a database that allows for easy compar-
isons between characteristics of past and present 
hybrids, are available at www.hybridjustice.com.
Hybrid tribunals, as we have tried to make clear 
throughout the Guidelines, operate in environ-
ments with a wide range of limitations and con-
straints. Moreover, like other options for justice, 
hybrids will not and cannot heal all i l ls, nor are 
they necessarily a path to peace. But, for those 
who support ending impunity for atrocity crimes, 
they offer the possibility of independent and ef-
fective prosecution as well as outreach and pos-
itive impact. When well-designed, they can make 
the best of unique opportunities. The crucial Risk 
Assessments, which should take place before ac-
countability mechanisms of any kind are estab-
lished or agreed upon, will make clear the con-
straints and opportunities in any given context. 
Constraints range from lack of political will to 
pursue accountability and political interference, 
through to active opposition to accountability 
mechanisms; from lack of resources to investi-
gate and prosecute all of those most responsible 
for atrocity crimes, to challenges in obtaining key 
evidence or suspects. Victims and survivors will 
invariably have contrasting views on what form(s) 
of justice should be pursued, and experts of var-
ious stripes will put forward competing claims 
about the best way for justice to be achieved 
in any given context. Establishing and running 
hybrid tribunals is an exercise in creativity and 
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compromise in the face of multiple constraints 
and diverse criticism.
If limitations and constraints can be managed, 
then hybrid courts have the potential to offer 
accountability for crimes that cannot or will not 
be tried elsewhere. Creating a tribunal with in-
ternational character can overcome constraints 
and immunities in domestic law. Meanwhile, 
constructing partnerships between national and 
international actors can lead to robust prosecu-
tions that assist in strengthening or rebuilding 
domestic systems and advance the practice of in-
ternational criminal law. 
The International Criminal Court, even if it over-
comes criticisms of its decisions and limited 
reach, will never have sufficient resources to try 
all those accused of the most serious interna-
tional crimes. National courts in states in which 
such crimes have taken place will often have 
been compromised or weakened by the political 
environment that facilitated the crimes and, as a 
result, may simply not have the judicial or politi-
cal capacity to investigate and prosecute atrocity 
crimes alone. In part for these reasons, the na-
tional-international partnerships at the heart of 
the hybrid tribunals are now seen to have utility 
in investigative settings too. The Dakar Guide-
lines focus on courts and tribunals, but there 
has been considerable innovation in the investi-
gation of crimes by hybrid ventures in situations 
in which a full tribunal would not be possible to 
establish. The International Commission against 
Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) is a U.N-backed 
commission set up in response to a request for 
assistance from the Government of Guatemala, 
to support, strengthen, and assist Guatemalan in-
stitutions in investigating and prosecuting illegal 
groups and clandestine security organisations re-
sponsible for organized crime and human rights 
violations in Guatemala. In addition to CICIG, a 
similar commission was established in Hondu-
ras (MACCIH) and another is proposed in El Sal-
vador (CICIES), where the Dakar Guidelines were 
launched in summer 2019. At the regional level, 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
has partnered with national governments in Mex-
ico and Nicaragua to establish Interdisciplinary 
Groups of Independent Experts to assist national 
authorities with the investigation of the 2014 dis-
appearance of 43 students in Mexico and of the 
violent events that took place between April 18th 
and May 30th 2018 in Nicaragua. At a more oper-
ational level, teams of international and national 
investigators are increasingly working together, 
with varying levels of national government sup-
port, in situations such as Iraq, Syria, Myanmar 
and Nigeria where the prospects of international 
criminal justice are severely limited. These com-
missions and groups have had mixed results but 
are an important part of a trend in which national 
and international resources are combined in the 
pursuit of justice.
The new forms of hybrid investigatory mech-
anisms mentioned above highlight that what 
is meant by ‘hybrid’ is continually changing. 
This reflects a dynamic legal landscape and an 
all-too-apparent need among justice communi-
ties to (re-)imagine and design new institutions 
and tools to meet growing demands for account-
ability. It was not long ago that hybrid tribunals 
were seen as being out of fashion. They have ex-
perienced something of a resurgence in recent 
years. Their renewed popularity may or may not 
last. Whatever the prognosis, we hope that the 
Dakar Guidelines will be of value to those pursu-
ing or evaluating hybrid justice. Whether or not 
more hybrid courts are established in the coming 
years, it is clear that the future of accountability 
for atrocity crimes is, on many levels, hybrid. 
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APPENDIX A: COMPOSITION OF HYBRID 
MECHANISMS
Key to the diagrams:
• Personnel shown as green shapes are national staff
• Personnel shown as red shapes are international staff
• Personnel shown as purple shapes are African Union staff
• Diamond shapes are Judges
• Circles are Prosecutors
• Triangles are Registrars
Organization of the Extraordinary African Chambers
Tribunal Regional
Hors Classe de Dakar
The Extraordinary African
Investigating Chamber
The Chambers
Dakar Court of Appeals
The Extraordinary African
Indicting Chamber
The Chambers
The Extraordinary African
Trial Chamber
The Extraordinary African
Appeals Chamber
4 Senegalese Investigating Judges
 
3 Senegalese Investigating
Judges
2 Senegalese Investigating
Judges
1 Presiding Judge (African
Union)
2 Senegalese Investigating
Judges
1 Presiding Judge (African
Union) 
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Organization of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of Cambodia
Ofﬁce of Administration 
Ofﬁce of the Director
Ofﬁce of the Deputy
Director
Budget and
Finance
Court
Management
General Services
Information and
Communication
Technology
Personnel Public Affairs
Safety and
Security
The Chambers
Pre-Trial Chamber Trial Chamber Supreme Court
2 international judges 3 national
judges.
2 international judges 3 national
judges.
All international judges have been
appointed by the Supreme Council
of the Magistracy of Cambodia
from a list of nominees submitted
by the UN Secretary General
Ofﬁce of the Co-Prosecutors
Ofﬁce of the Co-Investigating Judges
Cambodian National Co-
Prosecutor
The Cambodian National Co-Prosecutor is appointed by the Supreme
Council of the Magistracy of Cambodia
The International Co-Prosecutor is nominated by the United Nations
Secretary-General
International Co-
Prosecutor
Cambodian National Co-
Investigating Judge
International Co-
Investigating Judge
3 international judges 4 national
judges.
Victim's Support Section
Defence Support Section
Cambodian-led
UN-led
Manages victim complaints and supports
civil parties
Offers support to the defence teams
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Organization of the Iraqi High Tribunal
Cassation Panel Felony Courts Appeals Chamber
9 judges
Judges and Prosecutors
Affairs Committee
The Committee is comprised of 5 elected members from
Judges and public prosecutors, and shall be under the
supervision of the Cassation panel of the court. They shall
elect a President for a term of one year.
The President 
The Vice President
The Chief Judge of the Appeals
Chamber
Elected by the Committee
Investigating Judges
Up to 20 investigative judges, plus 10 reserve investigative judges
appointed by the Governing Council
Public Prosecution
Chief Public Prosecutor
Deputy Public Prosecutor
Administration
Chief Ofﬁcer
International/non-Iraqi“experts” to provide assistance and
expertise. International judges may be appointed by the President
5 judges
9 judges
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Organization of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and the Specialist Prosecutors Ofﬁce
The Chambers
The President
Basic Court Chamber Court of Appeals Chamber Supreme Court Chamber Constitutional Court Chamber
Roster of International Judges 
Judges are assigned from a roster of
appointees on an as-needed basis,
according to the Rules on the
Assignment. Judges are appointed by the
head of EULEX.
3 international judges
The Specialist Prosecutor's Ofﬁce
The Specialist Prosecutor
Prosecutors Police
The police within the Specialist Prosecutor’s Ofﬁce may
exercise powers given to the Kosovo Police under Kosovo
law in accordance with the modalities established by the Law
on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Ofﬁce
The Registry
Judicial Services Division Administrative Division
The Registrar
Immediate Ofﬁce of the
Registrar 
Public Information and
Communication Ofﬁce
Audit Ofﬁce
Court Management Unit
Language Services Unit
Detention Management Unit
Victims Participation Ofﬁce
Defence Ofﬁce
Chambers Legal Support Unit
Witness Protection and
Support Ofﬁce
Information Technology
Services
Security and Safety Unit
Facility Management and
General Services Unit
Procurement Unit
Finance and Budget Unit
Human Resources Unit
Ombudsman
3 international judges 3 international judges 3 international judges
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Organization of the Special Court for Sierra Leone
The Chambers
Trial Chamber Appeals Chamber
Ofﬁce of the Prosecutor 
2 international judges appointed by UN Security Council
1 Sierra Leonian Judge appointed by the Government of Sierra
Leone
1 presiding judge, elected by trial chamber judges
3 international judges appointed by UN Security Council
2 Sierra Leonian Judge appointed by the Government of Sierra Leone
1 presiding judge, elected by appeals chamber judges -- the presiding judge of the
appeals chamber is also the President of the Chambers
The Prosecutor 
The Deputy Prosecutor
The Registry
The Registrar
The President 
Elected by the appeals
chamber judges
Ofﬁce of the Principal
Defender  Administrative Ofﬁces
Victim and Witnesses Section
Shared by the Ofﬁce of the
Prosecutor
Appointed by the UN Security
Council
Appointed by the Government
of Sierra Leone
Appointed by the UN Security
Council
Responsible for providing protective
measures and security
arrangements, counselling and other
appropriate assistance for witnesses,
victims who appear before the Court
and others who are at risk on account of
testimony given by such witnesses.
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Organization of the Special Criminal Court in the Central African Republic
The Chambers
Une chambre d’Appel 
Appeals Chamber
Une chambre d’assises 
Assize Court
Une chambre d’accusation 
 speciale 
Pre-trial Chamber
Une chambre d’instruction
Examining Chamber
The Chief Judge
Statutorily aligned with the
Chambre Criminelle de la Cour
de Cessation de la Republic
Centrafricaine
Statutorily aligned with the
Cours Criminelles de la
Republique Centrafricaine
Statutorily aligned with the
Chambre d’Accusation of the
Court of Appeal de la
Republique Centrafricaine
Statutorily aligned with the
ofﬁces of instruction of the
tribunaux de grande instance de
la Republique Centrafricaine
2 national judges, 1 international judge
Presiding judge is a national judge
Section Section Section
Each section has three judges: 2 national, 1 international 
Presiding judge is a national judge elected by a simply majority of
judges in the assises chamber
Ofﬁce Ofﬁce Ofﬁce
Each ofﬁce has two judges: 1 national, 1 international 
Presiding judge is a national judge elected by a simply majority of
magistrates in the three ofﬁces
CAR National
Ofﬁce of the Special Prosecutor 
International Special
Prosecutor 
Substitute International
Special Prosecutor 
National Special
Prosecutor 
Substitute National
Special Prosecutor 
Special prosecutors are assisted by at least 2 substitutes.
Measure are taken to ensure parity between national and
international substitutes. 
The Registry
Chief Registrar - National
Deputy Chief Registrar -
International
Central Service
2 national judges, 1 international judge
Presiding judge is a national judge
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Organization of the Special Panels of the Dili District Court
UNTAET
Judicial Affairs Ofﬁce Human Rights Unit
Began investigating atrocities in
Timor L'este in 1999
The Dili District Court
The Special Panels and the Serious Crimes Unit developed separately and never functioned as a single institution. The SCU was not simply
an organ of the court, such as the Ofﬁce of the Prosecutor at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, as it basically operated as a quasi-separate
institution.*
Serious Crimes Unit
Public Prosecution Service
*Reiger, Caitlin & Marieke Wierda, The Serious Crimes Process in Timor-Leste: In Retrospect, ICTJ, 2006.
Special Panels of the Dili District Court Special Appeals Panels Dili District Court of Appeal
1 Timorese judge, 2 international judges
1 Timorese judge, 2 international judges. Or, in cases
of special importance or gravity, a panel of 5 judges
may be established.
Ofﬁce of the Deputy
General Prosecutor for
Serious Crimes
Has exclusive responsibility for series crimes cases
to be heard by the Special Panels
When it established the Special Panels, UNTAET also
created a Public Prosecution Service that included a
specialized unit to prosecute serious crimes. At this point the
SCU was transferred from the HRU to the Prosecutor General
ofTimor-Leste and became a subunit of the general
prosecution service.** 
UNTAET established the Dili District Court, and its Special
Panels, through UNTAET Regulation No. 2000/11
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Organization of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon
The Chambers
Pre-Trial Judge Trial Chamber Appeals Chamber
1 international judge 2 international judges 1
national judge. Judges elect
the presiding judge
3 international judges 2
national judges. Judges
elect the presiding judge
The President 
Judge elected by the appeals
chamber judges
Ofﬁce of the Prosecutor 
Prosecutor
Deputy Prosecutor
Appointed by the UN Security
Council 
Appointed by the Lebanese
Government
The Registry
The Registrar
Outreach Unit Victims Participation Unit
Victim and Witnesses Unit
Appointed by the UN Security Council
Victim and witness protection services
Shared by the Ofﬁce of the
Prosecutor
The Defense Ofﬁce
Head of the Defense
Ofﬁce
Defense Ofﬁce Staff
* * Current President is an international
judge, but both Lebanese and
international judges eligible for election.
List of Counsel
Only counsel admitted to the List are entitled to represent suspects and accused who
receive legal aid. 
In 2009, the STL used an Admission Panel to interviews persons who wish to be
added to the List, making them the ﬁrst international and hybrid court to do so. The
Panel determines whether an applicant meets the requirements of Rule 58 and 59 of
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and thus whether a person is qualiﬁed and
competent to appear before the Special Tribunal.
Senior Management Board
Composed of the President, the Prosecutor, the
Head of Defence Ofﬁce and the Registrar.
Intended ensure the coordination of the activities
of the organs of the
Tribunal.
The Senior Management Board shall meet once
a month at the initiative of the President.
* * Current Head of Defense Ofﬁce is an international judge, but
both Lebanese and international judges are eligible
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Organization of the War Crimes Chamber in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Criminal Division Appellate Division
Chamber II Chamber III
Chamber i (War
Crimes)
Organized Crime
Economic Crime
Corruption
General
Offences
Chamber Chamber ChamberChamberChamber
Within each chamber: 2 International
judges, 1 national judge
War Crimes
Chamber
Organized Crime
Economic Crime
Corruption
Chamber Chamber ChamberChamberChamber
Within each chamber: 2 International
judges, 1 national judge
Chamber II Chamber III
General
Offences
The Registry
Serves the Criminal and Appellate Divisions, and is shared by the Organized Crime Chamber. It is also responsible
for administering recruitment and appointment of international judges. 
During the transitional period, an international Registrar shall be appointed as Head of the Registry for the Special
Departments, responsible for the provision of support services to the Special Departments.
Legal Judicial
Support
Registrar for Chambers I
and II  Registrar for Chambers III
War Crimes Registrar
The Prosecutor's Ofﬁce of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Special Department I
(War Crimes)
Special Department II Department III
Organized Crime
Economic Crime
Corruption
General
Offences
Head of Department and
Deputy Chief Proseceutor
Section 1 Section 1 Section 1
Sarajevo and Eastern
Bosnia
Foca
Herzegovina
Neretva Valley
Northwestern Bosnia
Part of Posavina and
Central Bosnia
Eastern Bosnia
Part of Posavina
Srebrenica 
Court Management Witness Support Administration
The Chief Prosecutor
The Chief Prosecutor and the Deputy Chief Prosecutors shall be selected and appointed by the High
Judicial and Prosecutorial Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the Prosecutors of the
Prosecutor’s Ofﬁce. There is one Chief Prosecutor and four Deputy Chief Prosecutors.
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APPENDIX B: USEFUL RESOURCES
The following is a list of resources that readers might find useful, along with a short summary of each. 
The list includes those resources listed earlier in the Dakar Guidelines under specific sections, as well 
as more general items. The Hybrid Justice Project’s website contains longer lists of useful resources, 
including a literature review of hybrid courts, available here, 81 and reviews for each past and present 
hybrid, available via the Hybrids page. The literature review for each court focuses on analyses of the 
‘ impacts’ of these mechanisms. The reviews include resources that focus on internal evaluation, for in-
stance those that analyse the court’s legal framework, jurisprudence, and functional effectiveness, and 
resources that focus on external evaluation, for instance those that analyse the impact of the hybrid on 
communities and individuals, the country’s domestic justice system, and themes such as reconciliation 
and healing. 
Ainley, Kirsten and Mark Kersten, “Hybridization—A Spectrum of Possibilities”, in Carlson, Kerstin, Sha-
ron Weill and Kim Thuy Seelinger (eds.), The Habré Trial and Beyond: New Models of Prosecuting Interna-
tional Crime?  Oxford University Press (2019). This chapter uses the Habré trial as an example of how hy-
brid courts can become productive spaces for confronting persistent problems in international justice.
Ainley, Kirsten, “State Power, Head of State Immunity and the Crisis at the International Criminal Court”, 
in Alison Brysk and Michael Stohl (eds.) Contracting Human Rights: Crisis, Accountability, and Opportunity , 
Edward Elgar (2018) 179-93. This chapter examines recent attempts to undermine the ICC to establish 
the extent to which the Court is in fact biased, dysfunctional or powerless. It argues that lack of sup-
port from States Parties and UNSC member states is at least in part to blame for the Court’s perceived 
failings.
Ainley, Kirsten, Rebekka Friedman, and Chris Mahony (eds.), Evaluating Transitional Justice: Accountabili-
ty and Peacebuilding in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone, Palgrave  (2015). This book examines the successes and 
failures of the transitional justice programme in Sierra Leone, and describes the implications of the 
Sierra Leonean experience for other post-conflict countries, and particularly for impact evaluations of 
transitional justice. 
Ainley, Kirsten, “Transitional Justice in Cambodia: The Coincidence of Power and Principle”, in Renee 
Jeffery (ed.) Transitional Justice in the Asia-Pacific ,  Cambridge University Press (2014). This chapter, in 
one of the few books about TJ in the Asia-Pacific region, argues that the establishment of the ECCC was 
less a victory for advocates of transitional justice than it was a reflection of the interests of the Cam-
bodian government. By agreeing to a court to administer justice for past crimes, the government has 
diverted diplomatic and donor attention away from allegations of corruption and human rights abuses 
in the present. 
Ainley, Kirsten, “Excesses of Responsibility: the Limits of Law and the Possibilities of Politics”, Ethics and 
International Affairs ,  Vol. 25 (2011): 407-431. This article argues that atrocity crimes are often perpe-
trated by collective actors, and that war crimes trials should therefore be supplemented by non-judicial 
81 https://hybridjustice.files.wordpress.com/2019/02/hybridsoveralllit.pdf
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truth commissions that are mandated to hold to account individual and collective actors rather than 
simply to provide an account of past violence.
Ainley, Kirsten, “The International Criminal Court on Trial”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs , 
Vol. 24 (2011): 309-333. This article assesses the structure and operation of the International Criminal 
Court. It argues that the ICC has gone some way to ending impunity but is inevitably a political body 
rather than a purely legal institution, its use as a deterrent is as yet unproven and the expectation that 
it can bring peace as well as justice is unrealistic.
Ambach, Philipp and Klaus U. Rackwitz, “A Model Of International Judicial Administration? The Evolution 
Of Managerial Practices at the International Criminal Court”, Law and Contemporary Problems ,  Vol. 76 
(2014): 119-161, available at: https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol76/iss3/4. This article is a critical 
evaluation of the institutional and administrative framework of the International Criminal Court, includ-
ing its financial management, which contains useful insights for the designers of hybrid courts.  
Ambach, Philipp, “Performance Indicators for International(ised) Criminal Courts – Potential for In-
crease of an Institution’s Legacy or ‘ Just’ a Means of Budgetary Control?”, International Criminal Law 
Review ,  Vol. 18 (2018): 426-460, available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325328835_Per-
formance_Indicators_for_International ised_Criminal_Courts_-_Potential_for_Increase_of_an_Institu-
tion’s_Legacy_or_’Just’_a_Means_of_Budgetary_Control. Performance indicators function as a means of 
budgetary control, and while they are becoming increasingly central to benchmarking performance, 
whether they are enhancing the court’s legitimacy or supporting its broader impacts is unclear. 
Baylis, Elena, “Function and Dysfunction in Post-Conflict Justice Networks and Communities”, Vander-
bilt Journal of Transnational Law ,  Vol. 47 (2014): 625, available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2345394. Drawing on a series of interviews with internationals who have worked in 
post-conflict justice, this article examines the role of international practitioners in shaping the evolving 
norms of international justice.  
Baylis, Elena “The Persuasive Authority of Internationalized Criminal Tribunals”, American University 
International Law Review ,  Vol. 32 (2017): 611, available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=2944352. This article recommends that future hybrid courts should focus on influencing na-
tional courts in post-conflict states through their judgements as a means of increasing impact in those 
states. 
Baylis, Elena, “What Internationals Know: Improving the Effectiveness of Post-Conflict Justice Initiatives”, 
Washington University Global Studies Law Review ,  Vol. 14 (2015): 243, available at: https://openscholar-
ship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss2/6/. This article examines how internationals are develop-
ing the information and skills that comprise post-conflict justice knowledge, and assesses whether they 
are able to implement that knowledge. 
Bibas, Stephanos and William W. Burke-White, “International Idealism Meets Domestic-Criminal-Pro-
cedure Realism”, Duke Law Journal ,  Vol. 59 (2010): 637, available at: https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/
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dlj/vol59/iss4/1/. This article argues that hybrid designers must focus on discovery, speedy trial rules, 
witness preparation, cross examination, and victims’ rights in light of domestic experience. 
Brammertz, Baron Serge and Michelle Jarvis (eds.), Prosecuting Conflict-Related Sexual Violence at the 
ICTY ,  Oxford University Press (2016). This book documents the experiences, achievements and chal-
lenges of the OTP in prosecuting SGBC at the ICTY. The book argues there is a pressing need for sophis-
ticated strategies to overcome the ongoing obstacles in prosecuting conflict-related sexual violence 
crimes, and provides recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the future investigation and 
prosecution of SGBC.
Brandeis Institute for International Judges, The Authority of International Courts and Tribunals: Challeng-
es and Prospects ,  International Center for Ethics, Justice and Public Life, Brandeis University (2016), 
available at: http://www.brandeis.edu/ethics/pdfs/internationaljustice/biij/BIIJ2016.pdf. This document 
includes discussions on the role of international judges in building a coherent international legal order, 
internal aspects of the functioning of international courts and tribunals, and an evaluation of the per-
formance of international courts and tribunals. 
Brandeis Institute for International Judges, International Courts, Local Actors ,  International Center for 
Ethics, Justice and Public Life, Brandeis University (2015), available at: http://www.brandeis.edu/eth-
ics/pdfs/internationaljustice/biij/BIIJ2015.pdf. This document includes discussions of the international/
local relationship in the pursuit of justice, international courts and local politics, the local impact of 
international justice, and the role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in international justice. 
Brandeis Institute for International Judges, Oslo Recommendations for Enhancing the Legitimacy of In-
ternational Courts ,  Brandeis University (2018), available at: https://www.brandeis.edu/ethics/pdfs/Oslo 
Reccs Legitimacy of ICs.pdf. These recommendations were based on discussions with judges around 
strategies for enhancing their institutions’ legitimacy in the eyes of diverse stakeholders. 
Brandeis Institute for International Judges, Toward an International Rule of Law ,  International Center 
for Ethics, Justice and Public Life, Brandeis University (2010), available at: http://www.brandeis.edu/
ethics/pdfs/internationaljustice/biij/BIIJ2010.pdf. Includes discussions on the fairness and accessibility 
of international judicial institutions, the impact of international justice, the implications of diversity for 
an international rule of law, and issues of judicial independence in the international sphere. It also fea-
tures a keynote address by United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs Patricia O’Brien. 
Ciorciari, John D, & Anne Heindel, Hybrid Justice: The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia , 
University of Michigan Press (2014). This major study of the ECCC examines the politics behind the 
tribunal’s creation, its legal and institutional design, and the frequent political interference that has 
undermined its ability to deliver justice and to leave a positive legacy. 
Clark, Janine Natalya, International Trials and Reconciliation: Assessing the Impact of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ,  Routledge (2014). This book uses the results of extensive 
fieldwork to analyse the ICTY’s impact on reconciliation in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia and Kosovo. 
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Clark argues that reconciliation is not a suitable goal for a criminal court and that such courts must 
work alongside non-retributive transitional justice processes and mechanisms to realise the full goals 
of justice.
Cohen, David, “Hybrid Justice in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia: Lessons Learned and Pros-
pects for the Future”, Stanford Journal of International Law ,  Vol. 1 (2007), available at: https://heinonline.
org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/stanit43&div=5&id=&page=&t=1559832976. This article 
draws out the lessons learned from the experience of seeking accountability in East Timor and Sierra 
Leone to assess the prospects and challenges facing the ECCC, which was starting its work as the article 
was published.  
Cohen, David, Indifference and Accountability: The United Nations and the Politics of International Justice in 
East Timor ,  East-West Center (2006). This major study of the Serious Crimes process in East Timor criti-
cally analyses the performance of the various components of the hybrid, documents its flaws, examines 
the legacy of the SPDDC and draws lessons for future hybrids. 
Dancy, Geoff, and Christopher J Fariss, “Measuring the Impact of Human Rights: Conceptual and Meth-
odological Debates”, Annual Review of Law & Social Sciences ,  Vol. 13 (2017): 273-94, available at: https://
www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-110316-113333. This article examines the 
critiques of the use of indicators to evaluate human rights work (including human rights trials) and ar-
gues that international human rights law and its practice has contributed to social progress.  
Dancy, Geoff, “Impact Assessment, not Evaluation: Defining a Limited Role for Positivism in the Study of 
Transitional Justice”, The International Journal of Transitional Justice ,  Vol. 4 (2010): 355-376. This article 
argues that a distinction should be made between impact assessment and evaluation in transitional 
justice. Impact assessment can be carried out using positivist approaches, but evaluation requires that 
normative ideals are identified that the TJ mechanism can be compared to. 
Dittrich, Viviane, “Building a Legacy: Lessons Learnt from the Offices of the Prosecutors of Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunals and Hybrid Courts”, Wayamo Foundation, Conference Report, Nuremberg, 
Germany (2013), available at: http://www.wayamo.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/2013.11-FI-
NAL-REPORT-BUILDING-A-LEGACY-Lessons-Learnt-from-the-Offices-of-the-Prosecutors-of-Internation-
al-Criminal-Tribunals-and-Hybrid-Courts.pdf. This report, based on a conference held in Nuremberg, 
explores three main questions: what is the impact of the prosecution of international crimes; what are 
the lessons learnt on partnerships between domestic and international jurisdictions; and how can func-
tions currently undertaken by international courts be transferred to national systems?
Donlon, Fidelma, “Positive Complementarity in Practice: ICTY Rule 11bis and the Use of the Tribunal’s 
Evidence in the Srebrenica Trials before the Bosnian War Crimes Chamber”, in Carsten Stahn and Mo-
hamed M. El Zeidy (eds.) The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice , 
Cambridge University Press (2014). This article describes lessons learned from the process of transfer-
ring cases from the ICTY to the BiH WCC—a useful case study for drafters examining case transfer and 
hybrid legacy questions. 
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Drumbl, Mark, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy ,  Oxford University Press (2012). 
This book offers a new way to think about child soldiers that rejects narratives that depict them as pas-
sive victims, vulnerable and not responsible for their crimes. The book argues in favour of restorative 
forms of justice to promote rehabilitation and social repair after conflicts in which child soldiers have 
fought. 
European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, Measuring the Quality of Justice ,  Council of Europe 
(2017), available at: https://edoc.coe.int/en/index.php?controller=get-file&freeid=7500. Prepared by 
the CEPEJ-GT-QUAL on the basis of the preparatory work of Mr. Fabio Bartolomeo. This recent report 
gives extensive advice on methods of evaluation, including court evaluation through client satisfaction. 
European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, Checklist for Promoting the Quality of Justice and the 
Courts,  CEPEJ 11th Plenary Meeting (2008), available at: https://rm.coe.int/european-commission-for-ef-
ficiencyof-justice-cepej-checklist-for-promo/16807475cf. This document contains around 250 essential 
questions concerning all components of a judicial system to assess the quality of judicial services. How-
ever, the checklist does not include adequate questions about defence issues, the differential impacts 
of the court on different groups (for instance women or minority ethnic groups), or victim and witness 
participation, protection and support.
Fichtelberg, Aaron, Hybrid Tribunals: A Comparative Examination ,  Springer (2015). This book offers one of 
the only extended comparisons of the law and history of hybrid tribunals. It examines hybrids created 
in Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Cambodia, East Timor, and Lebanon, in terms of their origins, the legal regimes 
that they used, their institutional structures, and the challenges that they faced, and offers recommen-
dations for future hybrids.
Grey, Rosemary, Prosecuting Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes at the International Criminal Court ,  Cam-
bridge University Press (2019). This book analyses the ICC’s practice in prosecuting SGBC up until mid-
2018. It covers a broad range of topics, including wartime sexual violence against men and boys, perse-
cution on the grounds of gender and sexual orientation, and sexual violence against ‘child soldiers’, as 
well as documenting the challenges of prosecuting SGBC.
Goldstone, Richard and Christine Van den Wyngaert, “Evaluating the Performance of International 
Tribunals and Courts”, Brandeis Institute for International Judges (2016), available at: https://www.
brandeis.edu/ethics/pdfs/internationaljustice/biij/Performance_BIIJ2016.pdf. This document describes 
various methods of evaluating the performance of hybrid courts, and weights the pros and cons of 
these methods. 
Guilfoyle, Douglas, “Part I This is Not Fine: The International Criminal Court in Trouble”, Blog of the 
European Journal of International Law  (2019), available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/part-i-this-is-not-fine-
the-international-criminal-court-in-trouble/. This blog post (which includes 2 subsequent parts) pro-
vides an overview of a number of the ICC’s shortcomings and argues that the institution is in need of 
reform. 
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Hicks, Celeste, The Trial of Hissène Habré: How the People of Chad Brought a Tyrant to Justice ,  Zed Books 
(2018). This book tells the story of how Habré was brought to justice. Hicks argues that the conviction 
of a once untouchable tyrant has profound implications for African justice and for the future of human 
rights activism more broadly.
Hobbs, Harry, “Hybrid Tribunals and the Composition of the Court: In Search of Sociological Legitima-
cy,” Chicago Journal of International Law ,  Vol. 16 (2016): 482-522. Available at: http://chicagounbound.
uchicago.edu/cjil/vol16/iss2/5. This article examines the link between sociological legitimacy and the 
composition of hybrid courts. It finds that the presence of local judges on international criminal courts 
can enhance their legitimacy among the local community, and that the appointment of international 
judges should prioritise individuals from regional states, those of the same legal tradition, and individ-
uals who speak a language of the affected state.
Hobbs, Harry, “Victim Participation in International Criminal Proceedings: Problems and Potential Solu-
tions in Implementing and Effective and Vital Component of Justice”, Texas International Law Journal , 
Vol. 49 (2014), available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2428623. This article 
examines some of the difficulties involved in institutionalising victim participation, and proposes prac-
tical solutions for hybrid and international tribunals. 
International Bar Association International Criminal Court and International Criminal Law, Programme 
Report on the ‘Experts’ Roundtable on trials in absentia in international criminal justice’  (2016), available 
at: https://www.ibanet.org/ICC_ICL_Programme/ICL_Trials_in_Absentia_2016.aspx. 
This report summarises some of the underlying goals and justifications for trials in absentia. It discuss-
es the compatibility of trials in absentia and fair trials, and the perspectives of counsel and stakehold-
ers on trials in absentia in international criminal justice. 
ICTJ, Exploring the Legacy of the Special Court for Sierra Leone ,  New York, USA (2012), available at: https://
www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/subsites/scsl-legacy/. This is a useful multimedia project on the SCSL’s 
legacy, which describes and assesses the various legacies left by the SCSL. 
International Criminal Court, Guidelines Governing the Relations between the Court and Intermediaries 
(2014), available at: https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/lt/CCI-Eng.pdf. The ICC’s Code of Conduct for Inter-
mediaries offers guidance on working with third party investigative agencies, focusing on gathering and 
safeguarding evidence, and ensuring secure flows of information.  
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the United Nations Interregional Crime 
and Justice Research Institute, ICTY Manual on Developed Practices ,  UNICRI (2017). Available at: http://
www.icty.org/x/fi le/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/ICTY_Manual_on_Developed_Practices.pdf. 
The manual is intended to contribute to the process of capacity building within international and hy-
brid justice mechanisms by sharing ICTY experiences and established practices in the prosecution and 
adjudication of complex cases.
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International Commission of Jurists, International Principles on the Independence and Accountability of 
Judges, Lawyers and Prosecutors  (2007). Available at: https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4a7837af2.pdf. The 
International Principles contain practical guidance on the implementation of judicial standards, along 
with the text of relevant international and regional standards and norms.
Judicial Integrity Group, Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct  (2006). Available at: https://www.judici-
alintegritygroup.org/jig-principles. The Bangalore Principles are intended to establish standards for the 
ethical conduct of judges and to provide a framework for regulating judicial conduct. They have been 
endorsed by a number of UN agencies as well as by the International Commission of Jurists. 
Jo, Hyeran and Beth A Simmons, “Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity?”, International Orga-
nization,  Vol. 70 (2016): 443-475, available at: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-or-
ganization/article/can-the-international-criminal-court-deter-atrocity/0A64E6F29E839427A0A5398EBD-
2273CB. The authors present the first systematic assessment of the deterrent effects of the ICC for both 
state and nonstate actors. They argue that the ICC can deter some governments and non-state groups 
that seek legitimacy in the eyes of particular populations. 
Jalloh, Charles Chernor, “The African Union, the Security Council, and the International Criminal Court”, 
in Charles Chernor Jalloh and Ilias Bantekas (eds.) The International Criminal Court and Africa,  Oxford 
University Press (2017). This chapter critically assesses the political and legal relationship between the 
African Union, the International Criminal Court and the United Nations Security Council. 
Jalloh, Charles Chernor (eds.), The Sierra Leone Special Court and its Legacy: the Impact for Africa and 
International Criminal Law ,  Cambridge University Press (2013). The most detailed study of the SCSL to 
date, this is a particularly helpful resource for practitioners developing systems to evaluate the impacts 
of hybrid tribunals, and designing hybrid legacies.
Kaye, David, with Bryan Hance, Manal Hanna, Sunny Hwang, Elisabeth Levin, Grace Lo, Esther Yoo, and 
Xiangyu Zhang, The Council and the Court: Improving Security Council Support of the International Criminal 
Court ,  University of California Irvine, (2013). This comprehensive report explores the relationship be-
tween the International Criminal Court and the United Nations Security Council. 
Kerr, Rachel & Jessica Lincoln, The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Outreach, Legacy and Impact ,  King’s 
College London (2008). Available at: http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/slfinalreport.pdf. This report as-
sesses the impact of the SCSL’s outreach work on the dissemination of norms and values relating to the 
rule of law and rebuilding capacity in the Sierra Leonean judicial system.
Kim, Hunjoon, and Kathryn Sikkink, “Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights prosecutions 
for Transitional Countries”, International Studies Quarterly ,  Vol. 54 (2010): 939-963, available at: https://
www.jstor.org/stable/40931149?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents. This article uses new data on domes-
tic and international human rights prosecutions in 100 transitional countries to understand the link 
between prosecutions for human rights abuses and decreased repression. The authors found a deter-
rence effect, and also examined mechanisms through which deterrence appears to be more likely. 
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Kersten, Mark, “As the Pendulum Swings – The Revival of the Hybrid Tribunal.” In Christensen, Mikkel 
Jarle & Ron Levi (eds.) International Practices of Criminal Justice ,  Routledge (2017): 251-273. This book 
chapter examines the re-emergence of the hybrid tribunal model in international criminal justice and 
assesses the causes of this development, including the apparent limitations of the ICC.
Kersten, Mark, “A Fatal Attraction? The UN Security Council and the Relationship between R2P and the 
International Criminal Court”, in Jeff Handmaker and Karin Arts (eds.) Mobilising International Law for 
‘Global Justice’ ,  Cambridge University Press (2018). With a focus on the case of Libya, this book chapter 
critically examines the relationship between the International Criminal Court, the Responsibility to Pro-
tect, and the United Nations Security Council. 
Kersten, Mark and Angela Mudukuti, “Building Bridges and Reaching Compromise: Constructive engage-
ment in the Africa-ICC relationship”, Wayamo Policy Paper (2018), http://www.wayamo.com/archives/
policy-paper-africa-and-the-icc-building-bridges-and-reaching-compromise/. This policy paper outlines 
the relationship between the ICC and African communities and states, elaborating numerous critiques 
of the Court, and offering possible avenues for reform.  
Kersten, Mark, Justice in Conflict: the Effects of the International Criminal Court’s Interventions on Ending 
Wars and Building Peace ,  Oxford University Press (2016). Justice in Conflict examines the effects of ICC 
efforts in conflict-affected states in terms of building peace and supporting justice processes, and fo-
cuses on the experiences of Libya and Uganda. 
Kotecha, Birju, “The ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor and the Limits of Performance Indicators”, Journal of 
International Criminal Justice ,  Vol. 15 (2017): 543-565, available at: https://academic.oup.com/jicj/arti-
cle-abstract/15/3/543/4061089?redirectedFrom=fulltext. This article assesses and critiques the use of 
performance indicators in the OTP at the ICC, and argues that the indicators used do not measure the 
effectiveness in terms of outcomes within conflict-affected societies. The author provides cautionary 
tales about the use of indicators to prioritise economy and efficiency of prosecutions, possibly at the 
expense of broader justice goals.  
Labuda, Patryk I.,  “ ’Open for Business’: The Special Criminal Court Launches Investigations in the Cen-
tral African Republic”, Blog of the European Journal of International Law (2019), available at: https://
www.ej i l ta lk .org/open-for-business-the-special -cr iminal -court- launches- invest igat ions- in-the-cen-
tral-african-republic/. This post provides an introduction to the SCC and examines its and the prospects 
of accountability in CAR.
Lanegran, Kimberly, “Truth Commissions, Human Rights Trials, and the Politics of Memory”, Comparative 
Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East ,  Vol. 25 (2005): 111-121, available at: https://muse.jhu.
edu/article/185351/pdf. This article examines the efforts in East Timor, South Africa, Rwanda, Sierra Le-
one, and Cambodia to bring justice to individuals and societies that have experienced atrocity crimes. 
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Linton, Suzannah, “Cambodia, East Timor And Sierra Leone: Experiments in International Justice”, 
Criminal Law Forum ,  Vol. 12 (2001): 185–246. Available at: https://www1.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/story_
id/000385.pdf This article examines the enormous challenges caused by problems in design and imple-
mentation at hybrid tribunals, based in large part on a close analysis of the Serious Crimes process in 
East Timor. 
Meisenberg, M. & Stegmiller, I. (eds.) (2016) The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia: As-
sessing Their Contribution to International Criminal Law .  The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press.  This book is a 
comprehensive study of the work and functioning of the ECCC, including an analysis of the jurispru-
dence of the Chambers. Chapters from leading scholars and practitioners examine the establishment 
of the ECCC, subject matter crimes, joint criminal enterprise and procedural aspects such as trying frail 
accused.
Milanovic, Marko, “Establishing the Fact About Mass Atrocities: Accounting for the Failure of the ICTY to 
Persuade Target Audiences”, Georgetown Journal of International Law ,  Vol. 47 (2016), available at: https://
heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/geojintl47&div=42&id=&page=&t=1558652611. 
This article examines why the ICTY was so ineffectual in changing attitudes about the mass atrocities 
committed in the former Yugoslavia. 
National Center for State Courts, The International Framework for Court Excellence ,  2nd Edition, Interna-
tional Consortium on Court Excellence (2013), available at: http://www.courtexcellence.com/~/media/
Microsites/Files/ICCE/The International Framework 2E 2014 V3.ashx. The International Framework for 
Court Excellence develops a framework of values, concepts, and tools by which courts worldwide can 
voluntarily assess and improve the quality of justice and court administration they deliver. 
Naughton, Elena, Committing to Justice for Serious Human Rights Violations: Lessons from Hybrid Tribunals , 
International Center for Transitional Justice (2018), available at: https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/
files/ICTJ_Report_Hybrid_Tribunals.pdf. This substantial report provides a summary of lessons learned 
from hybrid tribunals, and offers suggestions to designers of future transitional justice mechanisms. 
Obara, Brian, “Outreach in the Hissène Habré trial was an exercise in winning hearts and minds”, Justice 
Hub (2017), available at: https://justicehub.org/article/outreach-in-the-hissene-habre-trial-was-an-ex-
ercise-in-winning-hearts-and-minds/. This short article describes the outreach efforts of the EAC, and 
provides insight into what worked in the specific context of the Habre trial. 
Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes  (2014). Available at: 
https://www.icc-cpi. int/iccdocs/otp/otp-policy-paper-on-sexual-and-gender-based-crimes--june-2014.
pdf. This policy paper details the commitments of the ICC OTP to: integrating a gender perspective and 
analysis into all of its work; being innovative in the investigation and prosecution of SGBC; providing 
adequate training for staff; adopting a victim-responsive approach in its work; and paying special at-
tention to staff interaction with victims and witnesses.
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Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTR, Best Practices Manual for the Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual 
Violence Crimes in Post-Conflict Regions: Lessons Learned from the Offi¬ce of the Prosecutor for the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, ICTR  (2014) Available at: http://www.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/
legal-library/140130_prosecution_of_sexual_violence.pdf. This manual draws on the ICTR OTP’s exten-
sive experience in prosecuting sexual violence crimes perpetrated during the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. 
The manual provides lessons learned and practical tips for other prosecutors tasked with investigating 
and prosecuting similar crimes. It includes summaries of key recommendations, checklists, sample 
investigative plans, and outlines of legal elements and modes of liability to help guide future prosecu-
tions.
OHCHR, “Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Maximizing the Legacy of Hybrid Courts,” United 
Nations, New York, USA, HR/PUB/08/2 (2008), available at: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publi-
cations/HybridCourts.pdf. Drawing on the lessons learned from hybrid courts created since 1999, this 
report suggests policies, processes and techniques on the interrelationship between hybrid courts and 
domestic courts to enhance the credibility, effectiveness and impact of hybrid courts on the long-term 
stability and development of domestic justice systems.
Open Society Justice Initiative, Options for Justice: A Handbook for Designing Accountability Mechanisms 
for Grave Crimes ,  Open Society Foundations (2018), available at: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.
org/sites/default/files/options-for-justice-20180918.pdf. Options for Justice is a comprehensive doc-
ument outlining the institutional and legal design of internationalised courts. It provides the reader 
with detailed information on the courts and key questions for the designers of justice mechanisms, and 
outlines some of the strengths and weaknesses of various design choices. 
Open Society Justice Initiative, Political Interference at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cam-
bodia ,  Open Society Institute (2010). This report outlines the commitment to international fair trial 
standards that are included in the Agreement establishing the ECCC, and the protections built into the 
Agreement to prevent political interference. The report includes recommendations to safeguard inde-
pendence at the ECCC and to inform the structure and performance of future international(ised) courts. 
Petit, R, D. Akerson, and M. Warren (eds.), Prosecuting Mass Atrocities: A Compendium of Lessons Learned 
and Suggested Practices from the Offices of the Prosecutors ,  International Association of Prosecutors 
(2014). Available at http://www.iap-association.org/ - (membership required). This manual provides 
practical tips for prosecutors tasked with investigating and prosecuting atrocity crimes. It shares les-
sons learned at the three principal stages of prosecution: investigation, pre-trial and trial, and appeal 
and post-appeal. It also includes summaries of key recommendations, checklists, sample investigative 
plans, and outlines of legal elements and modes of liability to help guide future prosecutions.
Pitcher, Kelly, Judicial Responses to Pre-Trial Procedural Violations in International Criminal Proceedings , 
T.M.C. Asser Press (2018). This book examines judicial responses at the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC to 
violations of procedural standards in the pre-trial phase of criminal proceedings, and offers recommen-
dations for improvement at future international(ised) justice mechanisms. 
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Quinn, Joanna R., “Cultivating Sympathy and Reconciliation: The Importance of Sympathetic Response 
in the Uptake of Transitional Justice”, in Clark, Tom, Ravi de Costa, Sarah Maddison (eds.) The Limits of 
Settler Colonial Reconciliation: Non-Indigenous People and the Responsibility to Engage ,  Springer, (2016): 
119-135. With a focus on the case of Canada and Indigenous peoples, this book chapter argues that, for 
acknowledgement and reconciliation to occur, “thin sympathy” must be developed between communi-
ties affected by atrocity and non-affected populations. 
 
Ribeiro, Sara Ferro and Danaé van der Straten Ponthoz, International Protocol on the Documentation and 
Investigation of Sexual Violence in Conflict: Best Practice on the Documentation of Sexual Violence as a Crime 
or Violation of International Law ,  UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office (2017). The Protocol, produced 
in collaboration with over 200 gender and sexual violence experts, is designed to help strengthen the 
evidence base for bringing perpetrators to justice, thus overcoming one of the key barriers to tackling 
impunity for SGBC. 
Schense, Jennifer and Linda Carter (eds.), Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: The Deterrent Effects of Inter-
national Criminal Tribunals ,  International Nuremberg Principles Academy (2016). This publication seeks 
to fil l  a gap in the international justice field’s understanding of the deterrent effects of hybrids and 
other international justice efforts by gathering new information about where deterrent effects have 
and have not been seen.    
Seils, Paul, Handbook on Complementarity: An Introduction to the Role of National Courts and the ICC in 
Prosecuting International Crimes ,  ICTJ, (2016), available at: https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ_
Handbook_ICC_Complementarity_2016.pdf.  A handbook for practitioners that examines the relation-
ship between the ICC and national court systems by describing how complementarity has been applied 
in various countries (Afghanistan, Colombia, Cote d’Ivoire, DRC, Kenya, and Libya). The handbook is fo-
cused on relationships between national courts and the ICC, but many of the issues covered are equally 
relevant to hybrid/ICC relations.
Sellers, Patricia Viseur, The Prosecution of Sexual Violence in Conflict: The Importance of Human Rights 
as Means of Interpretation ,  OHCHR (2008). Available at: https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document/
the-prosecution-of-sexual-violence-in-conflict-the-importance-of-human-rights-as-means-of-interpre-
tation/ This report examines the law on SGBC that international tribunals and courts have produced. It 
identifies progress made and gaps in the IHL and international criminal regimes. The report argues that 
all international judicial forums must, at a minimum, comply with human rights law and ensure that 
women and girls have equal and discrimination-free access to justice.
Skaar, Elin, Camila Gianella Malca & Trine Eide, After Violence: Transitional Justice, Peace, and Democracy , 
Routledge (2015). This book examines the effects of transitional justice on the development of peace 
and democracy, in particular on four cases: post-authoritarian Uruguay and Peru and post-conflict 
Rwanda and Angola. It identifies specific contextual obstacles and limitations to TJ processes. 
Sluiter, Goran, Hakan Friman, Suzannah Linton, Sergey Vasiliev and Salvatore Zappala (eds.), Interna-
tional Criminal Procedure: Principles and Rules ,  Oxford University Press (2013). This book provides a 
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comprehensive overview of procedural law from international tribunals, and offers recommendations 
for the development of international criminal procedure in the future. 
Squatrito, Theresa, Oran R. Young, and Andreas Follesdal (eds.), The Performance of International Courts 
and Tribunals ,  Cambridge University Press (2018). An edited collection which evaluates the performance 
of international justice projects through a comparative analysis of international courts covering the 
areas of trade, investment, the environment, human rights and criminal law. It offers a range of conclu-
sions on how and why international court performance varies.
Sriram, Chandra Lekha, and Suren Pillay (eds.), Peace vs. Justice? The Dilemmas of Transitional Justice in 
Africa ,  University of KwaZulu-Natal Press and James Currey (2011). This edited book describes a range 
of approaches to accountability and peacebuilding in Africa, and explores not only hybrid courts, but 
also truth commissions and other non-state led initiatives. 
Sriram, Chandra, Globalizing Justice for Mass Atroctities: A Revolution in Accountability ,  Routledge (2005). 
This book examines the phenomenon of “globalising” justice, and its ramifications. It details practices 
of universal jurisdiction and hybrid justice, arguing that the actual and perceived legitimacy of global-
ised justice is threatened by its remoteness from the locus of the crimes. The book also details the 
opportunities for the use of civil penalties, particularly for collective actors such as armed groups or 
corporations, alongside criminal accountability.
Teitel, Ruti, Globalizing Transitional Justice: Contemporary Essays ,  Oxford (2014). This collection of essays 
reflect upon contemporary practices and discourses of transitional justice. Teitel focuses on the ways 
in which transitional justice concepts have found legal expression, especially through human rights law 
and jurisprudence, and international criminal law. She also examines the difficult choices and trade-
offs encountered in the design of transitional justice mechanisms, and the contributions that that can 
make to political change. 
Thoms, Oskar N.T., James Ron & Roland Paris, “State-Level Effects of Transitional Justice: What Do We 
Know?”, International Journal of Transitional Justice ,  Vol. 4 (2010): 329–354. This article reviews schol-
arship on TJ impacts, and concludes that that empirical evidence of positive or negative effects is still 
insufficient to support strong causal claims about the effects of TJ mechanisms. It concludes that more 
systematic and comparative analysis of TJ efforts is needed in order to move from ‘faith-based’ to ‘fact-
based’ discussions of transitional justice impacts.
 
United Nations, “Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” (2015). Avail-
able at: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld/publication. This doc-
ument sets out the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, including Goal 16 on Peace, Justice and Strong 
Institutions. 
United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) and the Association of De-
fence Counsel Practising Before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ADC-IC-
TY), Manual on International Criminal Defence ,  UNICRI (2011). Available at: http://www.icty.org/x/file/
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About/Reports%20and%20Publications/manual_developed_practices/ADC_ICTY_developed_practices_
en.pdf. This Manual is a resource for Defence counsel at international(ised) courts, which cover all as-
pects of the work of the Defence, from developing a Case Theory and Defence Strategy to defence work 
at the Appeals stage and (where relevant) post-conviction.
 
UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Commentary on the Bangalore Principles  (2007). Available at: https://www.
unodc.org/documents/nigeria/publications/Otherpublications/Commentry_on_the_Bangalore_princi-
ples_of_Judicial_Conduct.pdf. The Commentary provides an authoritative guide to the application of 
the Bangalore Principles, explaining the drafting and consultation process and the rationale for the 
values and principles espoused. 
 
United Nations Secretary General, “Guidance Note of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Ap-
proach to Transitional Justice” United Nations (2010). Available at: https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/
TJ_Guidance_Note_March_2010FINAL.pdf This Guidance Note sets out the guiding principles and frame-
work for the United Nations’ approach to transitional justice processes and mechanisms. It outlines key 
components of transitional justice, and ways to strengthen TJ activities. 
 
United Nations & World Bank, Pathways for Peace ,  World Bank Publications (2018). Available at: https://
www.pathwaysforpeace.org/ This report sets out the United Nations’ commitment to and guidelines on 
preventing conflict. Chapter 5 outlines the potential that transitional justice mechanisms are argued to 
have to contribute to conflict prevention.
Van Schaak, Beth, “The Building Blocks of Hybrid Justice”, Denver Journal of International Law and Policy , 
Vol. 44 (2015-2016):169, available at: https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/
denilp44&div=13&id=&page=&t=1559833978. This article analyses international, hybrid, and interna-
tionalised judicial institutions, focusing on elements of institutional design. It develops a taxonomy of 
models and a “menu” of elements that can be mixed and matched as new accountability mechanisms 
are under consideration for historical, current, and emerging atrocity situations. 
Vinjamuri, Leslie, “Deterrence, Democracy, and the Pursuit of International Justice”,  Ethics and In-
ternational Affairs  Vol. 24 (2010): 191-211, available at: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/
ethics-and-international-affairs/art ic le/deterrence-democracy-and-the-pursuit-of- international- jus -
tice/98DA0BB6062AA43121628E0AE929316A. This article examines some of the empirical claims made 
about what hybrid courts can achieve, and offers options for adapting justice strategies to enhance 
effectiveness. 
Wayamo Foundation, “Capacity Building Workshop for the Members of the SCC in the CAR” (2017), 
http://www.wayamo.com/africa-group-for-justice-and-accountability/capacity-building-workshops-for-
the-members-of-the-special-criminal-court-in-the-central-african-republic/. This document describes 
an example of a capacity building exercise between peer practitioners from two hybrids—the EAC and 
SCC. 
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Williams, Sarah, Hybrid and Internationalised Criminal Tribunals: Selected Jurisdictional Issues ,  Hart Pub-
lishing (2012). This major comparative study of hybrid tribunals analyses the factors driving the increas-
ing demand for hybrids, determines the legal and jurisdictional bases of hybrid and internationalised 
tribunals and analyses how these bases affect the operation of the courts. The book examines the 
future role of hybrids, particularly in light of the operation of the ICC and assesses how hybrids fit into 
the frameworks of international criminal law and transitional justice.
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